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From the Editor in Chief

elcome to the Autumn issue of Parameters. This issue consists
of two In Focus commentaries, three forums, and the SRAD
Director’s Corner.

In our first In Focus essay, “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s
Wars,” John Nagl presents a detailed historical analysis of the US military wins
and losses since World War II. He provides a perspective on where past decisions
and doctrines have led to defeat and where they may have succeeded if given
more time or executed differently. In doing so, he outlines lessons learned and
argues victory in American wars means the long-term commitment of US forces
to troubled lands. In our second In Focus essay, “Sino-Russian Relations and
the War in Ukraine,” Zenel Garcia and Kevin Modlin contend Sino-Russian
relations are a narrow partnership centered on accelerating the emergence of a
multipolar order to reduce American hegemony. They show how Beijing and
Moscow converge on this point but diverge in how they define key actors and
interests in this order. They also trace the foundations of this relationship and
highlight how the war in Ukraine has created challenges and opportunities for
China’s strategic interests.
The issue’s first forum, War and Its Effects, features two articles.
In “Deconstructing the Collapse of Afghanistan National Security and Defense
Forces,” Thomas Lynch analyzes the operational liabilities and qualitative
limitations of the Afghanistan National Security and Defense Forces, referencing
statements by US and Afghan political and military officials, data from official
US government reports, and nongovernmental organization field analyses.
In “Linking Trauma to the Prevalence of Civil War,” Erik Goepner shows
that the more trauma endured by a population, the more civil war the country
will experience.
Our second forum, Future Force Development, includes three articles
showing how the military can anticipate personnel management challenges
successfully. In “Assessing the Army’s Cyber Force Structure,” John Fernandes,
Nicolas Starck, Richard Shmel, Charles Suslowicz, Jan Kallberg, and
Todd Arnold assess the Army’s cyber forces and highlight areas military
leadership must address to allow these forces to continue evolving. In “Meeting
the US Military’s Manpower Challenges,” Stefan Borg discusses personnel
issues and provides a scholarly overview of a critical yet understudied issue
facing the US military. In “Professionalizing Special Operations Forces,”
C. Anthony Pfaff argues that Special Operations Forces’ ethical crisis is due to
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the lack of a professional identity and ethic and shows how addressing organizational
issues can enable the group to establish and apply a code of ethics.
The third forum, Historical Studies, marks the 60th anniversary of the
Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. In “The Cuban Missile Crisis: Miscalculation,
Nuclear Risks, and the Human Dimension,” Arthur Cyr revisits the 35-day
confrontation between the United States and Russia to consider how leadership and
related human qualities remain crucial to understanding the perspectives, incentives,
and limitations of our opponents when facing crisis situations like nuclear war.
In the final section, the third installment of the SRAD Director’s Corner,
George Shatzer focuses on North Korea and the Kim family regime. He reviews
Becoming Kim Jong Un: A Former CIA Officer’s Insights into North Korea’s Enigmatic
Young Dictator by Jung H. Pak and Rationality in the North Korean Regime:
Understanding the Kims’ Strategy of Provocation by David W. Shin and shows how
these books might help readers better understand North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-Un,
and the implications of his actions for US foreign and military policy in the region.
The books also provide insights for strategists attempting to plan for security
in East Asia. ~AJE

In Focus

Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars
By John A. Nagl

©2022 John A. Nagl

ABSTRACT: Since achieving victory in World War II, the United States
military has a less-than-enviable combat record in irregular warfare. This
detailed historical analysis provides perspective on where past decisions and
doctrines have led to defeat and where they may have succeeded if given
more time or executed differently. In doing so, it provides lessons for future
Army engagements and argues that until America becomes prof icient
in irregular warfare, our enemies will continue to fight us at the lower levels
of the spectrum of conflict, where they have a good chance of exhausting our
will to fight.

A

Keywords: victory, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, irregular warfare, landpower

s the American war in Vietnam began heating up in 1962,
World War II hero General Douglas MacArthur returned to the
United States Military Academy to receive the Thayer Award and
encourage cadets to win the wars their generation would undoubtedly face. He
exhorted them to do everything in their power to win America’s wars, stating,
“Yours is the profession of arms, the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war
there is no substitute for victory, that if you lose, the Nation will be destroyed, that
the very obsession of your public service must be Duty, Honor, Country.”1
MacArthur did not live to see his exhortation left unheeded. Since winning
“the big one” more than 75 years ago, America’s win-loss record would have landed
any football coach in the hot seat—if it did not get the coach fired midseason.
Desert Storm was a clear military win, and the Korean War ended in a tie with an
armistice, which means it is technically ongoing.
However, Vietnam, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan were not wins in any meaningful sense of the
word. In Vietnam and Afghanistan, America’s exit was ignominious at best.
America’s withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 led to a rapid resurgence of the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria, which took control of nearly a third of the country,
necessitating the return of American forces to expel them from the ground
yielded to them by Iraqi forces. American troops will likely have to remain in
1. General Douglas MacArthur, “Farewell Given to the Corps of Cadets” (speech, West Point, NY,
May 12, 1962, National Center for Public Policy Research (website), https://nationalcenter.org/ncppr/2001/11/04
/general-douglas-macarthurs-farewell-speech-to-west-point-1962/.
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Iraq for the foreseeable future to prevent radical Islamists from toppling the
government as the Taliban did after America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Following America’s premature withdrawal, the Taliban returned to power
in Kabul in August 2021, defeating not just a superpower but the world’s only
remaining superpower, the Soviet Union itself having crumbled as a result of its
misadventures in the Hindu Kush.
The United States can make a credible claim to being the most powerful country
in history, a colossus astride the globe comparable only to the Romans and the
British at the heights of their respective powers. America currently spends more
on defense than the next 10 countries (many of which are its allies) combined,
with nearly 45 percent of global defense spending accruing to the red, white, and
blue. Why, then, has the country so little to show for the blood and treasure it has
invested in its wars since 1945? Why can’t America win its wars?
In particular, why can’t the Army win America’s wars? Korea, Vietnam,
Desert Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF) were all ground wars, with the Army playing a decisive role. Marines, by
their reckoning and by Department of Defense doctrine, fight battles and not wars,
while the Air Force and Navy—both clearly superior to any challengers on the
planet—played a supporting role in each of the wars of the past 75 years, but not
a decisive one. Due to the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, American soldiers
have enjoyed air supremacy since World War II, but even with this advantage, they
still could not win. The result has led Andrew Bacevich, former Army officer and
Boston University professor, to question whether the United States truly has the
greatest military in the world.2
This article argues that for conventional warfare, the US Army is the best in
the world but has consistently failed to plan for and adapt to the challenges of
irregular warfare. The United States is the most capable state-on-state power in
the world when it comes to high-intensity conflict and, indeed, the most powerful
the world has ever seen. Yet, our excellence in this arena has driven our enemies
to search for gaps in our armor. These enemies have found those vulnerabilities
(lower on the spectrum of conflict) in the areas of terrorism, insurgency, and
low-intensity conflict. Their success in these areas over the past 50 years has
provided an unmissable lesson to our enemies, who will continue to fight us where

2. Andrew J. Bacevich, “Do We Truly Have the ‘World’s Greatest’ Military?,” Responsible Statecraft
(website), December 27, 2021, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/12/27/do-we-truly-have-the-worlds
-greatest-military/.
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we are weak rather than strong. We must learn from our mistakes and remedy
them, so America is safe wherever our enemies choose to attack.
American hegemony began in the wake of World War II, with the ascension
of the United States to a power differential unmatched in human history. America
produced nearly half of the world’s gross domestic product and was in sole
possession of the most powerful weapon mankind had ever known—the nuclear
bomb. The Soviet Union, much more badly hurt by World War II than America,
created a buffer zone to protect its western flank, but the Cold War erupted into
conflict on another continent. American forces in South Korea were unprepared for
a North Korean invasion in June 1950. After stemming the North Korean advance
and the operational success of the Inchon landing, a much-larger American force
was unprepared for Chinese intervention when American forces approached
the Yalu River later that year.3 America earned a tie in the first war of its period
of hegemony and learned a global hegemon always has to be prepared for war—
a lesson that continues to animate US forces patrolling the 38th parallel to
this day. The Army can learn and has, but it is better at learning lessons related
to conventional war rather than unconventional war.
The Vietnam War was even more challenging since it was both a conventional
war against the North Vietnamese army supported by China and Russia and
an irregular war against the Viet Cong. Like Korea, the war was conducted in
the shadow of the Cold War, and the balance of power with Russia and China,
supported by the specter of nuclear war, put an upper limit on America’s ability to
escalate. Nonetheless, the United States made gradual progress against both sets
of enemies, leading North Vietnam to roll the dice with the Tet Offensive in 1968.
While the guerrilla uprising was defeated and its impact on the Viet Cong
was costly at the tactical and operational levels, wars are won and lost at the
strategic level. The American people lost faith in an Army and government that
had told them of a light at the end of the Vietnam War tunnel. US President
Lyndon Johnson chose not to run for reelection, contributing to Richard Nixon’s
ascent to the presidency and Creighton Abram’s ascent to command of the war
in Vietnam. Abrams created a much more nuanced “One War” strategy (the
strategy took advantage of the fact that the Viet Cong infrastructure had been
exposed during the Tet Offensive) and prioritized training and equipping the
South Vietnamese Army.4 The policy of withdrawing American ground troops but
supporting the South Vietnamese army with American advisers and air support
was called “Vietnamization.” Heavily supported by American airpower, the
3. T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History, Fiftieth-Anniversary Edition
(Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2001).
4. John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
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South Vietnamese forces turned back the 1972 Easter Offensive. Later, a
congressional decision to withdraw further American support for South Vietnam
in the wake of the Watergate scandal meant South Vietnamese forces had to face
the 1975 North Vietnamese offensive on their own. They crumbled, and America
withdrew in abject failure.
In the wake of the Vietnam War, the US Army turned away from
counterinsurgency to focus on deterring and, if necessary, winning a conventional
war with the Soviet Union in Europe. In a remarkable feat of leadership, vision,
and determination, the Army created an all-volunteer force and reequipped
itself with weapons systems that took advantage of the information revolution.5
The quality of that Army was a contributing factor in the defeat of the Soviet
Union in the Cold War, much accelerated by the Soviet defeat fighting an
insurgency in Afghanistan supported by the Central Intelligence Agency.
While the war in Europe for which the Army had prepared never emerged—in
no small part because of the Army’s deterrent effect—the training and technology
purchased at such great cost were put to the test in 1991 to overturn Saddam
Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. The largest deployment of American troops since
Vietnam demonstrated convincingly America’s ability to defeat conventional
opponents on a battlefield devoid of civilians. It was the Army’s sole clear victory
in the post–World War II period, even if the political result of the military
accomplishment was less clear. Hussein withdrew his defeated forces from Kuwait
but remained in power and a threat to regional stability.
The Army had made the right decision to focus on deterring conventional
war in Europe in the wake of Vietnam; the threat was real, and the Army was
unprepared for conventional war against a near-peer threat after two decades
of conflict in Southeast Asia. However, following the American victory in the
Cold War—a war that reached the threshold of 1,000 casualties per year only
during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts—and the defeat of Saddam Hussein’s
army, the Army struggled to find direction without a clearly identifiable
enemy. As the Army focused on drawing down among proclamations of the
“End of History” and the triumph of capitalism and democracy globally,
troubling conflicts in Bosnia and Somalia presented new challenges to an
Army that was finding its way in what President George H. W. Bush called
“A New World Order.”
His son would face a greater challenge the Army and the nation were
unprepared to handle. After the al-Qaeda attacks on Washington, DC, and
New York on September 11, 2001, the Pentagon had no war plans ready
5. James Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the
American Style of War (Sterling, VA: Potomac Books, 1997).
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for an invasion of Afghanistan when its Taliban rulers refused to hand over
Osama bin Laden for justice. American Special Forces and CIA operatives
supported Afghan Northern Alliance fighters who toppled the Taliban in
an unconventional warfare campaign.The operation, plagued by shortages of
ground-troop strength, contributed to bin Laden’s escape into Pakistan.
America’s attention quickly turned to the next war against Iraq, a country that
had played no role in the September 11 attacks. Saddam Hussein would never have
allowed al-Qaeda into Iraq, and before the American invasion in March 2003,
there was no al-Qaeda presence in the country. Taking advantage of the security
vacuum that followed the American invasion, al-Qaeda created a substantial
presence there.
In addition to a notable shortage of radical Islamists inside Hussein’s Iraq, there
was also a significant shortage of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), though
the apparent presence of these weapons was the proximate cause of America’s
invasion. More concerned about deterring Iran than American concerns about
his weapons stores, Hussein refused to reveal he had essentially ceased all WMD
production in the wake of Desert Storm. This decision would prove fatal to him—
and to thousands of American troops and tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians who
would perish in a war fought on incorrect intelligence.
In an attempt to win global support for the invasion, US Secretary of State
Colin Powell argued before the United Nations that Iraq possessed weapons of
mass destruction, testimony he would later regret. Unsure of the intelligence he
was briefing, he had required CIA Director George Tenet to appear in the camera
frame with him as he testified. The United States invaded Iraq in March 2003
with too few troops to meet its obligation under international law to secure
the country afterward and with no plan to govern the country after toppling
the Hussein regime. A predictable and predicted civil war erupted between the
minority Sunni, who had led the country for many years, and the newly empowered
Shia majority.6
The civil war initially took the form of a Sunni insurgency against the
American occupiers. It evolved to include both Sunni attacks on Shiite civilians
and Shia-led reprisals. As the violence mounted, American commander
General George Casey withdrew American forces from the cities where most
of the killing was taking place. He prepared to draw down American forces at
the direction of US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld until US President

6. W. Andrew Terrill and Conrad C. Crane, Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military
Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003),
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/807/.
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George W. Bush decided to surge American troops under a new commander who
had written a new counterinsurgency strategy.
General David Petraeus oversaw a reduction of violence of two-thirds during
his 18 months in command. Although Iraq is now a troubled and violent
democracy, it is the first democracy in the history of the Arab world. Mistakes in
Iraq have been bipartisan. US President Barack Obama’s premature withdrawal
of American troops in 2011 in fulfillment of a campaign promise provided space
for a resurgent Islamic State in Iraq and Syria that again threatened Baghdad.
A recommitment of American forces (who are likely to remain in Iraq indefinitely)
prevented that disaster. Consequently, there is no way to spin American
involvement in Iraq since 2003 as a victory. While the outcome has been far less
horrific than it could have been, Tom Ricks’s description of the American invasion
as “one of the most profligate actions in the history of American foreign policy” is
an understatement.7
Meanwhile, Iraq absorbed an inordinate share of resources, including the time
and attention of American troops and decisionmakers. Afghanistan became the
forgotten war, with the Taliban regaining strength as Iraq took all the oxygen and
attention the Bush administration could spare. On his election in 2008, Obama
studied the war in Afghanistan exhaustively before deciding upon his own surge
of troops to fight an insurgency there. Unfortunately, in the same speech in
which he committed those forces, Obama also provided the date they would start
to withdraw—a move reinforcing the adage that while the Americans have the
watches, the Taliban has the time to wait them out.8
The Taliban gained strength as US President Donald Trump repeatedly
requested all American troops be withdrawn, ultimately resulting in a plan for a
withdrawal beginning in May 2021. Newly elected US President Joe Biden, who
was never fully supportive of the Afghan surge, chose to delay his predecessor’s
withdrawal decision but not overturn it. The American withdrawal began in
earnest early in summer 2021. Afghan security forces who had grown dependent
on American airpower and logistical support wavered and broke as the withdrawal
accelerated. The horrifying picture of American helicopters evacuating the Kabul
embassy provided the metaphor Biden had tried to avoid when he stated Kabul
would not be another Saigon, as he predicted in July 2021, “There’s going to be

7. Tom E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 3.
8. Matt Zeller, Watches without Time: An American Soldier in Afghanistan (Charlottesville, VA: Just World
Books, 2021). The best book on the American war in Afghanistan is Carter Malkasian, The American War
in Afghanistan: A History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021).
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no circumstance when you’re going to see people being lifted off the roof of an
embassy of the United States from Afghanistan.”
In the same July 8 press conference, Biden promised “I want to make clear
what I made clear to [Afghan President Ashraf ] Ghani: that we are not going to
just walk away and not sustain their ability to maintain that force.”9 Yet, we did
walk away and did not sustain the Afghan’s ability to maintain the force we had so
laboriously built.
This history demonstrates that since America accepted its role as global
hegemon and the readiness requirements global leadership entails, America
can win wars decisively and at relatively low cost (in lives if not in treasure)—
as long as our opponents choose to fight us conventionally. Ricks has observed
the Civil War is the Old Testament and World War II is the New Testament
in the force-on-force contests that constitute the most hallowed parts of the
American military canon.10
When enemy forces confront the United States at a lower point on the
spectrum of conflict, as terrorists or insurgents, they can outlast America’s
patience as a nation. The Cold War demonstrated American democracy
could prevail in a long war—but only if the threat was obvious and existential.
When the stakes are lower and the threat less apparent, American politicians
tend to tire of the conflict, and American strategists struggle to explain why
continued sacrifices of blood and treasure—even at a relatively low level—
are to America’s benefit.
The reluctance of prospective enemies to fight the United States and
her allies conventionally was apparent in the wake of the Cold War and
Operation Desert Storm. Now, with two more irregular warfare failures in
America’s win-loss column, the choice for America’s enemies is crystal clear.
Nonetheless, in the wake of two abject irregular warfare failures, the Pentagon
has again turned to preparation for conventional high-intensity conflict against a
near-peer enemy, designating China as our “pacing threat.”
The Pentagon is correct in this decision; the costs of failure in a conventional
war with China would be enormous and likely result in the end of the
Pax Americana and the enormous benefits flowing from it to the entire globe
(ironically, China perhaps most of all). The weapons systems and capabilities
required to deter and, if necessary, defeat China in a conventional conflict will take
decades to acquire and cannot be “surged” in a short period of time; the Pentagon
is correct to prioritize this conflict. However, strategy is an iterative multiplayer
9. Michael Hirsh, “Is Biden Haunted by Vietnam? Should He Be?,” Foreign Policy (website), July 9, 2021,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/09/is-biden-haunted-by-vietnam-should-he-be/.
10. Discussion with the author circa 2010.
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game; our actions influence those of our adversaries. Our very investment in
these enormously costly conventional capabilities makes it less likely we will ever
use them in conventional combat with China. Our thinking enemies will avoid
our strengths and attack our weaknesses.
Therefore, after two decades of grinding irregular warfare, it is vital that the
Army not make the same mistake it made in the aftermath of the Vietnam War,
swearing America would “never again” engage in protracted irregular warfare.
While American leaders should avoid engaging in wars of choice whenever
possible, doing so only with eyes wide open as to the likely costs and consequences
of war, they cannot forget our enemies get a vote.11 America must learn the lessons
purchased at so high a price in the past 20 years of war and build the capabilities
needed to increase the Army’s effectiveness in this kind of war. In the wake of
Afghanistan and with continued conflict in Iraq, when the Army swears “never
again,” it must mean the United States will never again be as unprepared for
irregular warfare as it was when the towers fell.
America’s ability to win, and to help its allies and partners win, in irregular
warfare is as important in prospective large-scale combat operations as it is in
the wars lower on the spectrum of conflict that have dominated the Pentagon’s
attention for the past two decades. Future adversaries will pursue their aims
through irregular warfare as an element of, or (if the US and her Allies present
a sufficient conventional deterrent) as an alternative to, their conventional
warfighting approach. Improving America’s understanding of and ability to
succeed in irregular warfare is thus central to dealing with the pacing threat of
China and with the urgent threat of Russia, not to mention North Korea with its
massive special forces contingent.
Leaders can learn both military and political lessons from America’s bitter
history of engagement in irregular war over the past 50 years. The military
lessons focus on the unique challenges of counterinsurgency warfare and training
and advising foreign forces. While these tasks are difficult because their success
runs counter to the strategic and organizational culture of the Department of
Defense and the Army, they are both knowable and solvable problems. The
political challenges are more complicated since they involve sustaining public
support for a protracted commitment of American troops to a counterinsurgency
campaign, a task that may be impossible with a conscript army but doable with an
all-professional force. The task is different with an all-volunteer force and is

11. Richard N. Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 2009).
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perhaps even more challenging: sustaining the support of political elites for a
multigenerational troop commitment.
Doctrine for defeating an insurgency is a task the US military has solved many
times. While the Army struggled to come to terms with counterinsurgency in
Vietnam, it produced a sound counterinsurgency doctrine by the end of the war.12
However, in the wake of America’s withdrawal from Vietnam, counterinsurgency
doctrine, education, training, and force structure rapidly diminished as the Army
refocused on the Soviet threat in Europe.13 That choice was understandable in
1975 but became less so after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the military’s
struggles with low-intensity conflict scenarios throughout the 1990s, beginning
with Somalia and extending through the Balkans.
As a result, on September 12, 2001, the Army was not ready for the challenge
it faced. Former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General Jack Keane noted on
the Lehrer NewsHour on April 18, 2006:
We put an Army on the battlefield that I had been a part of
for 37 years. It didn’t have any doctrine, nor was it educated and
trained, to deal with an insurgency. . . . After the Vietnam War, we
purged ourselves of everything that had to do with irregular warfare or
insurgency, because it had to do with how we lost that war. In hindsight,
that was a bad decision.14

Indeed it was, as US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates agreed in a speech to
the Association of the United States Army on October 10, 2007:
In the years following the Vietnam War, the Army relegated
unconventional war to the margins of training, doctrine, and budget
priorities . . . [This] left the service unprepared to deal with the
operations that followed: Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, and more recently
Afghanistan and Iraq—the consequences and costs of which we are still
struggling with today.15

Although the Army was not ready for the wars it was tasked to fight in
this century, it adapted and learned, producing counterinsurgency doctrine
in 2006 and updating it in 2014. The 2006 doctrine focused on protecting the
population as the sine qua non of success in counterinsurgency. It highlighted the
12. US Army, Field Manual 100–20, Internal Defense and Development (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1974). For helpful analysis, see Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and
Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942–1976 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2006).
13. Andrew J. Birtle, “The Counterinsurgency Legacy,” in U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency
Operations Doctrine 1942–1976.
14. Jack Keane, “Lehrer NewsHour,” PBS, April 18, 2006.
15. Robert Gates, “Remarks” (speech, Association of the United States Army Conference, Washington, DC,
October 10, 2007).

16

Parameters 52(3) Autumn 2022

importance of information operations and training host-nation security forces,
a task further elevated in the 2014 doctrine as the key to America’s exit strategy.
Combat operations against identified insurgents and improved governance
to meet the needs of the local population through economic development and
the provision of essential services were all critical. By 2014, however, they were
acknowledged to be subordinate to, and in support of, training and equipping
local forces to take over responsibility for the country’s security, likely assisted
by American advisers and airpower.16
While doctrine increasingly acknowledged host-nation forces as the critical
path to success in counterinsurgency, force structure to implement that doctrine
lagged. The Army struggled to create the combat advisers required to train and
fight with Iraqi and Afghan security forces and used ad hoc training to create
ad hoc adviser units until the activation of the 1st Security Forces Assistance
Brigade in August 2017—more than 15 years into the Afghan War and more
than a decade after analysts began recommending the creation of dedicated
force structure to accomplish this high-priority mission.17 In addition to the
lack of understanding of counterinsurgency leading to a considerable number
of mistakes early in the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, the failure to build
a sufficient dedicated advisory force structure is among the most critical failures
of the military in Iraq and Afghanistan and contributed significantly to American
defeat in the latter war.18 These two strategic failures far override specific
questions about tactical and operational decisions made throughout the two
wars in determining final outcomes.
The military lessons, however, are subordinate to the political questions of
whether to intervene in the first place and whether, when, and how to leave.
Convincingly, Les Gelb and Richard Betts argued that when making the most
important decisions about the Vietnam War, key decisionmakers had the
information they needed and deliberated appropriately; there were simply no
good options available to them.19 No one will make the same argument about
the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Although the decision to intervene in
Afghanistan after the Taliban refused to hand over Osama bin Laden for justice
was justifiable, the war in Iraq overshadowed the Afghan War from the day it
16. US Army, Field Manual 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (Washington DC: Government
Printing Office, 2014), Chapter 7, especially page 7-9.
17. Matt Fontaine, “1st Security Force Assistance Brigade Change of Command” (media advisory, Fort
Benning, GA, July 21, 2019), https://www.benning.army.mil/mcoe/pao/newsreleases/2020/1st%20SFAB%20
Change%20of%20Command%20Media%20Advisory.pdf; John A. Nagl, Institutionalizing Adaptation:
It’s Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps (Center for a New American Security, June 2007),
https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/Nagl_AdvisoryCorp_June07.pdf.
18. John A. Nagl, “In Era of Small Wars, U.S. Army Must Embrace Training Mission,” World Politics
Review (website), February 5, 2013, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12693/in-era-of-small-wars
-u-s-army-must-embrace-training-mission.
19. Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 2016).
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began, stealing much of the attention and many of the resources that likely would
have changed the outcome there.
As important as getting into wars is getting out of them. By 1972, America
had arguably achieved a sustainable situation in Vietnam, with a small force of
several thousand advisers supported by American airpower capable of turning
back a conventional North Vietnamese invasion—North Vietnam’s best option
given the decimation of the Viet Cong during the Tet Offensive. Unfortunately,
events in Washington doomed South Vietnam to a horrific fate. The Watergate
scandal and the subsequent loss of faith in the Nixon administration led to
a congressional cutoff of all funding for additional support to the Army of
the Republic of Vietnam, which collapsed after another North Vietnamese
conventional assault in April 1975, ending what, at the time, was America’s
longest war.
History does not repeat itself, but it rhymes. Obama withdrew American
forces from Iraq in 2011 to fulfill a campaign promise but against the advice of
his secretary of defense, Robert Gates. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria swiftly
rebounded and gained control of a significant portion of Iraqi territory, including
Mosul, necessitating the recommitment of American advisers and airpower
to regain the lost ground. As of this writing, a small force of Americans
remains in Iraq; as long as the advisers endure and have the support of
American airpower, the government is likely to stand. In a remarkable irony,
an Iraq war fought unnecessarily and poorly early on may be perhaps the
best example of successful American counterinsurgency since Vietnam.
Afghanistan could have enjoyed the same fate—a violent and imperfect one,
but better than the starvation and absolute paucity of human rights that now mar
the face of a country to which America devoted thousands of lives, billions of
dollars, and two decades of effort. This abject defeat did not have to happen; as
Rory Stewart notes:
The Taliban were not on the verge of victory; they won because the
United States withdrew, crippled the Afghan air force on its way out,
and left Afghan troops without air support or resupply lines. In other
words, the decision to withdraw was driven not by military necessity, the
interests of the Afghans, or even larger US foreign policy objectives but
by US domestic politics.20

As in Vietnam and Iraq, American counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan
had resulted in the best end state realistically imaginable. It had a government
20. Rory Stewart, “The Last Days of Intervention: Afghanistan and the Delusions of Maximalism,”
Foreign Affairs 100, no. 6 (November/December 2021): 72.
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that, while imperfect, was far preferable to its people than the alternative and
an insurgency that could be managed by a growing host-nation security force
supported by a relatively small and sustainable force of long-term American
advisers. Nonetheless unpersuaded, the effort in the country was worth the
costs it entailed, Trump negotiated, and Biden implemented, an agreement that
gave the Taliban effective control of the country after a premature American
withdrawal. Ironically, by then, America had successfully adopted the policy
then-Vice President Biden had advocated in Afghanistan a decade earlier, with
American advisers and airpower supporting Afghan security forces who bore
the brunt of the fighting and the dying, but to no avail.
In the wake of World War I, America withdrew its forces from Europe and
its weight from the international system and soon found itself embroiled in
another European war even worse than the “War to End All Wars.” Since
victory in World War II, American diplomacy, supported by its military power,
has created the greatest system of alliances and the longest period of peace
and prosperity in history. That success has depended upon the commitment of
American landpower in Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Kuwait, the former
Yugoslavia, Iraq, and dozens of other countries around the globe. Sadly, the list does
not include Vietnam or Afghanistan, places where the long-term commitment
of American soldiers would have been in American interests and supported the
promotion of the democratic and human rights values for which America stands.
American politicians and the US Army would benefit from a deeper
understanding of the fact that victory in American wars requires the long-term
commitment of American forces to troubled lands. If a country is important
enough to fight over, it is important enough to stay there for generations. There
is no substitute for American boots on the ground; while they are not the
definition of victory, without them, there is only defeat, failure, and unimaginable
suffering and loss.

John A. Nagl
Dr. John A. Nagl is an associate professor of warf ighting studies in the
Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the US Army
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ABSTRACT: Claims that China has taken “Russia’s side” in the Ukrainian
War oversimplify Sino-Russian relations. We contend Sino-Russian
relations are a narrow partnership centered on accelerating the emergence
of a multipolar order to reduce American hegemony and illustrate this point
by tracing the discursive and empirical foundations of the relationship using
primary and secondary materials. Furthermore, we highlight how the war has
created challenges and opportunities for China’s other strategic interests, some
at the expense of the United States or Russia.
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Keywords: China, Russia, Ukraine war, strategic partnership, multipolarity

n February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation began an offensive on
Ukrainian territory escalating a war that began eight years earlier
with the annexation of Crimea. This event prompted a more resolute
response by the United States and its partners, resulting in a two-pronged approach
for compelling Russia to withdraw from Ukraine. One approach involved a series
of economic sanctions, and the other involved steadfast support of the Ukrainian
government and armed forces through financial aid and military equipment
assistance.1 However, despite rallying consensus on these key areas among its
European and Asian partners, the United States has fared poorly in galvanizing
support from the Global South.2
More concerning has been Washington’s inability to secure support from
Beijing which has instead opted to amplify Moscow’s talking points rather
than utilize its influence to change Russian President Vladimir Putin’s behavior.
This problem has led US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken to tell his Chinese
counterpart, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, that China should “stand up and make its
voice heard.”3 Blinken has also stated that “China in particular has a responsibility
1. “FACT SHEET: United States and G7 Partners Impose Severe Costs for Putin’s War against Ukraine,” White
House (website), May 8, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/08
/fact-sheet-united-states-and-g7-partners-impose-severe-costs-for-putins-war-against-ukraine/; FACT SHEET:
White House Calls on Congress to Provide Additional Support for Ukraine,” White House (website),
April 28, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/28/fact-sheet-white
-house-calls-on-congress-to-provide-additional-support-for-ukraine/.
2. Heather Ashby and Joseph Sany, “On Ukraine, Africa Needs a Clearer U.S. Message,” United States Institute
of Peace (website), May 17, 2022, https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/05/ukraine-africa-needs-clearer-us
-message.
3. “Secretary Blinken with Jake Tapper of CNN – Interview,” US Department of State (website), March 6, 2022,
https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-on-cnn-state-of-the-union-with-jake-tapper/.
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to use its influence with Putin and to defend the international rules and principles
that it professes to support,” adding he fears “China is moving in the opposite
direction by refusing to condemn this aggression, while seeking to portray itself
as a neutral arbiter.”4 For his part, US President Joe Biden communicated to his
Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, the “implications and consequences” should
China aid Russia in its attacks on Ukrainian cities and civilians.5
These statements illustrate Washington’s growing frustration with Beijing
as the conflict continues to unfold. In the context of the deterioration
of US-Chinese relations in recent years, Beijing’s position is increasingly viewed
as pro-Moscow and a sign of authoritarian unity against the “rules-based”
international order. This view fundamentally oversimplifies Sino-Russian relations
and fails to account for the impact the Ukrainian invasion might have on them.
In light of the current strategic context, we advance two arguments. The first
is that the Sino-Russian relationship is best understood as a limited strategic
partnership aimed at accelerating the emergence of a multipolar order to reduce
American hegemony. It should not be viewed as a deep relationship involving
coordination across the policy spectrum; instead each party perceives it will
benefit from a multipolar order in which the other is a pole. The second is that
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is simultaneously a challenge and an opportunity for
China. Challenges include a potential blow to China’s credibility as a champion
of sovereignty, territorial integrity, noninterference, and the possibility Russia’s
poor performance will leave it unable to act as a pole in the emerging multipolar
order. On the other hand, China has the opportunity to reorient pressure on itself
by providing relief to developing countries impacted by the economic sanctions
leveled by America and its allies. Furthermore, Russia’s isolation due to sanctions
provides China with greater leverage in its bilateral relations.
This article breaks down into three parts to address these points. The first
section focuses on the history of Sino-Russian relations and the emergence of
their strategic partnership aimed at establishing a multipolar order. The second
section focuses on how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is simultaneously a challenge

4. “Secretary Anthony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” US Department of State (website), March 17, 2022,
https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-a-press-availability-16/.
5. “Readout of President Joseph R. Biden Jr. Call with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic
of China,” White House (website), March 18, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room
/ statements-releases/ 2022/ 03/ 18/ readout- of-president- joseph-r- biden-jr- call-with- president-xi-jinping-of-thepeoples-republic-of-china-2/.
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and an opportunity for China by utilizing empirical cases in the Global South.
Lastly, the conclusion outlines the implications of our findings for US interests.

Sino-Russian Relations: Promoting a Multipolar Order
The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance in
1950 gave way to a Sino-Soviet split within a decade. This split exposed the
personality and ideological tensions between Chinese and Soviet leaders and
the historical tensions over unequal treaties involving border demarcation dating
from the nineteenth century.6 These issues resulted in several border clashes that
brought the former allies close to war.7 Consequently, it would take a change
in leadership in both countries for rapprochement to begin in earnest in the early
1980s.8 Then-General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Mikhail Gorbachev’s speech in Vladivostok on July 28, 1986, provided an opening
for the two countries to normalize relations. In his speech, Gorbachev indicated
his willingness to address key Chinese concerns, particularly the reduction of
forces along the Sino-Soviet border and the establishment of concessions on
disputed territory along the border.9 Ultimately, the resumption of negotiations
on these two issues paved the way for closer ties between China and Russia
in the post–Cold War era.
Their relationship, however, is not predicated on deeply shared politics or
economics. Instead, it hinges on how the two countries independently and
jointly want to operate in the international system, which contrasts with how
neither side viewed the other as a legitimate actor after the Sino-Soviet split.
Differences among leaders, images of idealized communism, leadership roles,
perceptions of threat, territorial disputes, and proxy wars contributed to an
unequal partnership and growing separation.10 This separation became more
apparent when the administration of President Richard M. Nixon pressured the
Soviet Union by improving relations with its “chief rival in the communist world,
the People’s Republic of China.”11 About two decades later, with the collapse
of the Soviet Union, the bipolar system shifted to a unipolar one. Within a few
6. See Danhui Li and Yafeng Xia, Mao and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1959–1973: A New History (Lanham, MD:
Lexington Books, 2020); Lorenz M. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton, University Press, 2010); “A Comment on the Statement of the Communist Party of the U.S.A,”
People’s Daily (website), March 8, 1963, 12, www.marx2mao.com/Other/CCP2CPUSA63.pdf.
7. Yang Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American
Rapprochement,” Cold War History 1, no. 1 (2000): 21–52.
8. Sergey Radchenko, Unwanted Visionaries: The Soviet Failure in Asia at the End of the Cold War (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2014), 10–50.
9. See Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, Speech by Mikhail Gorbachev in Vladivostok, July 28, 1986 (Moscow:
Novotsi Press Agency Publishing House, 1986); and Joseph M. Ha, “Gorbachev’s Bold Asian Initiatives:
Vladivostok and Beyond,” Asian Perspective 12, no. 1 (1988): 5–33.
10. Lorenz M. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2010), 349.
11. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy
during the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 292.
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years, their relations improved considerably as the two countries reached landmark
agreements on demilitarizing, demarcating, and delineating their respective
borders. Consequently, despite sharing limited security interests, these gradual
steps provided an avenue for a strategic partnership aimed at accelerating the
emergence of a multipolar international order.
Susan Turner observes that in the early 1990s, China and Russia experienced an
identity crisis as they began articulating their partnership. One area of converging
interest was their mutual support for a multipolar order which became “a joint
cause in many of their statements, declarations, and treaties.”12 This goal was first
encapsulated in the 1997 “Joint Russian-Chinese Declaration about a Multipolar
World and the Formation of a New World Order.” This declaration was followed
by the regional Shanghai Cooperation Organization agreement, where China and
Russia were the senior partners involved in more in-depth multilateral military
exercises than the various eras of the Treaty of Friendship.13
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization regional interactions do not extend
to deep mutual expectations or obligations. Its charter from 2002 referenced the
members’ historical ties and a desire for regional coordination and stability in an
“environment of developing political multipolarity.”14 Their interaction through the
organization increased coordination in the Central Asian region and competition
more generally defined relations where individual states could play Russia and
China against each other.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many diplomatic statements from
China and Russia have broadly stressed support for a multipolar order. For
example, during a visit to China on March 30, 2022, Russian Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov indicated Russia’s actions would clarify the international situation.
Specifically, he claimed that with like-minded partners, the world would “move
towards a multipolar, equitable, and democratic world order.”15 In his response,
Wang Yi stated, “our striving for peace has no limits, our upholding of security
has no limits, our opposition towards hegemony has no limits.”16 The readout of
the meeting highlights the key roles China and Russia play in promoting greater
12. Susan Turner “Russia, China and a Multipolar World Order: The Danger in the Undefined,” Asian
Perspective 33, no. 1 (2009): 159–84.
13. Alexander Marrow and Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber, “Russia, China Extend Friendship and Cooperation
Treaty - Kremlin,” Reuters (website), June 28, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/russia-china-extend
-friendship-cooperation-treaty-kremlin-2021-06-28/.
14. United Nations, Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Saint Petersburg, June 7, 2002), 245,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%202896/Part/volume-2896-I-50517.pdf.
15. “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Opening Remarks during Talks with Foreign Minister of the People’s
Republic of China Wang Yi,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russia Federation (website), March 30, 2022,
https://mid.ru/fr/foreign_policy/news/1807067/?lang=en.
16. “China, Russia Slam ‘Illegal’ International Sanctions Targeting Putin Over Ukraine,” Radio Free Asia
(website), March 30, 2022, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/russia-ukraine-03302022094602.html.
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multipolarity in the international system.17 In other words, the Ukraine war has
not undermined the commitment of both sides to advancing the emergence of
a multipolar order. Indeed, the response by the United States and its partners to
Russia’s aggression has buttressed the Sino-Russian partnership on this issue.
While China and Russia agree on a multipolar international order, they
disagree on who its primary members will be. In Chinese President Xi Jinping’s
conversation with French President Emmanuel Macron in February 2022,
he indicated China believes European strength is conducive to developing
a multipolar world.18 In other words, Chinese officials see the EU as an
important pole in the international system, while Russia views it as a threat.
Although both China and Russia want the EU to move away from the
United States, the Kremlin sees the European block as a security threat, whereas
China considers it a trading partner. Nevertheless, while the composition
of the order is contested, the general outline espoused by China and Russia has
existed for decades, even if the individual characters and characteristics differ.
Chinese and Russian official statements promoting a multipolar order
appear regularly in their respective post–Cold War documents. This consistent
reaffirmation indicates China and Russia organize around the ideas and recognize
that the other does as well. For example, China has historically associated
multipolarity with greater domestic and international autonomy in decision
making.19 Martin A. Smith argues that Russia sees multipolarity as a concept
that evolved from a polemic tool to a unifying policy concept that reinforces
sovereignty. Therefore, emphasizing multipolarity functions is an indirect
critique of the established pole, the United States.20 For both countries, the
approach is about asserting the shared idea that more autonomous decision
making exists under multipolarity.
Over time multipolarity has transformed from a criticism to a desired order. As
articulated by Russia and China, this order primarily operates in the domain of
ideas and argues they contest the ideas developed during the “Unipolar Moment”
with the United States as the sole great power.21 The current emphasis on a
multipolar order does not preclude the possibility of Chinese leaders eventually
seeking their own unipolar moment. However, official narratives and empirical
17. “Wang Yi Hold Talks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the People’s Republic of China, March 30, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202203
/t20220331_10658029.html.
18. “Xi Eyes New Driving Forces for China-France Cooperation,” Xinhua (website), February 25, 2022,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-02/26/c_139767737.htm.
19. Brantly Womack, “Asymmetry Theory and China’s Concept of Multipolarity,” Journal of Contemporary
China 13, no. 39 (2004): 351–66.
20. Martin A. Smith, “Russia and Multipolarity since the End of the Cold War,” East European Politics 29,
no. 1 (2013): 36–51.
21. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs, December 1, 1989, 23, https://www
-foreignaffairs-com.usawc.idm.oclc.org/articles/1990-01-01/unipolar-moment.
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evidence indicate that in the coming decades, their efforts are geared toward
accelerating the emergence of a multipolar order. In their view, a multipolar order
would result in a dominant position for China in the East Asia region and a
key global role in which Beijing has greater capacity to shape international rules
and norms.22
A Future with the Commitment Problem
In the future, can we expect China and Russia to continue reaffirming the idea
of a multipolar world where they have a prominent place at the global leadership
table? While Russia’s political and economic abilities are compromised, how China
develops economically will be just as important a factor in their relationship. As
was the case in recent decades of Sino-Russian relations, there continue to be
bilateral interactions but no ingrained commitments.
In other words, the implications of the war and economic slowdown may make
China and Russia play a closer coordinating role in influencing the international
system because they would recognize the limitations of acting independently.
While policymakers in the United States have understandably been interested
in the Belt and Road Initiative, fewer have focused on China shifting to a
dual-circulation model. The Chinese Communist Party is advancing the goal of
producing goods for domestic and global consumption. This additional influence
of increased domestic consumption in China is responsible for the International
Monetary Fund revising downward the expectations of China’s economic growth.23
Furthermore, while the outcome of the Ukrainian war is unknown, Russia will
likely be in a worse position in the international system. Its future seems to include
less global energy demand and other countries aligned against it, including the
pending membership of Finland and Sweden in NATO.
These are examples where China may capitalize on Russian isolation for access
to resources and as a global financial intermediary. For decades a long-delayed,
but now-online natural gas pipeline between Russia and China appeared to be
mutually beneficial. While neither side has much interest in exchanging in
respective currency or in bartering for goods, it bears watching to see how much
China commits to the project going forward and assists Russia with its financial

22. Alastair Iain Johnston, “China in a World of Orders: Rethinking Compliance and Challenge in Beijing’s
International Relations,” International Security 44, no. 2 (2019): 9–60.
23. “World Economic Outlook April 2022: War Sets Back the Global Recovery,” International Monetary
Fund (website), n.d., https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2022/04/19/world-economic-outlook
-april-2022.
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strain. This commitment will be emblematic of how each side deals with existing
bilateral differences in the face of new challenges.
For China and Russia to become much closer, the reasoning would be in
tension with general arguments in balance-of-power theory. These arguments
emphasize the role major powers play in global affairs because they more often
perceive other powers as threats rather than allies.24 This pair generally accepts a
lot of assumptions about the economy of major and great powers. It seems likely
that in a multipolar relationship, there would be more areas of agreement and
disagreement between China and Russia than there have been in recent decades.
Their opposition to the West will push them closer together within the constraints
of their objectives and generally weaken ties. Simultaneously, they will also seem
to be untrusting of each other to get involved in significant commitments.
The commitment problem influences a range of relations but is acute in the
international system, where states sometimes break agreements and treaties.
Therefore, the general assumptions for how Russia and China operate in the
international order may be stable, but they will plausibly weaken in the face of
efforts to expand commitments. This assumption may lead us to ask what the
bilateral and systemic implications are when states seek to avoid the challenges
inherent in the commitment problem.
Russia and China’s shared outlook on the international order does not indicate
unity of action. Both sides have expressed support for a multilateral order and
criticism of the United States and its partners during the war. China, however,
has routinely called for an end to the war without direct criticizing Russia and
has avoided direct support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In short, the absence
of deep commitments means the resulting words and deeds under a system of
alliance like NATO are different than the conceptual arrangement between Russia
and China. It will not be easy to parse the differences between commitment and
noncommitment because all interactions will involve words and deeds that may
resemble each other. To move toward significant commitment, Russia or China
would incur significant security costs and risks for the other. Currently, they avoid
the commitment problem and its side effects.
The Russo-Ukrainian War: Challenges and Opportunities for China
Russia’s escalation of the conflict in Ukraine has generated challenges and
opportunities for China. Understanding these dynamics is crucial because
they reveal areas of convergence and divergence in Sino-Russian relations and
prevent the simplistic perception that Beijing has effectively sided with Moscow.
24. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, Inc., 1979), 127.
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These dynamics are particularly important given the joint statement released
on February 4, 2022, at the start of the Beijing Winter Olympics, declaring the
friendship between the two states has “no limits,” which implies this alignment
has been solidified.25 Russia’s actions, however, have created problems for China’s
other policy priorities, though evidence suggests Beijing is also strategically
exploiting the crisis for its benefit. In other words, it is less about China taking
sides than it is about China navigating the geopolitical effects of the conflict in
ways that secure its interests.
Challenges
The biggest direct challenge posed by Russian aggression in Ukraine is
to the cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy: the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence.26 Although not always explicitly mentioned, these principles,
embedded in key foreign policy statements by Chinese officials, have been used
to generate international support. For example, Xi Jinping’s 2013 speeches
announcing the Silk Road Economic Belt in Astana, Kazakhstan, and the 21st
Century Maritime Silk Road in Jakarta, Indonesia, highlighted the importance
of sovereignty and noninterference.27 His 2017 United Nations speech outlining
his vision for a “Community of Shared Future for Mankind” also refers to
these principles.28 These principles serve as the basis for presenting China as a
nonhegemonic international actor and also allow Beijing to critique implicitly the
approach of the United States and its partners to foreign policy.29 Furthermore,
they serve as the basis for Chinese solidarity with the Global South.30 Thus, it is in
China’s interest to be seen as a supporter of these principles since they have been
shown to provide policy benefits.
Russia’s aggression in Ukraine exposes the inherent tension between China’s
strategic partnership with Russia, which it sees as necessary in a multipolar
international order, and its image as a protector of sovereignty, territorial integrity,
and non-interference in the face of American hegemony. Consequently, Beijing’s
messaging appears contradictory since it simultaneously voices support for the
25. “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International
Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development,” President of Russia, February 4, 2022,
http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770.
26. These refer to (1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, (2) mutual nonaggression,
(3) noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence.
27. See “Promote Friendship between Our People and Work Together to Build a Bright Future,” Embassy of
the People’s Republic of China in the Kingdom of Belgium (website), September 7, 2013, https://www.fmprc.gov
.cn/ce/cebel/eng/zxxx/t1078088.htm; and “Speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Indonesian Parliament,”
ASEAN-China Centre (website), October 3, 2013, http://www.asean-china-center.org/english/2013
-10/03/c_133062675.htm.
28. “Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind,” Embassy of the People’s Republic
of China in the Republic of Iraq, January 18, 2017, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceiq/eng/zygx/t1432869.htm.
29. Zenel Garcia, China’s Western Frontier and Eurasia: The Politics of State and Region-Building (New York:
Routledge, 2021), 7.
30. Garcia, China’s Western Frontier, 190.
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sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, while amplifying Moscow’s
talking points on NATO and refusing to refer to its actions as an invasion.31 While
this may be interpreted as hypocrisy on Beijing’s part, these statements reveal it is
trying walk a tightrope in the context of the geopolitical crisis Russia’s invasion
has set off. Because Beijing places a lot of weight on Moscow’s role as a pole in
the emerging multipolar order, it cannot situate itself squarely against Moscow in
ways that would seriously damage its ability to play that role.
Furthermore, China shares a long border with Russia, and the latter continues to
play an important security role in Central Asia, which has important implications
for the stability of China’s western frontiers.32 Russia’s assistance in putting down
anti-government protests in Kazakhstan in January 2022 highlights this point.33
The fact that the Russian military has fared poorly in Ukraine only reinforces
the need for China to walk that tightrope. Beijing cannot overtly support Russia
without undercutting China’s reputation as champion of sovereignty and risking
secondary sanctions from the United States. Simultaneously, Beijing cannot
pressure Moscow and undermine its strategic partnership.
Additionally, China relies on Russian strength to secure Central Asia, an area it
has invested heavily in and considers vital to the stability of its interior.34 Another
concern for Beijing is that a weakened Russia, further isolated by China, may
choose to play a destabilizing role along its frontiers—much like the USSR did
at the height of the Sino-Soviet split.35 Beijing is operating in a fundamentally
different strategic environment than Washington.
Opportunities
A United Nations General Assembly vote on March 2, 2022, calling for the
war’s end and the withdrawal of Russian troops, indicated broad support in the
Global South.36 Even in Africa, where the number of abstentions was the highest,
over half the countries voted in favor of ending the conflict.37 Hence, Beijing’s
31. See “State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
People’s Republic of China (website), March 7, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202203
/t20220308_10649559.html; and “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian’s Regular Press Conference,”
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (website), April 11, 2022, https://www.mfa.gov.cn
/eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/202204/t20220411_10666750.html.
32. Jakob Hedenskog, Erika Holmquist, and Johan Norberg, Security in Central Asia: Russian Policy and Military
Posture (Stockholm: FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2019), 1–96, https://foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R
--4756--SE.
33. Nastassia Astrasheuskaya, “Russian Troops to Withdraw, Says Kazakhstan’s President,” Financial Times
(website), January 11, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/d550169b-d50d-4188-86d7-91227810a43d.
34. Garcia, China’s Western Frontier.
35. Garcia, China’s Western Frontier, 53.
36. See “A/RES/ED-11/1Aggression against Ukraine: Resolution/Adopted by the General Assembly,”
United Nations (website), March 2, 2022, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3965290?ln=en; and “Aggression
against Ukraine: Resolution/Adopted by the General Assembly Vote,” United Nations (website), March 2, 2022,
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3959039.
37. “A/RES/ED-11/1.”
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efforts to develop a compelling counternarrative to its perceived support for
Russia proved difficult early on, given the challenge of reconciling the principles
of sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, by late March, Beijing began to
generate a coherent narrative on its position, which allowed it to exploit emerging
opportunities. This narrative focuses on the United States’ reaction to the invasion
rather than the invasion itself and makes three key points aimed at developing
countries in the Global South.
The first area focused on presenting China’s position as “objective and fair, and
on the right side of history.”38 In this context, Beijing’s narrative contends that
its position is balanced and more conducive to promoting a peaceful settlement
of the disputes than the United States and its partners, which are operating in
a “Cold War mentality.”39 As Foreign Minister Wang Yi indicated, “an enduring
solution is to reject the Cold War mentality, refrain from bloc confrontation,
and truly build a balanced, effective and sustainable security architecture for the
region, so that long-term stability and security in the European continent can be
achieved.”40 This framing allows Chinese officials to present the United States and
its partners as the actual impediment to the resolution of the conflict, rather than
its unwillingness to pressure Moscow.
The second component of the narrative builds on the first, critiquing
Washington’s efforts to build a broader coalition of support in the Global South
against Russian aggression. Wang Yi has framed this move as a form of coercion
and argues “all countries have the right to independently decide their external
policies.”41 He contends, “when dealing with complex issues and divergent views,
one should not opt for the simplistic approach of “friend or foe” and “black or
white,” adding that “it is particularly important to resist Cold War mentality.”42
This statement again reorients the focus away from Beijing’s position by casting
the United States as a source of instability. Furthermore, it connects directly to
Beijing’s long-standing narrative on sovereignty and noninterference.
The third and final component of the narrative focuses on the economic effects
of the conflict and the sanctions imposed by the United States and its partners.
In a meeting with African leaders in late March, Wang Yi stated the conflict
in Ukraine was “spilling over to the world,” adding that the “African continent
38. “Wang Yi: China’s Position is Objective and Fair, and on the Right Side of History,” Permanent
Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and Other International
Organizations in Switzerland (website), March 18, 2022, http://geneva.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/zgyw/202203
/t20220320_10653564.htm.
39. “Wang Yi: China’s Position.”
40. “Wang Yi: China’s Position.”
41. “Wang Yi: China and Other Developing Countries have Reasonable Concerns and Similar Positions on the
Current Situation in Europe,” Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office
at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland (website), March 20, 2022, http://geneva.china
-mission.gov.cn/eng/zgyw/202203/t20220320_10653593.htm.
42. “Wang Yi: China and Other Developing Countries.”

In Focus

Garcia and Modlin

31

in particular should not be forgotten and should no longer be marginalized.”43
While these meetings were scheduled before the invasion of Ukraine, Wang Yi
capitalized on the economic uncertainty caused by the conflict among developing
countries to promote the Belt and Road Initiative and other development
programs in the African continent.44 In the process, he cast China as a responsible
actor taking an interest in the economic plight of these countries in the Global
South. Furthermore, Wang Yi argued unilateral sanctions were fracturing
global industrial and supply chains in the context of the ongoing pandemic.45
This fracturing, he claimed, would negatively affect the livelihood of people around
the world “who bear no responsibility for the conflict, but who are effectively
paying for geopolitical conflicts and major-country competition.”46
Beyond expanding its foothold in the Global South, Beijing will reap the
benefits of Moscow’s self-inflicted wounds as it has in the past. For example,
despite the instability the collapse of the Soviet Union caused China, it allowed
Beijing to establish a foothold in Central Asia to secure its western frontier.
Furthermore, Moscow’s interference in the domestic affairs of Central Asia has
prompted these republics to pursue multivector policies, which facilitated Chinese
engagement in the region and allowed it to gain access to hydrocarbon and mineral
resources.47 These actions eventually led to the construction of the Central Asia
Pipeline, which accounts for about 20 percent of China’s gas consumption.48
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 provided another opportunity for
China. The resulting Western sanctions left Moscow with few options except
to turn to Beijing for investment. Consequently, Chinese investments in critical
Russian economic sectors that had stalled due to the latter’s informal barriers were
approved.49 The outcome of the Power of Siberia Pipeline benefited from this delay,
43. “Wang Yi: The More Turbulent the International Situation is, the More Support and Assistance to Africa
Should be Increased,” Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office at
Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland (website), March 20, 2022, http://geneva.china
-mission.gov.cn/eng/zgyw/202203/t20220320_10653589.htm.
44. See “Wang Yi Hold Video Talks with Tanzanian Minister for Foreign Affairs Liberata Mulamula,”
Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and Other
International Organizations in Switzerland (website), March 20, 2022, http://geneva.china-mission.gov.cn
/eng/zgyw/202203/t20220321_10653739.htm; and “Wang Yi Hold Talks with Algerian Foreign Minister
Ramtane Lamamra,” Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office
at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland (website), March 20, 2022, http://ee.china
-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgyw/202203/t20220321_10653737.htm.
45. “Wang Yi: China and Other Developing Countries Have Reasonable Concerns and Similar Positions on
the Current Situation in Europe,” Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations
Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland (website), March 20, 2022, http://geneva
.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/zgyw/202203/t20220320_10653593.htm.
46. “Wang Yi: China and Other Developing Countries.”
47. Garcia, China’s Western Frontier.
48. “Flow of Natural Gas from Central Asia,” China National Petroleum Corporation (website), 2016,
www.cnpc.com.cn/en/FlowofnaturalgasfromCentralAsia/ FlowofnaturalgasfromCentralAsia2.shtml.
49. Alexander Gabuev, “Friends with Benefits? Russian-Chinese Relations after the Ukraine Crisis,”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (website), 2016, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CEIP
_CP278_Gabuev_revised_FINAL.pdf.
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given the crisis allowed China to negotiate a lower price for gas purchases.50 The
sanctions also facilitated China’s involvement in the Yamal liquefied natural gas
(LNG) projects in northern Russia. As a Carnegie Endowment report suggests,
“due to the impact of Western sanctions,” China’s share in the Yamal LNG project
increased to 30 percent.51 This Chinese investment endeavor allowed Russian
resources to commit to liquified natural gas and the pipeline project. When
China capitalizes on Russian isolation and economic challenges, it also faces
financial risks from costly projects. Due to the war in Ukraine, Russia is likely
to become more reliant on Chinese investments. In time, China may face
diminishing returns and the choices it currently faces on Belt and Road
Initiative partnerships.
Facing unprecedented sanctions, Moscow has narrower options than in
2014. Chinese investment may be able to offer some respite; however, many
Chinese firms may be reticent and unable to fill the gap due to the fear of
secondary sanctions. Beijing has been adept at working informal channels for
capitalizing in strategic sectors, as it proved in Iran while it was under sanctions.52
For now, informal channels may not be necessary given Beijing can pursue three
formal options to assist Moscow.
The first option is to continue providing Russia access to the nearly $81 billion
in reserves it has denominated in renminbi (RMB), allowing it to continue
trading with China.53 The second option could involve increasing access to the
existing RMB swap line since most Sino-Russian trade occurs in dollars and
euros. The third tool Beijing could use is giving Moscow access to China’s
Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS). In theory, access to this system
would provide a closed trading loop based on renminbi. These three measures
could allow for trade expansion into investment sectors China has long sought
to increase (such as minerals, agriculture, and water) and provide Russia with
some economic relief. All three options come with significant limitations given
the imbalanced nature of the Sino-Russian bilateral trade, the nascent status
of CIPS and RMB internationalization, and the risk of financial exposure

50. Anastasia Kapetas, “Can China Prop Up Russia’s Failing Economy?” Strategist (website), Australian
Strategic Policy Institute, March 23, 2022, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/can-china-prop-up-russias-failing
-economy//.
51. Vita Spivak and Alexander Gabuev, “The Ice Age: Russia and China’s Energy Cooperation in the Arctic,”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (website), December 31, 2021, https://carnegiemoscow.org
/commentary/86100.
52. Garcia, China’s Western Frontier, 105–6.
53. Logan Wright, Reva Goujon, Jordan Schneider, and Lauren Dudley, “Beijing’s Russia Reckoning,”
Rhodium Group (website), March 4, 2022, https://rhg.com/research/beijings-russia-reckoning/.
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to Russia’s deteriorating economy.54 Despite the potential limitations, it is clear
Beijing stands to benefit from Moscow’s increased isolation.

Conclusion and Implications
The arguments laid out above have important implications for US interests
and policy. Of crucial importance is the need to recognize that the Sino-Russian
relationship is a partnership predicated on a narrow set of interests (specifically,
accelerating the emergence of a multipolar order). China and Russia frame their
efforts as anti-hegemonic and implicitly aimed at eroding US influence. These
efforts are presented as a public good, promoting state sovereignty and therefore
“greater democracy in international relations.”55 Furthermore, Beijing and Moscow
see each other as key poles in a multipolar order. Thus, Beijing is reticent to push
Moscow in ways that undermine its capacity to play the role. This fact is especially
important given the security implications for China’s western frontier. In essence,
the areas of convergence involve an active effort by Beijing to avoid serious
commitments to Moscow beyond the narrow scope of their mutual promotion of
a multipolar order and not to push Moscow into a position that would undermine
its capacity to be a pole in the international system.
Additionally, there are apparent tensions regarding which actors China
and Russia perceive as legitimate poles in a multipolar order. Another point of
contestation is that a multipolar order does not necessarily produce an equal
distribution of power as expected, given the general lack of parity across the
measures of power. An isolated Russia will be in an increasingly asymmetric
relationship with China—a situation Beijing may see as beneficial, but Moscow
would not.
It is also important to understand how Russia’s war in Ukraine has impacted
China and how it has adapted to the effects of the conflict. The initial challenges
Beijing faced have given way to some opportunities. Beijing found its footing
by late March as it began a comprehensive effort to shift the narrative to its
benefit. While its messaging may fall on deaf ears in much of the Global North,
it has found a receptive audience in the Global South. That the United States
has struggled to rally support from the Global South based on a clear example
of Russian aggression against Ukraine indicates its approach to these countries
lacks strategic empathy. In other words, there is a lack of recognition that these
countries are navigating complex strategic environments. For example, while
Washington has been flexible in is approach to Europe’s reliance on Russian
54. See Natasha Turak, “How Much Can—and Will—China Help Russia as Its Economy Crumbles?” CNBC
(website), March 16, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/16/how-much-can-and-will-china-help-russia-as
-its-economy-crumbles.html; and Wright, Goujon, Schneider, and Dudley, “Beijing’s Russia Reckoning.”
55. “Wang Yi Hold Talks.”
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energy, it has not extended this flexibility to developing countries in the Global
South. Conversely, Beijing has recognized and exploited this opening to shift the
narrative in these spaces. Consequently, while these countries may oppose Russian
aggression, China’s narrative allows them greater flexibility in their response.
Overall, US officials need to track and understand the Sino-Russian
relationship in its proper context and its scope and limitations. The partnership
challenges America’s position in the international system, especially in the Global
South, where emerging economies seek political and economic flexibility. However,
the context, scopes, and limitations of the Sino-Russian relations indicate
the United States and its partners can shape this relationship and its systemic
impacts. This indication is especially prescient in the context of Sino-American
relations, which are expected to be the most important bilateral relationship in the
twenty-first century. Assumptions that Beijing has cast its lot with Moscow are
a fundamental misinterpretation of the relationship and lead to erroneous policy
efforts, which can severely impact already-strained Sino-American relations.
As evidence suggests, China has taken its own side rather than siding with Russia.
The implications of these findings for US policy are threefold. The first is that
the Sino-Russian partnership is narrow and exhibits clear signs of a commitment
problem. Thus, there is space for US officials to shape China’s behavior vis-à-vis
Russia, particularly in the context of Ukraine. While Chinese leaders view Russia
as an important pole in the emerging multipolar order, a neighbor with which it
shares a long border, and a country that continues to possess capabilities impacting
Chinese security, Beijing’s primary concern remains political and economic
stability. Fear of secondary sanctions is illustrative of this concern. Furthermore,
despite the deterioration of Sino-American relations, evidence shows the United
States has played a key role in shaping Chinese domestic and foreign policy in
the past decades.56 While US officials are unlikely to reorient Chinese policy
fundamentally to meet their preferences, the narrow scope of the Sino-Russia
relation and the importance Chinese leaders place on stability indicates there is
room for shaping it.
Second, while China gained footing in its narrative on the war, Russia’s act
of aggression raises legitimate questions about its commitment to the principles
of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and noninterference. This situation provides
an important opportunity to shape China’s approach to Ukraine, and more
importantly, to gain the initiative in the Global South, given the key reason the
United States attained its present position in the international system was its
ability to bring its most likely competitors into the fold. Most of these actors
56. Tiffany Barron et al., “Engagement Revisited: Progress Made and Lessons Learned from the U.S.-China
Strategic and Economic Dialogue,” National Committee on American Foreign Policy (website), September 2021,
https://www.ncafp.org/2016/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/NCAFP_China_Engagement_final_Sept-2021.pdf.
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now face relative decline, whereas several actors in the Global South are becoming
increasingly pivotal to the international order. While the United States needs
its current partners and allies to maintain its position, it will need to bring these
emerging powers into the fold.
The third point stems from this need to win over emerging powers. China’s
success is predicated on deep economic engagement and the mobilization of
discursive power in ways that appeal to the countries in the Global South.
Therefore, American officials must understand the currencies in these spaces are
investment and trade coupled with a flexible strategic policy. In other words, they
need to recognize these countries are navigating complex strategic environments
that make clear alignments undesirable. Relying on political binaries and focusing
on security partnerships will likely yield limited returns.
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ABSTRACT: The rapid collapse of Afghan National Defense and Security
Forces (ANDSF) in August 2021 was widely anticipated and due to its
structural constraints and qualitative decline from 2018–21. This article
provides a targeted analysis of ANDSF operational liabilities and qualitative
limitations, referencing often overlooked statements by US and Afghan
political and military officials, data from official US government reports, and
prescient NGO field analyses. The painful ANDSF experience illuminates
several principles that must be considered as US policymakers turn toward
security force assistance for proxy and surrogate military forces in conflict with
the partners of America’s emerging great-power geostrategic competitors—
China and Russia.
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n the year since the abrupt August 2021 collapse of Afghan National
Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and the flight of the Government
of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) of President Ashraf
Ghani, a post-mortem myth has evolved. In the GIRoA narrative, the rapid
vaporization of the Afghan forces from the fight against the Afghan Taliban was
a surprise to the Ghani government, the leadership of the US Embassy in Kabul,
and American military leaders.1 As evidence of this shock, its proponents cite the
often-repeated 2021 public assurances by US political masters and military
commanders that the Afghan defense and security forces would likely not prevail
on their own but forecast that with limited American “over-the-horizon support,”
it might continue to put up a credible fight for another 6 to 12 months.2
This mythology does not withstand scrutiny. The swift demise of the Afghan
National Defense and Security Forces was, in the words of the late US Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, a “knowable known.” In fact, it was a “knowable known.”
1. See Jermaine Mohan, “Afghanistan’s Collapse Was Ashraf Ghani’s Fault,” Chronicle (website),
October 18, 2021, https://chronicle.durhamcollege.ca/2021/10/afghanistans-collapse-was-ashraf-ghanis-fault/;
and Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili, “Afghanistan Collapse Was Not Inevitable,” Slate (website), February 2, 2022,
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2022/02/joe-biden-afghanistan-collapse-not-inevitable.html.
2. See Lara Seligman, “Top General on Afghanistan: ‘I Don’t Think the End Game Is Yet Written’,”
Politico (website), July 21, 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/21/mark-milley-top-general
-afghanistan-taliban-500445; and Statement of General Mark A. Milley, USA, 20th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Department of Defense Afghanistan Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, September 28, 2021,
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/download/milley092821.
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In fact, it actually was a known-known for quite some time before August 2021.3
Since 2018, the ANDSF were never as big as reported nor as cohesive as implied in
public statements. Although pessimistic, American military and intelligence leaders
hedged their assessments of Afghan military viability after a final US withdrawal,
speaking of an inevitable ANDSF demise in terms of months, not weeks. Yet by
the end of 2018 ANDSF leaders and servicemembers understood that without a
reversal of course in Washington, the American-Taliban peace negotiations would
result in the end of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces.4
From its inception, the Afghan military was a “monkey in the middle” of the
geopolitical dynamics between the United States, the Pakistani military and
intelligence services, and the fractious political leadership of Afghanistan. Combined,
these factors seriously constrained the ANDSF, assuring it had quantifiable
shortcomings and qualitative liabilities it could never resolve without continuing
US and Coalition military in-country support. These quantitative shortfalls included
insufficient aerial or artillery support for troops in contact, inadequate aerial resupply
and replenishment for forces far afield, and insufficient maintenance to sustain the
main weapons systems. Each of these shortfalls had been reported publicly for years.
They merely accelerated after 2018.
More critically, the ANDSF had qualitative problems limiting its ability to
conduct credible, autonomous counterinsurgency operations against a determined
and resilient Taliban. Its cohesion was suspect owing to endemic mistrust of the
Afghan central government and systemic corruption in its leadership ranks. Its
morale was questionable, as it routinely suffered high-casualty attacks by Taliban
forces. Other than in its small number of special operations forces, it lacked the
ability to prevent proactively or respond to Taliban attacks without substantive
American support. Moreover, from 2018 through 2021, ANDSF bore the brunt
of Taliban aggression while US and Western militaries enjoyed first an informal
agreement, and later, after the February 2020 US-Taliban Peace Agreement
(Doha Accord), a formal arrangement with the Taliban to stop attacking foreign
military forces only.
The February 2020 US-Taliban Doha Accord framed one final important
dilemma for the ANDSF. The agreement stipulated all US and Western troops must
3. See Craig Whitlock, “The Afghanistan Papers – At War with the Truth,” Washington Post,
December
9,
2019,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers
/afghanistan-war-confidential-documents/; Paul D. Shinkman, “Top U.S. General: Afghan Army Could Not
Survive on Its Own,” U.S. News & World Report, March 25, 2021, https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news
/articles/2021-03-25/top-us-general-afghan-army-could-not-survive-on-its-own; and Anatol Lieven, “Why
Afghan Forces so Quickly Laid Down Their Arms,” Politico (website), August 16, 2021, https://www.politico
.com/news/magazine/2021/08/16/afghanistan-history-taliban-collapse-504977.
4. Douglas London, “CIA’s Former Counterterrorism Chief for the Region: Afghanistan, Not an Intelligence
Failure – Something Much Worse,” Just Security (website), August 18, 2021, https://www.justsecurity.org/77801
/ cias- former- counterterrorism- chief- for- the- region-afghanistan-not-an-intelligence-failure-something-muchworse/.

War and Its Effects

Lynch 39

depart Afghanistan by May 1, 2021, or, and as the Taliban made clear repetitively,
they would renew attacks against United States Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A)
and other foreign forces as “fair game.” This deadline gave the US military and
Coalition forces enormous incentives to move out of Afghanistan rapidly to reduce
“risks to the force.” But this accelerated American military retrograde undercut the
negotiating position of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
(GIRoA) with the Taliban, and, in turn, gave ANDSF mid-level and junior officers
and enlisted servicemembers additional incentives to cut local deals and prepare for
an almost-certain Taliban return to power.
These debilitating quantitative and qualitative dynamics were hiding in plain
sight—known and publicized in open-source media and public testimony. To
establish the record of preconditions and important moments in the ANDSF’s rapid
collapse properly, it is important to reexamine the chronology of what was known
about ANDSF fragility from 2018 on, especially from 2020–21. A focused review
will recount the most important “knowns” about this fragility in three key time
periods: (1) January 2018 to February 2020, (2) March 2020 to April 2021, and,
(3) May to August 2021.
This review highlights several principles American policymakers should consider
in the future; one where Washington may find itself advising or directly supporting
proxy and surrogate military forces undertaking kinetic activities against the proxies
or forces of America’s great-power competitors. The ANDSF’s failure to launch and
spectacular 2021 collapse reflect a larger historic problem for US security assistance
efforts at training, advising, and equipping of allied militaries as an alternative to
large, semipermanent US ground-force commitments.5 American policymakers must
acknowledge this disappointing legacy and approach security-partner assistance in
the new era of great-power competition with humility, forethought, and caution
informed by the heavily foretold, rapid demise of the ANDSF.

Cost Consciousness and Delimited Afghan
National Defense and Security Forces
The ANDSF’s growth parameters and composition were adjusted multiple
times over its 20-year lifespan.6 After fluctuating during the 2000s, by the 2010s,
5. Stephen Biddle, “Building Security Forces & Stabilizing Nations: The Problem of Agency,” Daedalus 146,
no. 4 (Fall 2017): 126–38, https://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/4/126/1831111/daed_a_00464.pdf;
Walter C. Ladwig III, The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships and Counterinsurgency (London:
Cambridge University Press, 2017), 1–52, 289–313; and Stephen Biddle, “Afghanistan’s Legacy: Emerging
Lessons of an Ongoing War,” Washington Quarterly 37, no. 2 (Summer 2014): 73–86, https://doi.org/10.1080/01
63660X.2014.926210.
6. For a short review of sizing machinations, see T. X. Hammes, “Raising and
Mentoring Security Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq,” in Lessons Encountered: Learning from
the Long War, ed., Richard D. Hooker Jr. and Joseph J. Collins (Washington, DC: National Defense University
Press, 2015), 281–304.
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US and Coalition partners decided ANDSF would be structured at 352,000 total
personnel, 195,000 of whom were in the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the
Afghan Air Force (AAF), with the remainder under the Ministry of the Interior
(MOI) as national police and special security forces.7 It is unlikely ANDSF ever
met these totals as reporting was notoriously suspect and the ability of US and
Coalition advisers to monitor them atrophied consistently after 2014 as ANDSF
took the counterinsurgency lead and Coalition mentors stepped back from side-byside advising.8 Washington and its partners limited the AAF to a small number of
aerial platforms with light, counterinsurgency-focused fixed-wing and ground-strike
helicopters and a limited number of lift aircraft for reliable countrywide mobility
for an ANA of almost 200,000 (see table 1). Likewise, the Afghan army would
have limited indirect-fire weapons capability and be structured without long-range
artillery or drone-strike assets.
The ANA was built to rely on US and Coalition support for its main
battlefield competitive advantages against the Taliban insurgency: generation
of airspace superiority, long-haul aerial logistics and mobility, and volume in
air-to-ground interdiction strikes.

7. Department of Defense (DoD), Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress
(Washington, DC: DoD, December 2017), 35–36, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/1225
-Report-Dec-2017.pdf.
8. “Transcripts: Department of Defense Press Briefing by Gen. Campbell via Satellite in the Pentagon Briefing
Room,” DoD (website), October 2, 2014; and SIGAR, “Oversight Bubble Inquiry Letter,” SIGAR 14-4-SP,
October 10, 2013.
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Table 1. March 2020 Authorized and Available Aircraft for Afghanistan Air Force
(Entries with an asterisk are very light, small aircraft that would prove no match for the standard aircraft found in the
Pakistani air force. These aircraft dominated the composition of the Afghanistan Air Force.)

Military Function

Aircraft Name

# Authorized # Available

Air-to-Air Fixed Wing Fighters

0

0

Air-to-Ground Strike and
Reconnaissance/
Strike Category Totals

105

89

A29 (Super Toucan)*

25

15

AC-208*

10

10

MD-530*

48

45

Mi-17

22

19

72

65

C-208*

23

23

C-130

4

2

UH-60

45

40

Fixed Wing

Rotary Wing

Aerial Transport/
Lift Category Totals
Fixed Wing
Rotary Wing

These military hardware parameter limitations and force number vacillations
emerged because of American and partner-state concerns about the costs and
sustainment potential for an autonomous Afghan security force. A bigger
AAF or a more capable ground force would cost more to recruit, train, retain,
and operate with higher-end technologies.9 Thus, the United States preferred
utilizing its own in-country military assets for these higher-end capabilities, thereby
capping the costs to US taxpayers at about $4 billion.10
Another critical regional security dynamic helped scope these ANDSF
limitations: Pakistan’s wary military and intelligence organizations. Pakistan never
wanted strong, capable, autonomous ANDSF for several strategic reasons. First,
Pakistan fundamentally distrusted the non-Pashtun ethnic groups in the north
and west of Afghanistan, particularly the Tajiks and the Uzbeks. Pakistani security
leaders viewed them as hostile to Pakistan and pointed to recent history for

9. Department of Defense (DoD), Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to
Congress (Washington, DC: DoD, October 2013, 48, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs
/October_1230_Report_Master_Nov7.pdf.
10. See Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, Congressional
Research Service (CRS) Report RL30588 (Washington, DC: CRS, December 13, 2017), 27–28,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30588/278.
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justification.11 During the Afghan civil war of the 1990s, these Tajik and Uzbek
groups not only battled against Pashtun groups favored by the Pakistani InterService Intelligence Agency, but often took funding and physical support from
Russia, Iran and, most critically, India. In 1994, Pakistan supported the Afghan
Taliban in opposing these groups and was alarmed when post-2001 Afghan
governments routinely featured Tajik and Uzbek strongmen as leaders of the
ANDSF and the Afghan national intelligence services.12
Second, Pakistan feared Indian subterfuge and access to Pakistan’s “back door”
in the post-2001 Afghan government and especially in the ANDSF.13 India is
Pakistan’s biggest security concern and is described in Pakistan as an existential
threat. Pakistan’s chilly relations with the Tajik and Uzbek groups who habitually led
the ANDSF (and Afghan intelligence service, the National Directorate of Security)
made them paranoid that the ANDSF and National Directorate of Security would
abet Indian diplomatic and intelligence assets at or near the Pakistani border.14 These
fears underpinned Pakistan’s constant complaining from 2004–15 that Afghanistan
was riven with over a dozen Indian consulates, many close to Pakistan, and
threatening to destabilize Pakistan through various means of cross-border influence.
In reality, there never were more than five of these Indian outposts, including
the Indian embassy in Kabul.15 Informed by these concerns, Pakistan’s security
establishment continued its indirect support for the Afghan Taliban, preferring a
low-boil instability inside Afghanistan to a strong, non-Pashtun, ANDSF doing
India’s bidding and putting a “security squeeze” on Pakistan from the west.16
Concurrently, Pakistan quietly preferred the US military remain affiliated with
the Afghan military while the Taliban was weak for three main reasons: because
Rawalpindi officials distrusted the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan as a stalking horse for India; because American presence there anchored
a counterterrorism partnership that reaped a large financial-aid package for the
Pakistani military; and because American military commanders served as a kind of
11. Raja Karthikeya Gundu and Teresita C. Schaffer, “India and Pakistan in Afghanistan: Hostile Sports,”
South Asia Monitor 117 (April 3, 2008), https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-asia-monitor-india-and-pakistan
-afghanistan-hostile-sports-april-03-2008.
12. Rizwan Hussein, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan (Burlington, VT: Ashgate
Press, 2005), 55–62; and Nasreen Akhtar, “Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Taliban,” International Journal on World
Peace 25, no. 4 (December 2008): 49–73, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20752859?seq=19#metadata_info_tab
_contents.
13. Larry Hanauer and Peter Chalk, India’s and Pakistan’s Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United
States and the Region, RAND Occasional Paper 387 (Santa Monica: CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), 1–3, 25–36,
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP387.pdf; and Gundu and
Schaffer, “India and Pakistan in Afghanistan.”
14. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Oxford, UK: Pan Books,
2000), 17–35.
15. Steve Coll, Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (New York: Penguin
Press, 2018), 267–70.
16. Seth G. Jones, “Afghanistan’s Future Emirate? The Taliban and the Struggle for Afghanistan,” CTC Sentinel
13, no. 11 (West Point, New York: Countering Terrorism Center, November 2020), https://ctc.usma.edu/wp
-content/uploads/2020/11/CTC-SENTINEL-112020.pdf; and Hanauer and Chalk, Strategies in Afghanistan.
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big-brother overseer and a node for the Pakistani military (PakMIL) and its InterServices Intelligence Agency to push back against ANDSF activities or associations
(especially with India) that Islamabad found threatening. To be certain, American
military presence in Afghanistan was bothersome for Pakistan in many other ways,
but Rawalpindi balanced these with the benefits a US footprint there provided.17
Thus, the AAF would have a limited quantity and quality of air-to-ground strike
aircraft. The AAF would have a limited number of airlifter planes with a capacity
limited to battling insurgent forces rather than a cross-border rival state. The
ANDSF had a limited number of ground artillery assets, and those were constrained
in firing range—again, so they would not be able to range far into Pakistani territory
in the event of major cross-border insurgency hostilities. The United States would
provide all these capabilities and more.18
From birth, ANDSF was a “monkey in the middle” caught between US/Coalition
concerns about affordability and sustainability and Pakistani worries about a strong
force on its border with autonomous security aims and suspect relations with India.

Mixed Loyalty
ANDSF uniformed and civilian leadership was normally ethnic Tajiks or Uzbeks,
and it struggled to recruit Pashtuns throughout the 2000s but attained proportionality
in the 2010s.19 While desirable, Pashtun proportionality in the Afghan armed forces
represented both a strength and a weakness. Pashtun representation was important
optically and politically for a Pashtun-led government. Pashtun proportionality in
the middle-to-lower ANDSF ranks enabled the government to present its forces
as representative of the nation. Additionally, proportional ethnic representation
ensured the Pashtun-led national government met the expectations of its political

17. See Moeed Yusuf, Huma Yusuf and Salman Zaidi, Pakistan, the United States and the End Game in
Afghanistan: Perceptions of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Elite (Islamabad: Jinnah Institute - R0811-04, 2011), 14–15,
21–28, 28; John Schmidt, The Unraveling: Pakistan in the Age of Jihad (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011),
198–202; and Jibran Ahmad, “Afghan Taliban Stop Pakistan Army from Fencing International Border,” Reuters
(website), December 22, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/afghan-taliban-stop-pakistan-army
-fencing-international-border-2021-12-22/.
18. See SIGAR, High-Risk List (Arlington, VA: SIGAR, December 2014), 1, www.sigar.mil/pdf/spotlight
/High-Risk_List.pdf.
19. DoD, Report on Progress, 38; and Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghan National Security Forces: Afghan
Corruption and the Development of an Effective Fighting Force,” Testimony before the House
Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Oversights and Investigations, Brookings (website),
August 2, 2012, https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/afghan-national-security-forces-afghan-corruption
-and-the-development-of-an-effective-fighting-force/.
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base. Given that the Afghan Taliban was mainly a Pashtun insurgency, equal ethnic
representation was a political and military necessity.

Figure 2. Major ethnic groups of Afghanistan
(Map courtesy of https://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/Reading/Maps/afghan.map.htm)

Pashtun representation in the Afghan military also generated weakness.
Unlike the northern Afghan ethnic groups, Pashtun tribes and subtribes
span the soft, highly porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. There
are approximately 14 million Pashtuns in Afghanistan, and they make up
42 percent of its population. As no other Afghan ethnicity comprises more than
27 percent of the population, Pashtuns hold the political power to assure national
leadership. There are another 30 million ethnic Pashtuns in Pakistan. They are 16
percent of the Pakistani population but make up 66 percent of all regional Pashtuns.
Therefore, Pashtun tribes and families in Afghanistan must always consider crossborder political and security issues. Since the Afghan Taliban is comprised of
ethnic Pashtun subtribes and subgroups, Afghan Pashtuns hedged their bets in the
post-2001 era. True across Afghanistan but especially in the Pashtun-dominated
east and southeast, kinship and tribal connections often take precedence over
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formal political loyalties.20 Thus, it was common for Afghan Pashtun families to
have one son in the Afghan military and another in the Taliban.21 One son made
the family money with a regular government paycheck, and the other assured the
family with a hedge against insurgent success.
By 2015, serious Afghan observers knew Pashtun families were negotiating
with the Taliban in anticipation of ANDSF’s ultimate failure. Early that year,
the United States and NATO ended their leadership of the counterinsurgency
combat mission in Afghanistan and shifted to training assistance, advising
the ANDSF at-distance. Soon afterward, al-Qaeda training sites appeared in
southern Afghanistan, where the Taliban had begun to push back the ANDSF
in 2015. Alarmed, the Obama administration arrested its withdrawal plans and
took steps to allow US and NATO forces to support the ANDSF.22 Then, the
Trump administration review of Afghan policy authorized a mid-2017 mini-surge
of US forces in yet another American effort to show strength against the resurgent
Afghan Taliban. The Trump surge featured additional US military advisers in new
Security Force Assistance Brigades for placement into ANDSF lower echelons
and were considered critical to the campaign’s success.23 Arriving in early 2018,
they conducted advising missions, facilitated operation planning with selected
ANA Brigades and even some Kandaks (battalions) fighting the Taliban for the
first time since 2014.

Taliban Violence Reduction against the United States,
Not Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
June 2018 to February 2020
The Trump surge and renewed connectivity between US/NATO military
units and tactical ANDSF formations was short-lived. By summer 2018, the
Trump administration announced it was pursuing direct peace negotiations
with the Afghan Taliban, formally appointing Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad
as a Special Representative for Afghan Reconciliation (SRAR) by the fall.
SRAR Khalilzad acquired presidential authority to negotiate directly with
Taliban representatives, mainly in Doha, Qatar, while keeping the Afghan
government informed but not formally represented. From this point, the
20. Anatol Lieven, “An Afghan Tragedy: The Pashtuns, the Taliban and the State,” Survival 63, no. 3
(June–July 2021): 7–31, https://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/2021/survival-global-politics-and-strategy
-june-july-2021; and Lieven, “Why Afghan Forces.”
21. General Abdul Fahim Wardak, then-Afghan Minister of Defense, comment to author (Kabul, Afghanistan,
December 2009).
22. Thomas F. Lynch III, “After ISIS: Reappraising U.S. Policy in Afghanistan,” Washington Quarterly,
38, no. 2 (July 2015): 119–44.
23. Ryan Browne and Barbara Starr, “US Military Says It Killed Dozens of Taliban Leaders in Afghanistan,”
CNN (website), May 30, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/30/politics/us-killed-taliban-leaders-afghanistan
/index.html.
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Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan felt it was being sidelined
and its future negotiated in absentia.
Sensing the prospect for a favorable outcome, or at least a respite from an
exceptionally violent period of the insurgency, Afghan Taliban targeting of
US/western military forces tailed off notably.24 Fifteen American and allied
forces were killed in Afghanistan in 2017, with eight of those deaths linked to
attacks by the Afghan Taliban. In 2018, there were 14 US/allied troop deaths,
and none were claimed by the Taliban. The pattern continued with almost all
US 2019–20 military deaths coming from counterterrorism operations initiated by
the US and Afghan forces against groups affiliated with al-Qaeda, the Pakistani
Taliban in Afghanistan, or the Islamic State in Khorasan (ISIS-K).25 Over the
same period, ANDSF deaths from Taliban attacks and battles soared, moving
beyond 8,000 per year in 2017–18 andup to an estimated 10,900 per year in 2019
and 2020.26 Afghan President Ashraf Ghani reported in early 2019 that more than
45,000 members of the ANDSF had been killed since he became leader in 2014.27
The ANDSF quandary came into full relief as formal US-Taliban
peace talks commenced in January 2019.28 The ANDSF bore the brunt
of the Taliban fight on the ground without sufficient critical military
capabilities to counter Taliban strength, and it
now had the full
knowledge that the Taliban appeared to have limited attacks against
the American and Western military forces informally to encourage talks designed

24. Jonathan Beale, “Why Are UK and US Sending More Troops to Afghanistan?” BBC News (website),
August 13, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44967531.
25. Compiled from “Number of Fatalities among Western Coalition Soldiers Involved in the Execution of
Operation Enduring Freedom from 2001 to 2021,” Statista (website), https://www.statista.com/statistics/262894
/western-coalition-soldiers-killed-in-afghanistan/; Bureau of Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on Terrorism
2020: Afghanistan,” Department of State (website), n.d., https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on
-terrorism-2020/afghanistan/; Bureau of Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2019:
Afghanistan,” Department of State (website), n.d., https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on
-terrorism-2019/afghanistan/; DoD, Stability and Security in Afghanistan, Reports to Congress (Washington,
DC: DoD, December 2017, December 2018, December 2019, December 2020, and December 2021);
and Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), January 20, 2017 Quarterly
Report to US Congress, January 20, 2018 Quarterly Report to US Congress, January 20, 2019 Quarterly Report to
US Congress, January 20, 2020 Quarterly Report to US Congress, and January 20, 2021 Quarterly Report to
US Congress, SIGAR (website), n.d., https://www.sigar.mil/quarterlyreports/.
26. Sam Gollob and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstructionand Security
in Post-9/11 Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2020), 17, https://www.brookings.edu
/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/FP_20200825_afganistan_index.pdf.
27. “Afghanistan’s Ghani Says 45,000 Security Personnel Killed Since 2014,” BBC News (website),
January 25, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47005558.
28. Steve Coll and Adam Entous, “The Secret History of the U.S. Diplomatic Failure in Afghanistan,”
New Yorker (website), December 10, 2021, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/12/20/the-secret
-history-of-the-us-diplomatic-failure-in-afghanistan.

War and Its Effects

Lynch 47

to end Western military presence. This knowledge exacerbated ANDSF anxieties
and reinforced local-level hedging behavior.

The Doha Accord and Extreme ANDSF Exposure
March 2020 to April 2021
On February 29, 2020, SRAR Khalilzad and Afghan Taliban representative
Abdul Ghani Baradar signed the US-Taliban Peace Accord in Doha,
Qatar. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was not
a signatory and had played no direct role in its negotiation over the prior
16 months. The agreement committed the United States and Coalition partners to
“complete” military withdrawal from Afghanistan in 15 months—by May 1, 2021. In
return, the Taliban promised three major outcomes. First, it committed to preventing
al-Qaeda or similar international Salafi jihadist terror organizations from planning
or conducting attacks against the United States or its allies from Afghan soil.
It made a formal promise to refrain from attacks against US and Coalition forces
during the implementation period and committed to a reduction in violence
(RIV) for Afghanistan as a whole. The Taliban, however, did not formally
promise to refrain from attacking GIRoA or ANDSF targets.29 It also agreed
to commence political talks with the Government of the Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan aimed at reconciliation and a new framework for Afghan
governance—inter-Afghan negotiations (IAN).30
Absent a total collapse of the peace agreement, the best outcome for the
ANDSF would be one where inter-Afghan negotiations were successful, and there
would be some combination of ANDSF and Taliban military assets. Ultimately,
this outcome would require a process of disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration (DDR). Historically, the pathway to DDR between government and
insurgent forces is vexing. While there are incentives for opposing military forces
to reduce violence and save combatant lives, there are also competing incentives
for them to maximize political negotiating leverage by conducting aggressive
military operations aimed at altering “facts on the ground.” Often, a cease-fire
agreement is built into a political negotiating period to dampen the incentives for
military aggression.31 When a viable cease-fire is not feasible or enforceable, the
29. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”
30. “Joint Declaration between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America for Bringing
Peace to Afghanistan,” February 29, 2020, 1, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/02.29.20-US
-Afghanistan-Joint-Declaration.pdf. (The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is not recognized by the United
States as a state and is known as the Taliban.); and Michael R. Pompeo, “Secretary Pompeo Remarks to
Media,” US Department of State (website), February 25, 2020, video, 18:35, site-894736.bcvp0rtal.com/detail
/videos/secretary-of-state/video/6135770177001/secretary-pompeo-remarks-to-media.?autoStart=true.
31. Valerie Sticher and Siniša Vuković, “Bargaining in Intrastate Conflicts: The Shifting Role of Ceasefires,”
Journal of Peace Research 1, no. 1 (May 2021): https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022343320982658;
Coll and Entous, “Secret History”; and SIGAR, April 30, 2020 Quarterly Report to US Congress, SIGAR (website),
n.d., https://www.sigar.mil/quarterlyreports/.
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force with the upper hand will normally fight to secure gains that will enhance its
negotiating leverage. Since the terms of the Doha Accord allowed the Taliban to
continue fighting against the ANDSF and GIRoA throughout the IAN period,
they continued to press their martial advantage.
The worst scenario for ANDSF was one where the United States stuck to its
withdrawal plans, IAN was not successful, and the Taliban took advantage of
US/Coalition withdrawal of forces to attrit the ANDSF badly. Details of the
reduction in violence (RIV) component in the US-Taliban Peace Accord were
relegated to a classified annex but appeared to inhibit, but not credibly prohibit,
the Taliban from pursuing this course of action.
After the February Doha Agreement signing ceremony, US Secretary of State
Michael Pompeo stated the level of Taliban attacks and violence were expected
to remain low.32 But by late April 2020, General Austin “Scott” Miller, US Forces
Afghanistan and Operation Resolute Support commander, reported that from
March 1 to 31, “the Taliban refrained from attacks against Coalition Forces,
[while] they increased attacks against ANDSF to levels above seasonal norms.”33
Taliban military activities during spring and summer 2020 were unambiguously
aggressive, but in a differentiated manner. An independent fall 2020 assessment
reported Taliban-controlled areas experienced unexpected peace in the aftermath
of Doha as the United States largely halted air attacks and the ANDSF
moved to a defensive posture. But in GIRoA-controlled areas, the Taliban
intensified violence against government entities and Afghan civilians even as it
limited major attacks.34
A key part of the Doha Accord not made public called on US forces to end
offensive air strikes against the Taliban while allowing for strikes in defense of
the ANDSF.35After a post–Doha Agreement lull, American military air strikes
to protect ANDSF resumed in summer 2020. The Taliban formally protested all
American strikes that supported ANDSF, calling them a violation of the Doha

32. Michael R. Pompeo, “Secretary Michael R. Pompeo at a Press Availability after the Afghanistan
Signing Ceremony: Remarks to the Press,” Department of State (website), February 29, 2020, https://2017-2021
.state.gov/at-a-press-availability-after-the-afghanistan-signing-ceremony/index.html.
33. SIGAR, April 30, 2020 Quarterly Report,” 62, 65.
34. Andrew Quilty, “Taleban Opportunism and ANSF Frustration: How the Afghan Conflict Has Changed
Since the Doha Agreement,” Afghan Analysts Network (website), October 12, 2020, https://www.afghanistananalysts.org /en /reports/war-and-peace/taleban-opportunism-and-ansf-frustration-how-the-afghan-conflict-has
-changed-since-the-doha-agreement/.
35. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”
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Accord’s annex on managing combat. Later in 2020, the Taliban used US air
activity to justify their intensifying military campaign against Kabul.36
The prisoner exchange component of the Doha Accord partially enabled
surging Talban military activity and acumen. Despite GIRoA skepticism,
the final Doha Accord called for the confidence-building exchange of “up to”
5,000 Taliban prisoners held in Afghan jails in exchange for 1,000 Afghans
held by the Taliban. The Taliban quickly insisted release of a full 5,000
was a precondition to commencing peace talks with the GIRoA.37 Under
American pressure, Afghan leaders released about 4,600 Taliban prisoners in
spring 2020 and the final 400 in August 2020 after a period of inter-Afghan,
and Afghan-American debate. An independent research report in late summer
2020 estimated almost 70 percent of the 108 released Taliban resumed active
fighting roles, returning important battlefield expertise to intensifying Taliban
military operations.38
ANDSF morale took a direct hit from the way Taliban leaders spoke
and acted after the Doha Accord. Tolo News reported that on March 25 in
Balochistan Province, Pakistan, a senior Taliban negotiator, Mullah Fazel, told
supporters the Taliban would ultimately be victorious in establishing an Islamic
Emirate. Fazel reportedly said that while the “Taliban or the Islamic Emirate
will never become part of the Kabul [Afghan] government,” the Taliban might
accept Afghan government officials with senior positions.39 US Agency for
International Development (USAID)–funded monitoring of Taliban public
communications found the Taliban’s tone resoundingly triumphant during
April and May 2020 following the announced withdrawal of US military forces,
clearly indicating to Afghan forces the future government of Afghanistan
would be subject to Taliban preferences and potential vengeance.40 The
one-sided pattern of Taliban aggression persisted into mid-October 2020
when USFOR-A Commander General Miller again stated that the high

36. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”
37. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”
38. Lynne O’Donnell, “Defying Peace Deal, Freed Taliban Return to Battlefield,” Foreign Policy (website),
September 3, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/03/defying-peace-deal-freed-taliban-prisoners-return
-battlefield-afghanistan/; France 24, “Some Freed Taliban Prisoners Have Returned to Battle, Says Afghan
Negotiator,” France24.com (website), September 23, 2020, https://www.france24.com/en/20200923-afghanistan
-freed-taliban-prisoners-return-battle-abdullah-abdullah-doha-peace-talks.
39. Abubakar Siddique, “Are the Taliban Committed to Negotiating Peace in Afghanistan?” Gandhara
(website), March 31, 2020, https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/are-the-taliban-committed-to-negotiating-peace-in
-afghanistan-/30520521.html.
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level of Taliban violence around the country “is not consistent with the
US-Taliban agreement and undermines the ongoing Afghan peace talks.”41
The disposition and orientation of ANDSF forces contributed to its
vulnerability in the post–Doha Accord fight. In November 2019, the Afghan
government estimated that the ANDSF had over 10,000 checkpoints nationwide,
with an average of 10 to 20 personnel at each. After the Doha Accord, as
Coalition forces stepped back from advising and assisting ANA forward elements,
they helped the ANA with a checkpoint reduction and base development plan
(CPRBD) for 2021 that reportedly reduced ANA checkpoints to just under 2,000
with another 600 patrol bases across Afghanistan.42 It still meant the ANDSF had
approximately one-third of its total force, 95,000 personnel, manning checkpoints
as of December 2020.43
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces checkpoint-heavy positioning
contributed to a largely static and defensive mission profile even as GIRoA political
leadership belatedly called for greater assertiveness against the resurgent Taliban
in 2020. Most ANA Corps reportedly refused to execute missions without ANA
Special Operations Command (ANASOC) augmentation. When ANASOC
Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) arrived, they were just as likely to be
misused to perform tasks intended for conventional forces such as route clearance,
checkpoint security, and quick-reaction force.44 From October to December 2020,
the ASSF took on more responsibility for ground operations, and conducting more
operations in a single quarter than they had since April–June 2019.45 Small and
overtaxed, the ASSF could not meet rapidly growing demand.46
As the Biden-Harris administration assumed control and began a
comprehensive review of Afghanistan policy in early 2021, the worst-case
scenario for ANDSF unfolded. The Taliban stepped up attacks, maintained
close ties with al-Qaeda, and actively planned for large-scale offensives—
all while IAN between GIRoA and the Taliban failed to make
any progress.47 The April 9, 2021, Annual Threat Assessment of the
41. USFOR-A Spokesman Colonel Sonny Leggett, “Taliban Need to Step Up,” October 12, 2020,
https://twitter.com/USFOR_A/status/1315602850186244096.
42. SIGAR, April 30, 2022 Quarterly Report to US Congress, SIGAR (website), n.d., 71-2, https://www.sigar
.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2022-04-30qr.pdf.
43. SIGAR, January 30, 2021 Quarterly Report to US Congress, SIGAR (website), n.d., 1, 68, https://www.sigar
.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2021-01-30qr.pdf.
44. SIGAR, April 30, 2021 Quarterly Report to US Congress, SIGAR (website), n.d., 75, https://www.sigar
.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2021-04-30qr.pdf.
45. See SIGAR, January 30, 2021 Quarterly Report, 63; and ASSF - Afghan Special Security Forces, ANA
Special Operations Command (ANASOC), https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/anasoc.
htm.
46. Also see SIGAR, January 30, 2021 Quarterly Report, 47.
47. Defense Department’s Office of Inspector General, May 18, 2021; and Courtney Kube and
Dan De Luce, “Taliban Ramped Up Attacks against Afghans as Peace Talks Faltered, Pentagon
Watchdog Says,” NBC News (website), March 2, 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/taliban
-ramped-attacks-against-afghans-peace-talks-faltered-pentagon-watchdog-n1267852).
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US Intelligence Community stated that prospects for an agreement between the
Afghan government and the Taliban “will remain low during the next year,” and
“the Taliban is likely to make gains on the battlefield, and the Afghan Government
will struggle to hold the Taliban at bay if the Coalition withdraws support.” The
assessment also concluded that the ANDSF “continues to face setbacks on the
battlefield, and the Taliban is confident it can achieve military victory.”48
Independent reporting indicates USFOR-A Commander Miller strongly
argued during the Biden-Harris administration comprehensive review that the
United States must keep forces in Afghanistan beyond the May 1, 2021, deadline
for fear of what would happen to the Afghan military once the United States
departed.49 General Miller wrote what he had earlier stated in public: the level
of Taliban military operational tempo could not be countered by the Afghan
military alone.

Full US Military Withdrawal and ANDSF Collapse
May to August 2021
On April 14, 2021, Biden announced the United States would end its military
presence in Afghanistan by September 11, 2021.50 American diplomats began
pressing for expedited IAN, even as the US military and allied NATO forces pivoted
to an accelerated withdrawal.51 In response, Afghan President Ghani tweeted an
aspirational message about the ANDSF, stating “Afghanistan’s proud security
and defense forces are fully capable of defending its people and country.”52 Ghani
seemed to hold out hope and made changes to leadership of the Afghan MOD
and MOI in March 2021 that bolstered Pashtun status and loyalty to him. At his
request, the United States and its European allies avoided evacuating their personnel
or Afghan associates for fear it would look like a rush to the exits and precipitate
a collapse of GIRoA.53
Yet, as the final US military withdrawal began in May 2021, Ghani was
mired in a political crisis that bode poorly for an already bedraggled ANDSF.
48. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence
Community (Washington, DC: ODNI, April 9, 2021), 25, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents
/assessments/ATA-2021-Unclassified-Report.pdf.
49. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”
50. “Briefing Room: Remarks by Joe Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan” White House (website),
April
14,
2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/14/remarks-by
-president-biden-on-the-way-forward-in-afghanistan/.
51. Associated Press, “Afghan Cease-fire Ends after Wave of Violence amid Calls for Fresh Peace Talks,”
NBC News (website), May 16, 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/afghan-cease-fire-ends-amid
-calls-fresh-peace%7C-talks-n1267517; and George Packer, “The Betrayal,” Atlantic (website),
January 31, 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/03/biden-afghanistan-exit-american
-allies-abandoned/621307/.
52. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”
53. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”
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Ghani and his small inner circle, led by National Security Adviser Hamdullah
Mohib, had not fully acted on the late 2020 US military recommendation to
consolidate ANDSF forces into a smaller array of more defensible positions focused
on strategic elements such as key roads, cities, and border crossings. In truth, the
politics and demographics of Afghanistan made it impossible for Ghani to comply
fully. Ghani reportedly told US Secretary of State Antony Blinken this sort of
repositioning would make GIRoA look weak.54 Mohib reportedly stated, “We’re not
giving up one inch of our country.”55
The Taliban already had de facto control of much of Afghanistan by then, but
Ghani and Mohib knew that to consolidate any further—away from ethnic Pashtun
areas and into ones more populated by ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras—
was political suicide. Under such a consolidation, he and any future national Pashtun
political leader would play third fiddle to a Taliban-dominated Pashtun political base
and to Tajik Co-president Abdullah Abdullah or another northern ethnic political
persona. SRAR Khalilzad later told American journalists Steve Coll and Adam
Entous that Ghani never had any interest in negotiating with the Taliban, for only
the status quo kept him in power.56 While far from exculpatory of SRAR Khalilzad’s
pivotal role in empowering the Taliban military success during peace negotiations,
Khalilzad properly understood Ghani’s political calculus.
Poorly positioned, insufficiently equipped, and politically isolated, ANDSF
morale was at a tipping point. Then, on July 2, 2021, the abrupt US military
departure from Bagram hit the ANDSF hard. Many in the ANDSF reported to
local and national news they felt abandoned to die trying to defend Bagram and
other such locations.57
Regrettably, Biden went on record in early July 2021 stating that a Taliban
military takeover or collapse of GIRoA was not inevitable.58 This statement
misappreciated the realities of low ANDSF morale, bad tactical positioning, and a lack
of confidence in GIRoA. Perhaps the American intelligence community supported
Biden’s ANDSF assessment, but such a conclusion would have been based upon its
evaluation of the Taliban shortcomings, not on the structural or emotional liabilities
of the ANDSF. By then, US military leaders lacked the onsite ability to evaluate

54. Jonathan Schroden “Lessons from the Collapse of Afghanistan’s Security Forces,” CTC Sentinel 14, no. 8
(October 2021): 45–61, https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/CTC-SENTINEL-082021.pdf.
55. Schroden “Lessons from Collapse.”
56. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”
57. Packer, “Betrayal.”
58. “Briefing Room: Remarks by President Biden on the Drawdown of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan,” White
House (website), July 8, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/07/08
/remarksby-president-biden-on-the-drawdown-of-u-s-forces-in-afghanistan/.
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ANDSF morale and cohesion dynamics reasonably, and US/Western abilities
to make such assessments accurately had been suspect for a long time.59
A lengthy Washington Post exposé later confirmed that by spring 2021, Afghan
forces were negotiating with the Taliban, often with the help of local elders rather
than fighting.60 Dealmaking featured arrangements for ANDSF surrender, parole,
and temporary local truces, all of which were well-established Afghan conflict
resolution practices, alongside those of revenge killings and summary executions.
Newly appointed Afghan Minister of Defense Bismillah Khan reported in
mid-July what outside accounts like those from the Afghan Advisor Network
(AAN) had foretold: the Taliban were offering ANDSF members money and a
letter of passage to protect them from harassment after they surrendered. By August
2021, “money was changing hands at a rapid rate,” a senior British military officer
said, with Afghan security forces getting “bought off by the Taliban.”61

Implications
The US-Taliban Peace Accord of February 29, 2020, put a 15-month “clock” on
what the ANDSF could expect from US or allied support. It did not generate the
perverse incentives underpinning the rapid collapse of the ANDSF, but it accelerated
negative expectations that the Taliban would ultimately prevail. From February 2020
until its collapse, ANDSF leadership was told to anticipate an Afghan political
settlement and subsequent security forces integration without ever witnessing a
viable IAN process. An AAN postmortem summary critiqued this period of political
negotiations scathingly, observing that SRAR Khalilzad’s faulty assumption that the
Taliban were truly pursuing negotiated peace spawned fantasy scenarios of TalibanGIRoA cooperation that never aligned with realities on the ground.62
Concurrently, ANDSF leaders and troopers could only reason the US military
would draw down to a point where it would stand alone against a resurgent
Taliban. An October 2020 AAN report cogently observed that in eight short
months since the Doha Agreement, US concessions to coax the Taliban to the
negotiating table sharpened its military edge and heightened its confidence while
simultaneously deflating and disempowering the ANDSF. The ANDSF bore the

59. Daniel P. Bolger, Why We Lost: A General’s Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (New York:
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014), 391; and Ben Connable, Embracing the Fog of War: Assessment and Metrics
in Counterinsurgency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012).
60. Susannah George, “Afghanistan’s Military Collapse: Illicit Deals and Mass Desertions,” Washington Post
(website), August 15, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/08/15/afghanistan-military-collapse
-taliban/.
61. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”
62. Kate Clark, “The Taleban’s Rise to Power: As the US Prepared for Peace, the Taleban Prepared for War,”
Afghanistan Analysts Network (website), August 21, 2021, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports
/war-and-peace/the-talebans-rise-to-power-as-the-us-prepared-for-peace-the-taleban-prepared-for-war/.
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brunt of the Taliban’s growing eagerness to fight all the while knowing it could not
shoulder the accelerating fight alone.”63
On August 16, Biden addressed the nation and acknowledged the regrettable
outcome of America’s exit from Afghanistan, asserting that GIRoA and ANDSF
collapsed more quickly than anticipated. He also recited the mass of money and
equipment the United States had provided ANDSF over the years and called the
group it out for collapsing so quickly.64
Biden clearly articulated American frustrations with the enormous but
unsuccessful effort to build an autonomous Afghan military capability. However,
his remarks did not acknowledge that the ANDSF never was designed to defend
Afghanistan against a determined, resilient adversary alone or that Afghan culture
and tradition set the conditions for a rapid patchwork of local peace deals once
it was clear to “the monkey in the middle” that all US military forces would depart
and a strong, durable Taliban with tacit Pakistani backing would remain.
As the United States moves forward into a new geostrategic era of
great-power competition, it has backed away from counterinsurgency and
associated security-sector building and reform that featured in Afghanistan for
almost two decades. But American military advising and material support for
partner security forces will not vanish in this new era, instead it will morph. The
United States assuredly will find itself working with partner militaries, surrogates,
and even proxy forces requiring structural and operational support.65 Although
security-sector reform for a counterinsurgency environment is not the same as
advising and supporting a proxy force or surrogate military, a couple of insights from
the American experience with ANDSF seem germane.66
First, US policymakers should fully study and tailor mission support and package
profiles to a realistic set of security goals and outcomes appropriate to both the
conflict and the limitations on US military presence. Surrogates or proxy forces
aligned against adversaries with sustained backing from an American rival state
are not good candidates for structures or operations modeled after US institutions
or tactics. Afghanistan, like Vietnam, demonstrates that American-centric
approaches are unsustainable without a significant, long-term US military presence.
American military advisers and supporting packages must be tailored to understand
63. Kate Clark, “Behind the Statistics: Drop in Civilian Casualties Masks Increased Taleban Violence,”
Afghanistan Analysts Network (website), October 27, 2020, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports
/war-and-peace/behind-the-statistics-drop-in-civilian-casualties-masks-increased-taleban-violence/.
64. “Briefing: Remarks by President Biden on Afghanistan,” White House (website), August 16, 2021,
https: // www.whitehouse.gov /briefing - room /speeches - remarks /2021 /08 /16 /remarks - by - president-biden-onafghanistan/.
65. Frank Hoffman and Andrew Orner, “The Return of Great-Power Proxy Wars,” War on the Rocks
(website), September 2, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/09/the-return-of-great-power-proxy-wars/.
66. Ladwig III, Forgotten Front, 289–313; Biddle, “Building Security Forces,” 126–38; and Biddle,
“Afghanistan’s Legacy,” 73–86.
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the cultures and organizations before they deploy and be empowered to shape
operational and technological support in a manner that best complements the
forces they advise.67
Second, security partner fighting force morale must be factored into policy
options.68 Too often, American military advising reduces its evaluation criteria
to counting the quantity of material support and training time. Afghanistan
reminds us that the morale of the fighting force is determined by much more
than quantitative factors. The culture and incentives of the partner force must be
considered. Qualitative metrics based upon local cultural and political needs must
be developed and recurrently and fairly assessed. As the loss of fidelity in evaluating
ANDSF morale from 2018–21 demonstrates, accurate evaluations are impossible at
a distance. US policy must accept the inherent risk necessary to empower military
advisers down to the tactical level with partner formations—surrogates or proxies—
to generate reasonably reliable evaluations of fighting force morale.
Finally, the advising, training, and operational support for a partner military,
proxy, or surrogate force is inherently a principal-agent arrangement.69 Principals
and agents operate in accordance with their respective political objectives. When
these align, the relationship can be productive and enhance mutual security. When
these diverge, the relationship can fray and pose a security risk.70 Inevitably, even
mutually advantageous security relationships tend to expire under the accumulating
weight of political interest misalignment. In the case of Afghanistan, that expiration
occurred when the United States decided to negotiate peace with the Taliban alone
with an aim to terminate American military presence, leaving ANDSF without
the structure, sufficient capabilities, or morale to sustain autonomous security
operations against a strong and aggressive Taliban adversary. US policymakers
must assume that future proxy or surrogate relationships will eventually fray or
expire. Thus, the strategic interaction must be informed by a realistic termination
criterion and a viable military transition plan.71
The rapid collapse of Afghan security forces was heavily foretold and largely
anticipated. Cognitive dissonance alone explains why this certainty did not better
impact American contingency plans for terminating its military presence in

67. Hammes, “Raising and Mentoring Security Forces,” 330–31.
68. Schroden, “Lessons from Collapse.”
69. Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” Academy of Management Review 14,
no. 1 (1989): 58–59.
70. Biddle, “Building Security Forces,” 126–38.
71. Amos C. Fox, In Pursuit of a General Theory of Proxy War, Land Warfare Paper 123 (Washington, DC:
Institute of Land Warfare/Association of the United States Army, February 2019), 14.
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Afghanistan. Future American plans for security forces partnerships can and must
do better.
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In fact, it actually was a known-known for quite some time before August 2021.3
Since 2018, the ANDSF were never as big as reported nor as cohesive as implied in
public statements. Although pessimistic, American military and intelligence leaders
hedged their assessments of Afghan military viability after a final US withdrawal,
speaking of an inevitable ANDSF demise in terms of months, not weeks. Yet by
the end of 2018 ANDSF leaders and servicemembers understood that without a
reversal of course in Washington, the American-Taliban peace negotiations would
result in the end of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces.4
From its inception, the Afghan military was a “monkey in the middle” of the
geopolitical dynamics between the United States, the Pakistani military and
intelligence services, and the fractious political leadership of Afghanistan. Combined,
these factors seriously constrained the ANDSF, assuring it had quantifiable
shortcomings and qualitative liabilities it could never resolve without continuing
US and Coalition military in-country support. These quantitative shortfalls included
insufficient aerial or artillery support for troops in contact, inadequate aerial resupply
and replenishment for forces far afield, and insufficient maintenance to sustain the
main weapons systems. Each of these shortfalls had been reported publicly for years.
They merely accelerated after 2018.
More critically, the ANDSF had qualitative problems limiting its ability to
conduct credible, autonomous counterinsurgency operations against a determined
and resilient Taliban. Its cohesion was suspect owing to endemic mistrust of the
Afghan central government and systemic corruption in its leadership ranks. Its
morale was questionable, as it routinely suffered high-casualty attacks by Taliban
forces. Other than in its small number of special operations forces, it lacked the
ability to prevent proactively or respond to Taliban attacks without substantive
American support. Moreover, from 2018 through 2021, ANDSF bore the brunt
of Taliban aggression while US and Western militaries enjoyed first an informal
agreement, and later, after the February 2020 US-Taliban Peace Agreement
(Doha Accord), a formal arrangement with the Taliban to stop attacking foreign
military forces only.
The February 2020 US-Taliban Doha Accord framed one final important
dilemma for the ANDSF. The agreement stipulated all US and Western troops must
3. See Craig Whitlock, “The Afghanistan Papers – At War with the Truth,” Washington Post,
December
9,
2019,
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depart Afghanistan by May 1, 2021, or, and as the Taliban made clear repetitively,
they would renew attacks against United States Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A)
and other foreign forces as “fair game.” This deadline gave the US military and
Coalition forces enormous incentives to move out of Afghanistan rapidly to reduce
“risks to the force.” But this accelerated American military retrograde undercut the
negotiating position of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
(GIRoA) with the Taliban, and, in turn, gave ANDSF mid-level and junior officers
and enlisted servicemembers additional incentives to cut local deals and prepare for
an almost-certain Taliban return to power.
These debilitating quantitative and qualitative dynamics were hiding in plain
sight—known and publicized in open-source media and public testimony. To
establish the record of preconditions and important moments in the ANDSF’s rapid
collapse properly, it is important to reexamine the chronology of what was known
about ANDSF fragility from 2018 on, especially from 2020–21. A focused review
will recount the most important “knowns” about this fragility in three key time
periods: (1) January 2018 to February 2020, (2) March 2020 to April 2021, and,
(3) May to August 2021.
This review highlights several principles American policymakers should consider
in the future; one where Washington may find itself advising or directly supporting
proxy and surrogate military forces undertaking kinetic activities against the proxies
or forces of America’s great-power competitors. The ANDSF’s failure to launch and
spectacular 2021 collapse reflect a larger historic problem for US security assistance
efforts at training, advising, and equipping of allied militaries as an alternative to
large, semipermanent US ground-force commitments.5 American policymakers must
acknowledge this disappointing legacy and approach security-partner assistance in
the new era of great-power competition with humility, forethought, and caution
informed by the heavily foretold, rapid demise of the ANDSF.

Cost Consciousness and Delimited Afghan
National Defense and Security Forces
The ANDSF’s growth parameters and composition were adjusted multiple
times over its 20-year lifespan.6 After fluctuating during the 2000s, by the 2010s,
5. Stephen Biddle, “Building Security Forces & Stabilizing Nations: The Problem of Agency,” Daedalus 146,
no. 4 (Fall 2017): 126–38, https://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/4/126/1831111/daed_a_00464.pdf;
Walter C. Ladwig III, The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships and Counterinsurgency (London:
Cambridge University Press, 2017), 1–52, 289–313; and Stephen Biddle, “Afghanistan’s Legacy: Emerging
Lessons of an Ongoing War,” Washington Quarterly 37, no. 2 (Summer 2014): 73–86, https://doi.org/10.1080/01
63660X.2014.926210.
6. For a short review of sizing machinations, see T. X. Hammes, “Raising and
Mentoring Security Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq,” in Lessons Encountered: Learning from
the Long War, ed., Richard D. Hooker Jr. and Joseph J. Collins (Washington, DC: National Defense University
Press, 2015), 281–304.
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US and Coalition partners decided ANDSF would be structured at 352,000 total
personnel, 195,000 of whom were in the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the
Afghan Air Force (AAF), with the remainder under the Ministry of the Interior
(MOI) as national police and special security forces.7 It is unlikely ANDSF ever
met these totals as reporting was notoriously suspect and the ability of US and
Coalition advisers to monitor them atrophied consistently after 2014 as ANDSF
took the counterinsurgency lead and Coalition mentors stepped back from side-byside advising.8 Washington and its partners limited the AAF to a small number of
aerial platforms with light, counterinsurgency-focused fixed-wing and ground-strike
helicopters and a limited number of lift aircraft for reliable countrywide mobility
for an ANA of almost 200,000 (see table 1). Likewise, the Afghan army would
have limited indirect-fire weapons capability and be structured without long-range
artillery or drone-strike assets.
The ANA was built to rely on US and Coalition support for its main
battlefield competitive advantages against the Taliban insurgency: generation
of airspace superiority, long-haul aerial logistics and mobility, and volume in
air-to-ground interdiction strikes.

7. Department of Defense (DoD), Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress
(Washington, DC: DoD, December 2017), 35–36, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/1225
-Report-Dec-2017.pdf.
8. “Transcripts: Department of Defense Press Briefing by Gen. Campbell via Satellite in the Pentagon Briefing
Room,” DoD (website), October 2, 2014; and SIGAR, “Oversight Bubble Inquiry Letter,” SIGAR 14-4-SP,
October 10, 2013.
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Table 1. March 2020 Authorized and Available Aircraft for Afghanistan Air Force
(Entries with an asterisk are very light, small aircraft that would prove no match for the standard aircraft found in the
Pakistani air force. These aircraft dominated the composition of the Afghanistan Air Force.)

Military Function

Aircraft Name

# Authorized # Available

Air-to-Air Fixed Wing Fighters

0

0

Air-to-Ground Strike and
Reconnaissance/
Strike Category Totals

105

89

A29 (Super Toucan)*

25

15

AC-208*

10

10

MD-530*

48

45

Mi-17

22

19

72

65

C-208*

23

23

C-130

4

2

UH-60

45

40

Fixed Wing

Rotary Wing

Aerial Transport/
Lift Category Totals
Fixed Wing
Rotary Wing

These military hardware parameter limitations and force number vacillations
emerged because of American and partner-state concerns about the costs and
sustainment potential for an autonomous Afghan security force. A bigger
AAF or a more capable ground force would cost more to recruit, train, retain,
and operate with higher-end technologies.9 Thus, the United States preferred
utilizing its own in-country military assets for these higher-end capabilities, thereby
capping the costs to US taxpayers at about $4 billion.10
Another critical regional security dynamic helped scope these ANDSF
limitations: Pakistan’s wary military and intelligence organizations. Pakistan never
wanted strong, capable, autonomous ANDSF for several strategic reasons. First,
Pakistan fundamentally distrusted the non-Pashtun ethnic groups in the north
and west of Afghanistan, particularly the Tajiks and the Uzbeks. Pakistani security
leaders viewed them as hostile to Pakistan and pointed to recent history for

9. Department of Defense (DoD), Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to
Congress (Washington, DC: DoD, October 2013, 48, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs
/October_1230_Report_Master_Nov7.pdf.
10. See Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, Congressional
Research Service (CRS) Report RL30588 (Washington, DC: CRS, December 13, 2017), 27–28,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30588/278.
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justification.11 During the Afghan civil war of the 1990s, these Tajik and Uzbek
groups not only battled against Pashtun groups favored by the Pakistani InterService Intelligence Agency, but often took funding and physical support from
Russia, Iran and, most critically, India. In 1994, Pakistan supported the Afghan
Taliban in opposing these groups and was alarmed when post-2001 Afghan
governments routinely featured Tajik and Uzbek strongmen as leaders of the
ANDSF and the Afghan national intelligence services.12
Second, Pakistan feared Indian subterfuge and access to Pakistan’s “back door”
in the post-2001 Afghan government and especially in the ANDSF.13 India is
Pakistan’s biggest security concern and is described in Pakistan as an existential
threat. Pakistan’s chilly relations with the Tajik and Uzbek groups who habitually led
the ANDSF (and Afghan intelligence service, the National Directorate of Security)
made them paranoid that the ANDSF and National Directorate of Security would
abet Indian diplomatic and intelligence assets at or near the Pakistani border.14 These
fears underpinned Pakistan’s constant complaining from 2004–15 that Afghanistan
was riven with over a dozen Indian consulates, many close to Pakistan, and
threatening to destabilize Pakistan through various means of cross-border influence.
In reality, there never were more than five of these Indian outposts, including
the Indian embassy in Kabul.15 Informed by these concerns, Pakistan’s security
establishment continued its indirect support for the Afghan Taliban, preferring a
low-boil instability inside Afghanistan to a strong, non-Pashtun, ANDSF doing
India’s bidding and putting a “security squeeze” on Pakistan from the west.16
Concurrently, Pakistan quietly preferred the US military remain affiliated with
the Afghan military while the Taliban was weak for three main reasons: because
Rawalpindi officials distrusted the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan as a stalking horse for India; because American presence there anchored
a counterterrorism partnership that reaped a large financial-aid package for the
Pakistani military; and because American military commanders served as a kind of
11. Raja Karthikeya Gundu and Teresita C. Schaffer, “India and Pakistan in Afghanistan: Hostile Sports,”
South Asia Monitor 117 (April 3, 2008), https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-asia-monitor-india-and-pakistan
-afghanistan-hostile-sports-april-03-2008.
12. Rizwan Hussein, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan (Burlington, VT: Ashgate
Press, 2005), 55–62; and Nasreen Akhtar, “Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Taliban,” International Journal on World
Peace 25, no. 4 (December 2008): 49–73, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20752859?seq=19#metadata_info_tab
_contents.
13. Larry Hanauer and Peter Chalk, India’s and Pakistan’s Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United
States and the Region, RAND Occasional Paper 387 (Santa Monica: CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), 1–3, 25–36,
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP387.pdf; and Gundu and
Schaffer, “India and Pakistan in Afghanistan.”
14. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Oxford, UK: Pan Books,
2000), 17–35.
15. Steve Coll, Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (New York: Penguin
Press, 2018), 267–70.
16. Seth G. Jones, “Afghanistan’s Future Emirate? The Taliban and the Struggle for Afghanistan,” CTC Sentinel
13, no. 11 (West Point, New York: Countering Terrorism Center, November 2020), https://ctc.usma.edu/wp
-content/uploads/2020/11/CTC-SENTINEL-112020.pdf; and Hanauer and Chalk, Strategies in Afghanistan.
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big-brother overseer and a node for the Pakistani military (PakMIL) and its InterServices Intelligence Agency to push back against ANDSF activities or associations
(especially with India) that Islamabad found threatening. To be certain, American
military presence in Afghanistan was bothersome for Pakistan in many other ways,
but Rawalpindi balanced these with the benefits a US footprint there provided.17
Thus, the AAF would have a limited quantity and quality of air-to-ground strike
aircraft. The AAF would have a limited number of airlifter planes with a capacity
limited to battling insurgent forces rather than a cross-border rival state. The
ANDSF had a limited number of ground artillery assets, and those were constrained
in firing range—again, so they would not be able to range far into Pakistani territory
in the event of major cross-border insurgency hostilities. The United States would
provide all these capabilities and more.18
From birth, ANDSF was a “monkey in the middle” caught between US/Coalition
concerns about affordability and sustainability and Pakistani worries about a strong
force on its border with autonomous security aims and suspect relations with India.

Mixed Loyalty
ANDSF uniformed and civilian leadership was normally ethnic Tajiks or Uzbeks,
and it struggled to recruit Pashtuns throughout the 2000s but attained proportionality
in the 2010s.19 While desirable, Pashtun proportionality in the Afghan armed forces
represented both a strength and a weakness. Pashtun representation was important
optically and politically for a Pashtun-led government. Pashtun proportionality in
the middle-to-lower ANDSF ranks enabled the government to present its forces
as representative of the nation. Additionally, proportional ethnic representation
ensured the Pashtun-led national government met the expectations of its political

17. See Moeed Yusuf, Huma Yusuf and Salman Zaidi, Pakistan, the United States and the End Game in
Afghanistan: Perceptions of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Elite (Islamabad: Jinnah Institute - R0811-04, 2011), 14–15,
21–28, 28; John Schmidt, The Unraveling: Pakistan in the Age of Jihad (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011),
198–202; and Jibran Ahmad, “Afghan Taliban Stop Pakistan Army from Fencing International Border,” Reuters
(website), December 22, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/afghan-taliban-stop-pakistan-army
-fencing-international-border-2021-12-22/.
18. See SIGAR, High-Risk List (Arlington, VA: SIGAR, December 2014), 1, www.sigar.mil/pdf/spotlight
/High-Risk_List.pdf.
19. DoD, Report on Progress, 38; and Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghan National Security Forces: Afghan
Corruption and the Development of an Effective Fighting Force,” Testimony before the House
Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Oversights and Investigations, Brookings (website),
August 2, 2012, https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/afghan-national-security-forces-afghan-corruption
-and-the-development-of-an-effective-fighting-force/.
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base. Given that the Afghan Taliban was mainly a Pashtun insurgency, equal ethnic
representation was a political and military necessity.

Figure 2. Major ethnic groups of Afghanistan
(Map courtesy of https://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/Reading/Maps/afghan.map.htm)

Pashtun representation in the Afghan military also generated weakness.
Unlike the northern Afghan ethnic groups, Pashtun tribes and subtribes
span the soft, highly porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. There
are approximately 14 million Pashtuns in Afghanistan, and they make up
42 percent of its population. As no other Afghan ethnicity comprises more than
27 percent of the population, Pashtuns hold the political power to assure national
leadership. There are another 30 million ethnic Pashtuns in Pakistan. They are 16
percent of the Pakistani population but make up 66 percent of all regional Pashtuns.
Therefore, Pashtun tribes and families in Afghanistan must always consider crossborder political and security issues. Since the Afghan Taliban is comprised of
ethnic Pashtun subtribes and subgroups, Afghan Pashtuns hedged their bets in the
post-2001 era. True across Afghanistan but especially in the Pashtun-dominated
east and southeast, kinship and tribal connections often take precedence over
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formal political loyalties.20 Thus, it was common for Afghan Pashtun families to
have one son in the Afghan military and another in the Taliban.21 One son made
the family money with a regular government paycheck, and the other assured the
family with a hedge against insurgent success.
By 2015, serious Afghan observers knew Pashtun families were negotiating
with the Taliban in anticipation of ANDSF’s ultimate failure. Early that year,
the United States and NATO ended their leadership of the counterinsurgency
combat mission in Afghanistan and shifted to training assistance, advising
the ANDSF at-distance. Soon afterward, al-Qaeda training sites appeared in
southern Afghanistan, where the Taliban had begun to push back the ANDSF
in 2015. Alarmed, the Obama administration arrested its withdrawal plans and
took steps to allow US and NATO forces to support the ANDSF.22 Then, the
Trump administration review of Afghan policy authorized a mid-2017 mini-surge
of US forces in yet another American effort to show strength against the resurgent
Afghan Taliban. The Trump surge featured additional US military advisers in new
Security Force Assistance Brigades for placement into ANDSF lower echelons
and were considered critical to the campaign’s success.23 Arriving in early 2018,
they conducted advising missions, facilitated operation planning with selected
ANA Brigades and even some Kandaks (battalions) fighting the Taliban for the
first time since 2014.

Taliban Violence Reduction against the United States,
Not Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
June 2018 to February 2020
The Trump surge and renewed connectivity between US/NATO military
units and tactical ANDSF formations was short-lived. By summer 2018, the
Trump administration announced it was pursuing direct peace negotiations
with the Afghan Taliban, formally appointing Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad
as a Special Representative for Afghan Reconciliation (SRAR) by the fall.
SRAR Khalilzad acquired presidential authority to negotiate directly with
Taliban representatives, mainly in Doha, Qatar, while keeping the Afghan
government informed but not formally represented. From this point, the
20. Anatol Lieven, “An Afghan Tragedy: The Pashtuns, the Taliban and the State,” Survival 63, no. 3
(June–July 2021): 7–31, https://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/2021/survival-global-politics-and-strategy
-june-july-2021; and Lieven, “Why Afghan Forces.”
21. General Abdul Fahim Wardak, then-Afghan Minister of Defense, comment to author (Kabul, Afghanistan,
December 2009).
22. Thomas F. Lynch III, “After ISIS: Reappraising U.S. Policy in Afghanistan,” Washington Quarterly,
38, no. 2 (July 2015): 119–44.
23. Ryan Browne and Barbara Starr, “US Military Says It Killed Dozens of Taliban Leaders in Afghanistan,”
CNN (website), May 30, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/30/politics/us-killed-taliban-leaders-afghanistan
/index.html.
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Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan felt it was being sidelined
and its future negotiated in absentia.
Sensing the prospect for a favorable outcome, or at least a respite from an
exceptionally violent period of the insurgency, Afghan Taliban targeting of
US/western military forces tailed off notably.24 Fifteen American and allied
forces were killed in Afghanistan in 2017, with eight of those deaths linked to
attacks by the Afghan Taliban. In 2018, there were 14 US/allied troop deaths,
and none were claimed by the Taliban. The pattern continued with almost all
US 2019–20 military deaths coming from counterterrorism operations initiated by
the US and Afghan forces against groups affiliated with al-Qaeda, the Pakistani
Taliban in Afghanistan, or the Islamic State in Khorasan (ISIS-K).25 Over the
same period, ANDSF deaths from Taliban attacks and battles soared, moving
beyond 8,000 per year in 2017–18 andup to an estimated 10,900 per year in 2019
and 2020.26 Afghan President Ashraf Ghani reported in early 2019 that more than
45,000 members of the ANDSF had been killed since he became leader in 2014.27
The ANDSF quandary came into full relief as formal US-Taliban
peace talks commenced in January 2019.28 The ANDSF bore the brunt
of the Taliban fight on the ground without sufficient critical military
capabilities to counter Taliban strength, and it
now had the full
knowledge that the Taliban appeared to have limited attacks against
the American and Western military forces informally to encourage talks designed

24. Jonathan Beale, “Why Are UK and US Sending More Troops to Afghanistan?” BBC News (website),
August 13, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44967531.
25. Compiled from “Number of Fatalities among Western Coalition Soldiers Involved in the Execution of
Operation Enduring Freedom from 2001 to 2021,” Statista (website), https://www.statista.com/statistics/262894
/western-coalition-soldiers-killed-in-afghanistan/; Bureau of Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on Terrorism
2020: Afghanistan,” Department of State (website), n.d., https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on
-terrorism-2020/afghanistan/; Bureau of Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2019:
Afghanistan,” Department of State (website), n.d., https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on
-terrorism-2019/afghanistan/; DoD, Stability and Security in Afghanistan, Reports to Congress (Washington,
DC: DoD, December 2017, December 2018, December 2019, December 2020, and December 2021);
and Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), January 20, 2017 Quarterly
Report to US Congress, January 20, 2018 Quarterly Report to US Congress, January 20, 2019 Quarterly Report to
US Congress, January 20, 2020 Quarterly Report to US Congress, and January 20, 2021 Quarterly Report to
US Congress, SIGAR (website), n.d., https://www.sigar.mil/quarterlyreports/.
26. Sam Gollob and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstructionand Security
in Post-9/11 Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2020), 17, https://www.brookings.edu
/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/FP_20200825_afganistan_index.pdf.
27. “Afghanistan’s Ghani Says 45,000 Security Personnel Killed Since 2014,” BBC News (website),
January 25, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47005558.
28. Steve Coll and Adam Entous, “The Secret History of the U.S. Diplomatic Failure in Afghanistan,”
New Yorker (website), December 10, 2021, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/12/20/the-secret
-history-of-the-us-diplomatic-failure-in-afghanistan.
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to end Western military presence. This knowledge exacerbated ANDSF anxieties
and reinforced local-level hedging behavior.

The Doha Accord and Extreme ANDSF Exposure
March 2020 to April 2021
On February 29, 2020, SRAR Khalilzad and Afghan Taliban representative
Abdul Ghani Baradar signed the US-Taliban Peace Accord in Doha,
Qatar. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was not
a signatory and had played no direct role in its negotiation over the prior
16 months. The agreement committed the United States and Coalition partners to
“complete” military withdrawal from Afghanistan in 15 months—by May 1, 2021. In
return, the Taliban promised three major outcomes. First, it committed to preventing
al-Qaeda or similar international Salafi jihadist terror organizations from planning
or conducting attacks against the United States or its allies from Afghan soil.
It made a formal promise to refrain from attacks against US and Coalition forces
during the implementation period and committed to a reduction in violence
(RIV) for Afghanistan as a whole. The Taliban, however, did not formally
promise to refrain from attacking GIRoA or ANDSF targets.29 It also agreed
to commence political talks with the Government of the Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan aimed at reconciliation and a new framework for Afghan
governance—inter-Afghan negotiations (IAN).30
Absent a total collapse of the peace agreement, the best outcome for the
ANDSF would be one where inter-Afghan negotiations were successful, and there
would be some combination of ANDSF and Taliban military assets. Ultimately,
this outcome would require a process of disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration (DDR). Historically, the pathway to DDR between government and
insurgent forces is vexing. While there are incentives for opposing military forces
to reduce violence and save combatant lives, there are also competing incentives
for them to maximize political negotiating leverage by conducting aggressive
military operations aimed at altering “facts on the ground.” Often, a cease-fire
agreement is built into a political negotiating period to dampen the incentives for
military aggression.31 When a viable cease-fire is not feasible or enforceable, the
29. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”
30. “Joint Declaration between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America for Bringing
Peace to Afghanistan,” February 29, 2020, 1, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/02.29.20-US
-Afghanistan-Joint-Declaration.pdf. (The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is not recognized by the United
States as a state and is known as the Taliban.); and Michael R. Pompeo, “Secretary Pompeo Remarks to
Media,” US Department of State (website), February 25, 2020, video, 18:35, site-894736.bcvp0rtal.com/detail
/videos/secretary-of-state/video/6135770177001/secretary-pompeo-remarks-to-media.?autoStart=true.
31. Valerie Sticher and Siniša Vuković, “Bargaining in Intrastate Conflicts: The Shifting Role of Ceasefires,”
Journal of Peace Research 1, no. 1 (May 2021): https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022343320982658;
Coll and Entous, “Secret History”; and SIGAR, April 30, 2020 Quarterly Report to US Congress, SIGAR (website),
n.d., https://www.sigar.mil/quarterlyreports/.
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force with the upper hand will normally fight to secure gains that will enhance its
negotiating leverage. Since the terms of the Doha Accord allowed the Taliban to
continue fighting against the ANDSF and GIRoA throughout the IAN period,
they continued to press their martial advantage.
The worst scenario for ANDSF was one where the United States stuck to its
withdrawal plans, IAN was not successful, and the Taliban took advantage of
US/Coalition withdrawal of forces to attrit the ANDSF badly. Details of the
reduction in violence (RIV) component in the US-Taliban Peace Accord were
relegated to a classified annex but appeared to inhibit, but not credibly prohibit,
the Taliban from pursuing this course of action.
After the February Doha Agreement signing ceremony, US Secretary of State
Michael Pompeo stated the level of Taliban attacks and violence were expected
to remain low.32 But by late April 2020, General Austin “Scott” Miller, US Forces
Afghanistan and Operation Resolute Support commander, reported that from
March 1 to 31, “the Taliban refrained from attacks against Coalition Forces,
[while] they increased attacks against ANDSF to levels above seasonal norms.”33
Taliban military activities during spring and summer 2020 were unambiguously
aggressive, but in a differentiated manner. An independent fall 2020 assessment
reported Taliban-controlled areas experienced unexpected peace in the aftermath
of Doha as the United States largely halted air attacks and the ANDSF
moved to a defensive posture. But in GIRoA-controlled areas, the Taliban
intensified violence against government entities and Afghan civilians even as it
limited major attacks.34
A key part of the Doha Accord not made public called on US forces to end
offensive air strikes against the Taliban while allowing for strikes in defense of
the ANDSF.35After a post–Doha Agreement lull, American military air strikes
to protect ANDSF resumed in summer 2020. The Taliban formally protested all
American strikes that supported ANDSF, calling them a violation of the Doha

32. Michael R. Pompeo, “Secretary Michael R. Pompeo at a Press Availability after the Afghanistan
Signing Ceremony: Remarks to the Press,” Department of State (website), February 29, 2020, https://2017-2021
.state.gov/at-a-press-availability-after-the-afghanistan-signing-ceremony/index.html.
33. SIGAR, April 30, 2020 Quarterly Report,” 62, 65.
34. Andrew Quilty, “Taleban Opportunism and ANSF Frustration: How the Afghan Conflict Has Changed
Since the Doha Agreement,” Afghan Analysts Network (website), October 12, 2020, https://www.afghanistananalysts.org /en /reports/war-and-peace/taleban-opportunism-and-ansf-frustration-how-the-afghan-conflict-has
-changed-since-the-doha-agreement/.
35. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”
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Accord’s annex on managing combat. Later in 2020, the Taliban used US air
activity to justify their intensifying military campaign against Kabul.36
The prisoner exchange component of the Doha Accord partially enabled
surging Talban military activity and acumen. Despite GIRoA skepticism,
the final Doha Accord called for the confidence-building exchange of “up to”
5,000 Taliban prisoners held in Afghan jails in exchange for 1,000 Afghans
held by the Taliban. The Taliban quickly insisted release of a full 5,000
was a precondition to commencing peace talks with the GIRoA.37 Under
American pressure, Afghan leaders released about 4,600 Taliban prisoners in
spring 2020 and the final 400 in August 2020 after a period of inter-Afghan,
and Afghan-American debate. An independent research report in late summer
2020 estimated almost 70 percent of the 108 released Taliban resumed active
fighting roles, returning important battlefield expertise to intensifying Taliban
military operations.38
ANDSF morale took a direct hit from the way Taliban leaders spoke
and acted after the Doha Accord. Tolo News reported that on March 25 in
Balochistan Province, Pakistan, a senior Taliban negotiator, Mullah Fazel, told
supporters the Taliban would ultimately be victorious in establishing an Islamic
Emirate. Fazel reportedly said that while the “Taliban or the Islamic Emirate
will never become part of the Kabul [Afghan] government,” the Taliban might
accept Afghan government officials with senior positions.39 US Agency for
International Development (USAID)–funded monitoring of Taliban public
communications found the Taliban’s tone resoundingly triumphant during
April and May 2020 following the announced withdrawal of US military forces,
clearly indicating to Afghan forces the future government of Afghanistan
would be subject to Taliban preferences and potential vengeance.40 The
one-sided pattern of Taliban aggression persisted into mid-October 2020
when USFOR-A Commander General Miller again stated that the high

36. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”
37. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”
38. Lynne O’Donnell, “Defying Peace Deal, Freed Taliban Return to Battlefield,” Foreign Policy (website),
September 3, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/03/defying-peace-deal-freed-taliban-prisoners-return
-battlefield-afghanistan/; France 24, “Some Freed Taliban Prisoners Have Returned to Battle, Says Afghan
Negotiator,” France24.com (website), September 23, 2020, https://www.france24.com/en/20200923-afghanistan
-freed-taliban-prisoners-return-battle-abdullah-abdullah-doha-peace-talks.
39. Abubakar Siddique, “Are the Taliban Committed to Negotiating Peace in Afghanistan?” Gandhara
(website), March 31, 2020, https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/are-the-taliban-committed-to-negotiating-peace-in
-afghanistan-/30520521.html.
40. Quilty, “Taleban Opportunism and ANSF Frustration.”
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level of Taliban violence around the country “is not consistent with the
US-Taliban agreement and undermines the ongoing Afghan peace talks.”41
The disposition and orientation of ANDSF forces contributed to its
vulnerability in the post–Doha Accord fight. In November 2019, the Afghan
government estimated that the ANDSF had over 10,000 checkpoints nationwide,
with an average of 10 to 20 personnel at each. After the Doha Accord, as
Coalition forces stepped back from advising and assisting ANA forward elements,
they helped the ANA with a checkpoint reduction and base development plan
(CPRBD) for 2021 that reportedly reduced ANA checkpoints to just under 2,000
with another 600 patrol bases across Afghanistan.42 It still meant the ANDSF had
approximately one-third of its total force, 95,000 personnel, manning checkpoints
as of December 2020.43
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces checkpoint-heavy positioning
contributed to a largely static and defensive mission profile even as GIRoA political
leadership belatedly called for greater assertiveness against the resurgent Taliban
in 2020. Most ANA Corps reportedly refused to execute missions without ANA
Special Operations Command (ANASOC) augmentation. When ANASOC
Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) arrived, they were just as likely to be
misused to perform tasks intended for conventional forces such as route clearance,
checkpoint security, and quick-reaction force.44 From October to December 2020,
the ASSF took on more responsibility for ground operations, and conducting more
operations in a single quarter than they had since April–June 2019.45 Small and
overtaxed, the ASSF could not meet rapidly growing demand.46
As the Biden-Harris administration assumed control and began a
comprehensive review of Afghanistan policy in early 2021, the worst-case
scenario for ANDSF unfolded. The Taliban stepped up attacks, maintained
close ties with al-Qaeda, and actively planned for large-scale offensives—
all while IAN between GIRoA and the Taliban failed to make
any progress.47 The April 9, 2021, Annual Threat Assessment of the
41. USFOR-A Spokesman Colonel Sonny Leggett, “Taliban Need to Step Up,” October 12, 2020,
https://twitter.com/USFOR_A/status/1315602850186244096.
42. SIGAR, April 30, 2022 Quarterly Report to US Congress, SIGAR (website), n.d., 71-2, https://www.sigar
.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2022-04-30qr.pdf.
43. SIGAR, January 30, 2021 Quarterly Report to US Congress, SIGAR (website), n.d., 1, 68, https://www.sigar
.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2021-01-30qr.pdf.
44. SIGAR, April 30, 2021 Quarterly Report to US Congress, SIGAR (website), n.d., 75, https://www.sigar
.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2021-04-30qr.pdf.
45. See SIGAR, January 30, 2021 Quarterly Report, 63; and ASSF - Afghan Special Security Forces, ANA
Special Operations Command (ANASOC), https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/anasoc.
htm.
46. Also see SIGAR, January 30, 2021 Quarterly Report, 47.
47. Defense Department’s Office of Inspector General, May 18, 2021; and Courtney Kube and
Dan De Luce, “Taliban Ramped Up Attacks against Afghans as Peace Talks Faltered, Pentagon
Watchdog Says,” NBC News (website), March 2, 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/taliban
-ramped-attacks-against-afghans-peace-talks-faltered-pentagon-watchdog-n1267852).
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US Intelligence Community stated that prospects for an agreement between the
Afghan government and the Taliban “will remain low during the next year,” and
“the Taliban is likely to make gains on the battlefield, and the Afghan Government
will struggle to hold the Taliban at bay if the Coalition withdraws support.” The
assessment also concluded that the ANDSF “continues to face setbacks on the
battlefield, and the Taliban is confident it can achieve military victory.”48
Independent reporting indicates USFOR-A Commander Miller strongly
argued during the Biden-Harris administration comprehensive review that the
United States must keep forces in Afghanistan beyond the May 1, 2021, deadline
for fear of what would happen to the Afghan military once the United States
departed.49 General Miller wrote what he had earlier stated in public: the level
of Taliban military operational tempo could not be countered by the Afghan
military alone.

Full US Military Withdrawal and ANDSF Collapse
May to August 2021
On April 14, 2021, Biden announced the United States would end its military
presence in Afghanistan by September 11, 2021.50 American diplomats began
pressing for expedited IAN, even as the US military and allied NATO forces pivoted
to an accelerated withdrawal.51 In response, Afghan President Ghani tweeted an
aspirational message about the ANDSF, stating “Afghanistan’s proud security
and defense forces are fully capable of defending its people and country.”52 Ghani
seemed to hold out hope and made changes to leadership of the Afghan MOD
and MOI in March 2021 that bolstered Pashtun status and loyalty to him. At his
request, the United States and its European allies avoided evacuating their personnel
or Afghan associates for fear it would look like a rush to the exits and precipitate
a collapse of GIRoA.53
Yet, as the final US military withdrawal began in May 2021, Ghani was
mired in a political crisis that bode poorly for an already bedraggled ANDSF.
48. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence
Community (Washington, DC: ODNI, April 9, 2021), 25, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents
/assessments/ATA-2021-Unclassified-Report.pdf.
49. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”
50. “Briefing Room: Remarks by Joe Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan” White House (website),
April
14,
2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/14/remarks-by
-president-biden-on-the-way-forward-in-afghanistan/.
51. Associated Press, “Afghan Cease-fire Ends after Wave of Violence amid Calls for Fresh Peace Talks,”
NBC News (website), May 16, 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/afghan-cease-fire-ends-amid
-calls-fresh-peace%7C-talks-n1267517; and George Packer, “The Betrayal,” Atlantic (website),
January 31, 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/03/biden-afghanistan-exit-american
-allies-abandoned/621307/.
52. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”
53. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”
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Ghani and his small inner circle, led by National Security Adviser Hamdullah
Mohib, had not fully acted on the late 2020 US military recommendation to
consolidate ANDSF forces into a smaller array of more defensible positions focused
on strategic elements such as key roads, cities, and border crossings. In truth, the
politics and demographics of Afghanistan made it impossible for Ghani to comply
fully. Ghani reportedly told US Secretary of State Antony Blinken this sort of
repositioning would make GIRoA look weak.54 Mohib reportedly stated, “We’re not
giving up one inch of our country.”55
The Taliban already had de facto control of much of Afghanistan by then, but
Ghani and Mohib knew that to consolidate any further—away from ethnic Pashtun
areas and into ones more populated by ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras—
was political suicide. Under such a consolidation, he and any future national Pashtun
political leader would play third fiddle to a Taliban-dominated Pashtun political base
and to Tajik Co-president Abdullah Abdullah or another northern ethnic political
persona. SRAR Khalilzad later told American journalists Steve Coll and Adam
Entous that Ghani never had any interest in negotiating with the Taliban, for only
the status quo kept him in power.56 While far from exculpatory of SRAR Khalilzad’s
pivotal role in empowering the Taliban military success during peace negotiations,
Khalilzad properly understood Ghani’s political calculus.
Poorly positioned, insufficiently equipped, and politically isolated, ANDSF
morale was at a tipping point. Then, on July 2, 2021, the abrupt US military
departure from Bagram hit the ANDSF hard. Many in the ANDSF reported to
local and national news they felt abandoned to die trying to defend Bagram and
other such locations.57
Regrettably, Biden went on record in early July 2021 stating that a Taliban
military takeover or collapse of GIRoA was not inevitable.58 This statement
misappreciated the realities of low ANDSF morale, bad tactical positioning, and a lack
of confidence in GIRoA. Perhaps the American intelligence community supported
Biden’s ANDSF assessment, but such a conclusion would have been based upon its
evaluation of the Taliban shortcomings, not on the structural or emotional liabilities
of the ANDSF. By then, US military leaders lacked the onsite ability to evaluate

54. Jonathan Schroden “Lessons from the Collapse of Afghanistan’s Security Forces,” CTC Sentinel 14, no. 8
(October 2021): 45–61, https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/CTC-SENTINEL-082021.pdf.
55. Schroden “Lessons from Collapse.”
56. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”
57. Packer, “Betrayal.”
58. “Briefing Room: Remarks by President Biden on the Drawdown of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan,” White
House (website), July 8, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/07/08
/remarksby-president-biden-on-the-drawdown-of-u-s-forces-in-afghanistan/.
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ANDSF morale and cohesion dynamics reasonably, and US/Western abilities
to make such assessments accurately had been suspect for a long time.59
A lengthy Washington Post exposé later confirmed that by spring 2021, Afghan
forces were negotiating with the Taliban, often with the help of local elders rather
than fighting.60 Dealmaking featured arrangements for ANDSF surrender, parole,
and temporary local truces, all of which were well-established Afghan conflict
resolution practices, alongside those of revenge killings and summary executions.
Newly appointed Afghan Minister of Defense Bismillah Khan reported in
mid-July what outside accounts like those from the Afghan Advisor Network
(AAN) had foretold: the Taliban were offering ANDSF members money and a
letter of passage to protect them from harassment after they surrendered. By August
2021, “money was changing hands at a rapid rate,” a senior British military officer
said, with Afghan security forces getting “bought off by the Taliban.”61

Implications
The US-Taliban Peace Accord of February 29, 2020, put a 15-month “clock” on
what the ANDSF could expect from US or allied support. It did not generate the
perverse incentives underpinning the rapid collapse of the ANDSF, but it accelerated
negative expectations that the Taliban would ultimately prevail. From February 2020
until its collapse, ANDSF leadership was told to anticipate an Afghan political
settlement and subsequent security forces integration without ever witnessing a
viable IAN process. An AAN postmortem summary critiqued this period of political
negotiations scathingly, observing that SRAR Khalilzad’s faulty assumption that the
Taliban were truly pursuing negotiated peace spawned fantasy scenarios of TalibanGIRoA cooperation that never aligned with realities on the ground.62
Concurrently, ANDSF leaders and troopers could only reason the US military
would draw down to a point where it would stand alone against a resurgent
Taliban. An October 2020 AAN report cogently observed that in eight short
months since the Doha Agreement, US concessions to coax the Taliban to the
negotiating table sharpened its military edge and heightened its confidence while
simultaneously deflating and disempowering the ANDSF. The ANDSF bore the

59. Daniel P. Bolger, Why We Lost: A General’s Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (New York:
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014), 391; and Ben Connable, Embracing the Fog of War: Assessment and Metrics
in Counterinsurgency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012).
60. Susannah George, “Afghanistan’s Military Collapse: Illicit Deals and Mass Desertions,” Washington Post
(website), August 15, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/08/15/afghanistan-military-collapse
-taliban/.
61. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”
62. Kate Clark, “The Taleban’s Rise to Power: As the US Prepared for Peace, the Taleban Prepared for War,”
Afghanistan Analysts Network (website), August 21, 2021, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports
/war-and-peace/the-talebans-rise-to-power-as-the-us-prepared-for-peace-the-taleban-prepared-for-war/.
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brunt of the Taliban’s growing eagerness to fight all the while knowing it could not
shoulder the accelerating fight alone.”63
On August 16, Biden addressed the nation and acknowledged the regrettable
outcome of America’s exit from Afghanistan, asserting that GIRoA and ANDSF
collapsed more quickly than anticipated. He also recited the mass of money and
equipment the United States had provided ANDSF over the years and called the
group it out for collapsing so quickly.64
Biden clearly articulated American frustrations with the enormous but
unsuccessful effort to build an autonomous Afghan military capability. However,
his remarks did not acknowledge that the ANDSF never was designed to defend
Afghanistan against a determined, resilient adversary alone or that Afghan culture
and tradition set the conditions for a rapid patchwork of local peace deals once
it was clear to “the monkey in the middle” that all US military forces would depart
and a strong, durable Taliban with tacit Pakistani backing would remain.
As the United States moves forward into a new geostrategic era of
great-power competition, it has backed away from counterinsurgency and
associated security-sector building and reform that featured in Afghanistan for
almost two decades. But American military advising and material support for
partner security forces will not vanish in this new era, instead it will morph. The
United States assuredly will find itself working with partner militaries, surrogates,
and even proxy forces requiring structural and operational support.65 Although
security-sector reform for a counterinsurgency environment is not the same as
advising and supporting a proxy force or surrogate military, a couple of insights from
the American experience with ANDSF seem germane.66
First, US policymakers should fully study and tailor mission support and package
profiles to a realistic set of security goals and outcomes appropriate to both the
conflict and the limitations on US military presence. Surrogates or proxy forces
aligned against adversaries with sustained backing from an American rival state
are not good candidates for structures or operations modeled after US institutions
or tactics. Afghanistan, like Vietnam, demonstrates that American-centric
approaches are unsustainable without a significant, long-term US military presence.
American military advisers and supporting packages must be tailored to understand
63. Kate Clark, “Behind the Statistics: Drop in Civilian Casualties Masks Increased Taleban Violence,”
Afghanistan Analysts Network (website), October 27, 2020, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports
/war-and-peace/behind-the-statistics-drop-in-civilian-casualties-masks-increased-taleban-violence/.
64. “Briefing: Remarks by President Biden on Afghanistan,” White House (website), August 16, 2021,
https: // www.whitehouse.gov /briefing - room /speeches - remarks /2021 /08 /16 /remarks - by - president-biden-onafghanistan/.
65. Frank Hoffman and Andrew Orner, “The Return of Great-Power Proxy Wars,” War on the Rocks
(website), September 2, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/09/the-return-of-great-power-proxy-wars/.
66. Ladwig III, Forgotten Front, 289–313; Biddle, “Building Security Forces,” 126–38; and Biddle,
“Afghanistan’s Legacy,” 73–86.
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the cultures and organizations before they deploy and be empowered to shape
operational and technological support in a manner that best complements the
forces they advise.67
Second, security partner fighting force morale must be factored into policy
options.68 Too often, American military advising reduces its evaluation criteria
to counting the quantity of material support and training time. Afghanistan
reminds us that the morale of the fighting force is determined by much more
than quantitative factors. The culture and incentives of the partner force must be
considered. Qualitative metrics based upon local cultural and political needs must
be developed and recurrently and fairly assessed. As the loss of fidelity in evaluating
ANDSF morale from 2018–21 demonstrates, accurate evaluations are impossible at
a distance. US policy must accept the inherent risk necessary to empower military
advisers down to the tactical level with partner formations—surrogates or proxies—
to generate reasonably reliable evaluations of fighting force morale.
Finally, the advising, training, and operational support for a partner military,
proxy, or surrogate force is inherently a principal-agent arrangement.69 Principals
and agents operate in accordance with their respective political objectives. When
these align, the relationship can be productive and enhance mutual security. When
these diverge, the relationship can fray and pose a security risk.70 Inevitably, even
mutually advantageous security relationships tend to expire under the accumulating
weight of political interest misalignment. In the case of Afghanistan, that expiration
occurred when the United States decided to negotiate peace with the Taliban alone
with an aim to terminate American military presence, leaving ANDSF without
the structure, sufficient capabilities, or morale to sustain autonomous security
operations against a strong and aggressive Taliban adversary. US policymakers
must assume that future proxy or surrogate relationships will eventually fray or
expire. Thus, the strategic interaction must be informed by a realistic termination
criterion and a viable military transition plan.71
The rapid collapse of Afghan security forces was heavily foretold and largely
anticipated. Cognitive dissonance alone explains why this certainty did not better
impact American contingency plans for terminating its military presence in

67. Hammes, “Raising and Mentoring Security Forces,” 330–31.
68. Schroden, “Lessons from Collapse.”
69. Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” Academy of Management Review 14,
no. 1 (1989): 58–59.
70. Biddle, “Building Security Forces,” 126–38.
71. Amos C. Fox, In Pursuit of a General Theory of Proxy War, Land Warfare Paper 123 (Washington, DC:
Institute of Land Warfare/Association of the United States Army, February 2019), 14.
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Afghanistan. Future American plans for security forces partnerships can and must
do better.
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In fact, it actually was a known-known for quite some time before August 2021.3
Since 2018, the ANDSF were never as big as reported nor as cohesive as implied in
public statements. Although pessimistic, American military and intelligence leaders
hedged their assessments of Afghan military viability after a final US withdrawal,
speaking of an inevitable ANDSF demise in terms of months, not weeks. Yet by
the end of 2018 ANDSF leaders and servicemembers understood that without a
reversal of course in Washington, the American-Taliban peace negotiations would
result in the end of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces.4
From its inception, the Afghan military was a “monkey in the middle” of the
geopolitical dynamics between the United States, the Pakistani military and
intelligence services, and the fractious political leadership of Afghanistan. Combined,
these factors seriously constrained the ANDSF, assuring it had quantifiable
shortcomings and qualitative liabilities it could never resolve without continuing
US and Coalition military in-country support. These quantitative shortfalls included
insufficient aerial or artillery support for troops in contact, inadequate aerial resupply
and replenishment for forces far afield, and insufficient maintenance to sustain the
main weapons systems. Each of these shortfalls had been reported publicly for years.
They merely accelerated after 2018.
More critically, the ANDSF had qualitative problems limiting its ability to
conduct credible, autonomous counterinsurgency operations against a determined
and resilient Taliban. Its cohesion was suspect owing to endemic mistrust of the
Afghan central government and systemic corruption in its leadership ranks. Its
morale was questionable, as it routinely suffered high-casualty attacks by Taliban
forces. Other than in its small number of special operations forces, it lacked the
ability to prevent proactively or respond to Taliban attacks without substantive
American support. Moreover, from 2018 through 2021, ANDSF bore the brunt
of Taliban aggression while US and Western militaries enjoyed first an informal
agreement, and later, after the February 2020 US-Taliban Peace Agreement
(Doha Accord), a formal arrangement with the Taliban to stop attacking foreign
military forces only.
The February 2020 US-Taliban Doha Accord framed one final important
dilemma for the ANDSF. The agreement stipulated all US and Western troops must
3. See Craig Whitlock, “The Afghanistan Papers – At War with the Truth,” Washington Post,
December
9,
2019,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers
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depart Afghanistan by May 1, 2021, or, and as the Taliban made clear repetitively,
they would renew attacks against United States Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A)
and other foreign forces as “fair game.” This deadline gave the US military and
Coalition forces enormous incentives to move out of Afghanistan rapidly to reduce
“risks to the force.” But this accelerated American military retrograde undercut the
negotiating position of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
(GIRoA) with the Taliban, and, in turn, gave ANDSF mid-level and junior officers
and enlisted servicemembers additional incentives to cut local deals and prepare for
an almost-certain Taliban return to power.
These debilitating quantitative and qualitative dynamics were hiding in plain
sight—known and publicized in open-source media and public testimony. To
establish the record of preconditions and important moments in the ANDSF’s rapid
collapse properly, it is important to reexamine the chronology of what was known
about ANDSF fragility from 2018 on, especially from 2020–21. A focused review
will recount the most important “knowns” about this fragility in three key time
periods: (1) January 2018 to February 2020, (2) March 2020 to April 2021, and,
(3) May to August 2021.
This review highlights several principles American policymakers should consider
in the future; one where Washington may find itself advising or directly supporting
proxy and surrogate military forces undertaking kinetic activities against the proxies
or forces of America’s great-power competitors. The ANDSF’s failure to launch and
spectacular 2021 collapse reflect a larger historic problem for US security assistance
efforts at training, advising, and equipping of allied militaries as an alternative to
large, semipermanent US ground-force commitments.5 American policymakers must
acknowledge this disappointing legacy and approach security-partner assistance in
the new era of great-power competition with humility, forethought, and caution
informed by the heavily foretold, rapid demise of the ANDSF.

Cost Consciousness and Delimited Afghan
National Defense and Security Forces
The ANDSF’s growth parameters and composition were adjusted multiple
times over its 20-year lifespan.6 After fluctuating during the 2000s, by the 2010s,
5. Stephen Biddle, “Building Security Forces & Stabilizing Nations: The Problem of Agency,” Daedalus 146,
no. 4 (Fall 2017): 126–38, https://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/4/126/1831111/daed_a_00464.pdf;
Walter C. Ladwig III, The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships and Counterinsurgency (London:
Cambridge University Press, 2017), 1–52, 289–313; and Stephen Biddle, “Afghanistan’s Legacy: Emerging
Lessons of an Ongoing War,” Washington Quarterly 37, no. 2 (Summer 2014): 73–86, https://doi.org/10.1080/01
63660X.2014.926210.
6. For a short review of sizing machinations, see T. X. Hammes, “Raising and
Mentoring Security Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq,” in Lessons Encountered: Learning from
the Long War, ed., Richard D. Hooker Jr. and Joseph J. Collins (Washington, DC: National Defense University
Press, 2015), 281–304.
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US and Coalition partners decided ANDSF would be structured at 352,000 total
personnel, 195,000 of whom were in the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the
Afghan Air Force (AAF), with the remainder under the Ministry of the Interior
(MOI) as national police and special security forces.7 It is unlikely ANDSF ever
met these totals as reporting was notoriously suspect and the ability of US and
Coalition advisers to monitor them atrophied consistently after 2014 as ANDSF
took the counterinsurgency lead and Coalition mentors stepped back from side-byside advising.8 Washington and its partners limited the AAF to a small number of
aerial platforms with light, counterinsurgency-focused fixed-wing and ground-strike
helicopters and a limited number of lift aircraft for reliable countrywide mobility
for an ANA of almost 200,000 (see table 1). Likewise, the Afghan army would
have limited indirect-fire weapons capability and be structured without long-range
artillery or drone-strike assets.
The ANA was built to rely on US and Coalition support for its main
battlefield competitive advantages against the Taliban insurgency: generation
of airspace superiority, long-haul aerial logistics and mobility, and volume in
air-to-ground interdiction strikes.

7. Department of Defense (DoD), Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress
(Washington, DC: DoD, December 2017), 35–36, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/1225
-Report-Dec-2017.pdf.
8. “Transcripts: Department of Defense Press Briefing by Gen. Campbell via Satellite in the Pentagon Briefing
Room,” DoD (website), October 2, 2014; and SIGAR, “Oversight Bubble Inquiry Letter,” SIGAR 14-4-SP,
October 10, 2013.
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Table 1. March 2020 Authorized and Available Aircraft for Afghanistan Air Force
(Entries with an asterisk are very light, small aircraft that would prove no match for the standard aircraft found in the
Pakistani air force. These aircraft dominated the composition of the Afghanistan Air Force.)

Military Function

Aircraft Name

# Authorized # Available

Air-to-Air Fixed Wing Fighters

0

0

Air-to-Ground Strike and
Reconnaissance/
Strike Category Totals

105

89

A29 (Super Toucan)*

25

15

AC-208*

10

10

MD-530*

48

45

Mi-17

22

19

72

65

C-208*

23

23

C-130

4

2

UH-60

45

40

Fixed Wing

Rotary Wing

Aerial Transport/
Lift Category Totals
Fixed Wing
Rotary Wing

These military hardware parameter limitations and force number vacillations
emerged because of American and partner-state concerns about the costs and
sustainment potential for an autonomous Afghan security force. A bigger
AAF or a more capable ground force would cost more to recruit, train, retain,
and operate with higher-end technologies.9 Thus, the United States preferred
utilizing its own in-country military assets for these higher-end capabilities, thereby
capping the costs to US taxpayers at about $4 billion.10
Another critical regional security dynamic helped scope these ANDSF
limitations: Pakistan’s wary military and intelligence organizations. Pakistan never
wanted strong, capable, autonomous ANDSF for several strategic reasons. First,
Pakistan fundamentally distrusted the non-Pashtun ethnic groups in the north
and west of Afghanistan, particularly the Tajiks and the Uzbeks. Pakistani security
leaders viewed them as hostile to Pakistan and pointed to recent history for

9. Department of Defense (DoD), Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to
Congress (Washington, DC: DoD, October 2013, 48, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs
/October_1230_Report_Master_Nov7.pdf.
10. See Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, Congressional
Research Service (CRS) Report RL30588 (Washington, DC: CRS, December 13, 2017), 27–28,
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30588/278.
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justification.11 During the Afghan civil war of the 1990s, these Tajik and Uzbek
groups not only battled against Pashtun groups favored by the Pakistani InterService Intelligence Agency, but often took funding and physical support from
Russia, Iran and, most critically, India. In 1994, Pakistan supported the Afghan
Taliban in opposing these groups and was alarmed when post-2001 Afghan
governments routinely featured Tajik and Uzbek strongmen as leaders of the
ANDSF and the Afghan national intelligence services.12
Second, Pakistan feared Indian subterfuge and access to Pakistan’s “back door”
in the post-2001 Afghan government and especially in the ANDSF.13 India is
Pakistan’s biggest security concern and is described in Pakistan as an existential
threat. Pakistan’s chilly relations with the Tajik and Uzbek groups who habitually led
the ANDSF (and Afghan intelligence service, the National Directorate of Security)
made them paranoid that the ANDSF and National Directorate of Security would
abet Indian diplomatic and intelligence assets at or near the Pakistani border.14 These
fears underpinned Pakistan’s constant complaining from 2004–15 that Afghanistan
was riven with over a dozen Indian consulates, many close to Pakistan, and
threatening to destabilize Pakistan through various means of cross-border influence.
In reality, there never were more than five of these Indian outposts, including
the Indian embassy in Kabul.15 Informed by these concerns, Pakistan’s security
establishment continued its indirect support for the Afghan Taliban, preferring a
low-boil instability inside Afghanistan to a strong, non-Pashtun, ANDSF doing
India’s bidding and putting a “security squeeze” on Pakistan from the west.16
Concurrently, Pakistan quietly preferred the US military remain affiliated with
the Afghan military while the Taliban was weak for three main reasons: because
Rawalpindi officials distrusted the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan as a stalking horse for India; because American presence there anchored
a counterterrorism partnership that reaped a large financial-aid package for the
Pakistani military; and because American military commanders served as a kind of
11. Raja Karthikeya Gundu and Teresita C. Schaffer, “India and Pakistan in Afghanistan: Hostile Sports,”
South Asia Monitor 117 (April 3, 2008), https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-asia-monitor-india-and-pakistan
-afghanistan-hostile-sports-april-03-2008.
12. Rizwan Hussein, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan (Burlington, VT: Ashgate
Press, 2005), 55–62; and Nasreen Akhtar, “Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Taliban,” International Journal on World
Peace 25, no. 4 (December 2008): 49–73, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20752859?seq=19#metadata_info_tab
_contents.
13. Larry Hanauer and Peter Chalk, India’s and Pakistan’s Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United
States and the Region, RAND Occasional Paper 387 (Santa Monica: CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), 1–3, 25–36,
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP387.pdf; and Gundu and
Schaffer, “India and Pakistan in Afghanistan.”
14. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Oxford, UK: Pan Books,
2000), 17–35.
15. Steve Coll, Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan (New York: Penguin
Press, 2018), 267–70.
16. Seth G. Jones, “Afghanistan’s Future Emirate? The Taliban and the Struggle for Afghanistan,” CTC Sentinel
13, no. 11 (West Point, New York: Countering Terrorism Center, November 2020), https://ctc.usma.edu/wp
-content/uploads/2020/11/CTC-SENTINEL-112020.pdf; and Hanauer and Chalk, Strategies in Afghanistan.
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big-brother overseer and a node for the Pakistani military (PakMIL) and its InterServices Intelligence Agency to push back against ANDSF activities or associations
(especially with India) that Islamabad found threatening. To be certain, American
military presence in Afghanistan was bothersome for Pakistan in many other ways,
but Rawalpindi balanced these with the benefits a US footprint there provided.17
Thus, the AAF would have a limited quantity and quality of air-to-ground strike
aircraft. The AAF would have a limited number of airlifter planes with a capacity
limited to battling insurgent forces rather than a cross-border rival state. The
ANDSF had a limited number of ground artillery assets, and those were constrained
in firing range—again, so they would not be able to range far into Pakistani territory
in the event of major cross-border insurgency hostilities. The United States would
provide all these capabilities and more.18
From birth, ANDSF was a “monkey in the middle” caught between US/Coalition
concerns about affordability and sustainability and Pakistani worries about a strong
force on its border with autonomous security aims and suspect relations with India.

Mixed Loyalty
ANDSF uniformed and civilian leadership was normally ethnic Tajiks or Uzbeks,
and it struggled to recruit Pashtuns throughout the 2000s but attained proportionality
in the 2010s.19 While desirable, Pashtun proportionality in the Afghan armed forces
represented both a strength and a weakness. Pashtun representation was important
optically and politically for a Pashtun-led government. Pashtun proportionality in
the middle-to-lower ANDSF ranks enabled the government to present its forces
as representative of the nation. Additionally, proportional ethnic representation
ensured the Pashtun-led national government met the expectations of its political

17. See Moeed Yusuf, Huma Yusuf and Salman Zaidi, Pakistan, the United States and the End Game in
Afghanistan: Perceptions of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Elite (Islamabad: Jinnah Institute - R0811-04, 2011), 14–15,
21–28, 28; John Schmidt, The Unraveling: Pakistan in the Age of Jihad (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011),
198–202; and Jibran Ahmad, “Afghan Taliban Stop Pakistan Army from Fencing International Border,” Reuters
(website), December 22, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/afghan-taliban-stop-pakistan-army
-fencing-international-border-2021-12-22/.
18. See SIGAR, High-Risk List (Arlington, VA: SIGAR, December 2014), 1, www.sigar.mil/pdf/spotlight
/High-Risk_List.pdf.
19. DoD, Report on Progress, 38; and Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghan National Security Forces: Afghan
Corruption and the Development of an Effective Fighting Force,” Testimony before the House
Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Oversights and Investigations, Brookings (website),
August 2, 2012, https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/afghan-national-security-forces-afghan-corruption
-and-the-development-of-an-effective-fighting-force/.
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base. Given that the Afghan Taliban was mainly a Pashtun insurgency, equal ethnic
representation was a political and military necessity.

Figure 2. Major ethnic groups of Afghanistan
(Map courtesy of https://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/Reading/Maps/afghan.map.htm)

Pashtun representation in the Afghan military also generated weakness.
Unlike the northern Afghan ethnic groups, Pashtun tribes and subtribes
span the soft, highly porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. There
are approximately 14 million Pashtuns in Afghanistan, and they make up
42 percent of its population. As no other Afghan ethnicity comprises more than
27 percent of the population, Pashtuns hold the political power to assure national
leadership. There are another 30 million ethnic Pashtuns in Pakistan. They are 16
percent of the Pakistani population but make up 66 percent of all regional Pashtuns.
Therefore, Pashtun tribes and families in Afghanistan must always consider crossborder political and security issues. Since the Afghan Taliban is comprised of
ethnic Pashtun subtribes and subgroups, Afghan Pashtuns hedged their bets in the
post-2001 era. True across Afghanistan but especially in the Pashtun-dominated
east and southeast, kinship and tribal connections often take precedence over
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formal political loyalties.20 Thus, it was common for Afghan Pashtun families to
have one son in the Afghan military and another in the Taliban.21 One son made
the family money with a regular government paycheck, and the other assured the
family with a hedge against insurgent success.
By 2015, serious Afghan observers knew Pashtun families were negotiating
with the Taliban in anticipation of ANDSF’s ultimate failure. Early that year,
the United States and NATO ended their leadership of the counterinsurgency
combat mission in Afghanistan and shifted to training assistance, advising
the ANDSF at-distance. Soon afterward, al-Qaeda training sites appeared in
southern Afghanistan, where the Taliban had begun to push back the ANDSF
in 2015. Alarmed, the Obama administration arrested its withdrawal plans and
took steps to allow US and NATO forces to support the ANDSF.22 Then, the
Trump administration review of Afghan policy authorized a mid-2017 mini-surge
of US forces in yet another American effort to show strength against the resurgent
Afghan Taliban. The Trump surge featured additional US military advisers in new
Security Force Assistance Brigades for placement into ANDSF lower echelons
and were considered critical to the campaign’s success.23 Arriving in early 2018,
they conducted advising missions, facilitated operation planning with selected
ANA Brigades and even some Kandaks (battalions) fighting the Taliban for the
first time since 2014.

Taliban Violence Reduction against the United States,
Not Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
June 2018 to February 2020
The Trump surge and renewed connectivity between US/NATO military
units and tactical ANDSF formations was short-lived. By summer 2018, the
Trump administration announced it was pursuing direct peace negotiations
with the Afghan Taliban, formally appointing Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad
as a Special Representative for Afghan Reconciliation (SRAR) by the fall.
SRAR Khalilzad acquired presidential authority to negotiate directly with
Taliban representatives, mainly in Doha, Qatar, while keeping the Afghan
government informed but not formally represented. From this point, the
20. Anatol Lieven, “An Afghan Tragedy: The Pashtuns, the Taliban and the State,” Survival 63, no. 3
(June–July 2021): 7–31, https://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/2021/survival-global-politics-and-strategy
-june-july-2021; and Lieven, “Why Afghan Forces.”
21. General Abdul Fahim Wardak, then-Afghan Minister of Defense, comment to author (Kabul, Afghanistan,
December 2009).
22. Thomas F. Lynch III, “After ISIS: Reappraising U.S. Policy in Afghanistan,” Washington Quarterly,
38, no. 2 (July 2015): 119–44.
23. Ryan Browne and Barbara Starr, “US Military Says It Killed Dozens of Taliban Leaders in Afghanistan,”
CNN (website), May 30, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/30/politics/us-killed-taliban-leaders-afghanistan
/index.html.
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Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan felt it was being sidelined
and its future negotiated in absentia.
Sensing the prospect for a favorable outcome, or at least a respite from an
exceptionally violent period of the insurgency, Afghan Taliban targeting of
US/western military forces tailed off notably.24 Fifteen American and allied
forces were killed in Afghanistan in 2017, with eight of those deaths linked to
attacks by the Afghan Taliban. In 2018, there were 14 US/allied troop deaths,
and none were claimed by the Taliban. The pattern continued with almost all
US 2019–20 military deaths coming from counterterrorism operations initiated by
the US and Afghan forces against groups affiliated with al-Qaeda, the Pakistani
Taliban in Afghanistan, or the Islamic State in Khorasan (ISIS-K).25 Over the
same period, ANDSF deaths from Taliban attacks and battles soared, moving
beyond 8,000 per year in 2017–18 andup to an estimated 10,900 per year in 2019
and 2020.26 Afghan President Ashraf Ghani reported in early 2019 that more than
45,000 members of the ANDSF had been killed since he became leader in 2014.27
The ANDSF quandary came into full relief as formal US-Taliban
peace talks commenced in January 2019.28 The ANDSF bore the brunt
of the Taliban fight on the ground without sufficient critical military
capabilities to counter Taliban strength, and it
now had the full
knowledge that the Taliban appeared to have limited attacks against
the American and Western military forces informally to encourage talks designed

24. Jonathan Beale, “Why Are UK and US Sending More Troops to Afghanistan?” BBC News (website),
August 13, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44967531.
25. Compiled from “Number of Fatalities among Western Coalition Soldiers Involved in the Execution of
Operation Enduring Freedom from 2001 to 2021,” Statista (website), https://www.statista.com/statistics/262894
/western-coalition-soldiers-killed-in-afghanistan/; Bureau of Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on Terrorism
2020: Afghanistan,” Department of State (website), n.d., https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on
-terrorism-2020/afghanistan/; Bureau of Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2019:
Afghanistan,” Department of State (website), n.d., https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on
-terrorism-2019/afghanistan/; DoD, Stability and Security in Afghanistan, Reports to Congress (Washington,
DC: DoD, December 2017, December 2018, December 2019, December 2020, and December 2021);
and Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), January 20, 2017 Quarterly
Report to US Congress, January 20, 2018 Quarterly Report to US Congress, January 20, 2019 Quarterly Report to
US Congress, January 20, 2020 Quarterly Report to US Congress, and January 20, 2021 Quarterly Report to
US Congress, SIGAR (website), n.d., https://www.sigar.mil/quarterlyreports/.
26. Sam Gollob and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstructionand Security
in Post-9/11 Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2020), 17, https://www.brookings.edu
/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/FP_20200825_afganistan_index.pdf.
27. “Afghanistan’s Ghani Says 45,000 Security Personnel Killed Since 2014,” BBC News (website),
January 25, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47005558.
28. Steve Coll and Adam Entous, “The Secret History of the U.S. Diplomatic Failure in Afghanistan,”
New Yorker (website), December 10, 2021, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/12/20/the-secret
-history-of-the-us-diplomatic-failure-in-afghanistan.
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to end Western military presence. This knowledge exacerbated ANDSF anxieties
and reinforced local-level hedging behavior.

The Doha Accord and Extreme ANDSF Exposure
March 2020 to April 2021
On February 29, 2020, SRAR Khalilzad and Afghan Taliban representative
Abdul Ghani Baradar signed the US-Taliban Peace Accord in Doha,
Qatar. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was not
a signatory and had played no direct role in its negotiation over the prior
16 months. The agreement committed the United States and Coalition partners to
“complete” military withdrawal from Afghanistan in 15 months—by May 1, 2021. In
return, the Taliban promised three major outcomes. First, it committed to preventing
al-Qaeda or similar international Salafi jihadist terror organizations from planning
or conducting attacks against the United States or its allies from Afghan soil.
It made a formal promise to refrain from attacks against US and Coalition forces
during the implementation period and committed to a reduction in violence
(RIV) for Afghanistan as a whole. The Taliban, however, did not formally
promise to refrain from attacking GIRoA or ANDSF targets.29 It also agreed
to commence political talks with the Government of the Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan aimed at reconciliation and a new framework for Afghan
governance—inter-Afghan negotiations (IAN).30
Absent a total collapse of the peace agreement, the best outcome for the
ANDSF would be one where inter-Afghan negotiations were successful, and there
would be some combination of ANDSF and Taliban military assets. Ultimately,
this outcome would require a process of disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration (DDR). Historically, the pathway to DDR between government and
insurgent forces is vexing. While there are incentives for opposing military forces
to reduce violence and save combatant lives, there are also competing incentives
for them to maximize political negotiating leverage by conducting aggressive
military operations aimed at altering “facts on the ground.” Often, a cease-fire
agreement is built into a political negotiating period to dampen the incentives for
military aggression.31 When a viable cease-fire is not feasible or enforceable, the
29. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”
30. “Joint Declaration between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America for Bringing
Peace to Afghanistan,” February 29, 2020, 1, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/02.29.20-US
-Afghanistan-Joint-Declaration.pdf. (The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is not recognized by the United
States as a state and is known as the Taliban.); and Michael R. Pompeo, “Secretary Pompeo Remarks to
Media,” US Department of State (website), February 25, 2020, video, 18:35, site-894736.bcvp0rtal.com/detail
/videos/secretary-of-state/video/6135770177001/secretary-pompeo-remarks-to-media.?autoStart=true.
31. Valerie Sticher and Siniša Vuković, “Bargaining in Intrastate Conflicts: The Shifting Role of Ceasefires,”
Journal of Peace Research 1, no. 1 (May 2021): https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022343320982658;
Coll and Entous, “Secret History”; and SIGAR, April 30, 2020 Quarterly Report to US Congress, SIGAR (website),
n.d., https://www.sigar.mil/quarterlyreports/.
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force with the upper hand will normally fight to secure gains that will enhance its
negotiating leverage. Since the terms of the Doha Accord allowed the Taliban to
continue fighting against the ANDSF and GIRoA throughout the IAN period,
they continued to press their martial advantage.
The worst scenario for ANDSF was one where the United States stuck to its
withdrawal plans, IAN was not successful, and the Taliban took advantage of
US/Coalition withdrawal of forces to attrit the ANDSF badly. Details of the
reduction in violence (RIV) component in the US-Taliban Peace Accord were
relegated to a classified annex but appeared to inhibit, but not credibly prohibit,
the Taliban from pursuing this course of action.
After the February Doha Agreement signing ceremony, US Secretary of State
Michael Pompeo stated the level of Taliban attacks and violence were expected
to remain low.32 But by late April 2020, General Austin “Scott” Miller, US Forces
Afghanistan and Operation Resolute Support commander, reported that from
March 1 to 31, “the Taliban refrained from attacks against Coalition Forces,
[while] they increased attacks against ANDSF to levels above seasonal norms.”33
Taliban military activities during spring and summer 2020 were unambiguously
aggressive, but in a differentiated manner. An independent fall 2020 assessment
reported Taliban-controlled areas experienced unexpected peace in the aftermath
of Doha as the United States largely halted air attacks and the ANDSF
moved to a defensive posture. But in GIRoA-controlled areas, the Taliban
intensified violence against government entities and Afghan civilians even as it
limited major attacks.34
A key part of the Doha Accord not made public called on US forces to end
offensive air strikes against the Taliban while allowing for strikes in defense of
the ANDSF.35After a post–Doha Agreement lull, American military air strikes
to protect ANDSF resumed in summer 2020. The Taliban formally protested all
American strikes that supported ANDSF, calling them a violation of the Doha

32. Michael R. Pompeo, “Secretary Michael R. Pompeo at a Press Availability after the Afghanistan
Signing Ceremony: Remarks to the Press,” Department of State (website), February 29, 2020, https://2017-2021
.state.gov/at-a-press-availability-after-the-afghanistan-signing-ceremony/index.html.
33. SIGAR, April 30, 2020 Quarterly Report,” 62, 65.
34. Andrew Quilty, “Taleban Opportunism and ANSF Frustration: How the Afghan Conflict Has Changed
Since the Doha Agreement,” Afghan Analysts Network (website), October 12, 2020, https://www.afghanistananalysts.org /en /reports/war-and-peace/taleban-opportunism-and-ansf-frustration-how-the-afghan-conflict-has
-changed-since-the-doha-agreement/.
35. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”

War and Its Effects

Lynch

49

Accord’s annex on managing combat. Later in 2020, the Taliban used US air
activity to justify their intensifying military campaign against Kabul.36
The prisoner exchange component of the Doha Accord partially enabled
surging Talban military activity and acumen. Despite GIRoA skepticism,
the final Doha Accord called for the confidence-building exchange of “up to”
5,000 Taliban prisoners held in Afghan jails in exchange for 1,000 Afghans
held by the Taliban. The Taliban quickly insisted release of a full 5,000
was a precondition to commencing peace talks with the GIRoA.37 Under
American pressure, Afghan leaders released about 4,600 Taliban prisoners in
spring 2020 and the final 400 in August 2020 after a period of inter-Afghan,
and Afghan-American debate. An independent research report in late summer
2020 estimated almost 70 percent of the 108 released Taliban resumed active
fighting roles, returning important battlefield expertise to intensifying Taliban
military operations.38
ANDSF morale took a direct hit from the way Taliban leaders spoke
and acted after the Doha Accord. Tolo News reported that on March 25 in
Balochistan Province, Pakistan, a senior Taliban negotiator, Mullah Fazel, told
supporters the Taliban would ultimately be victorious in establishing an Islamic
Emirate. Fazel reportedly said that while the “Taliban or the Islamic Emirate
will never become part of the Kabul [Afghan] government,” the Taliban might
accept Afghan government officials with senior positions.39 US Agency for
International Development (USAID)–funded monitoring of Taliban public
communications found the Taliban’s tone resoundingly triumphant during
April and May 2020 following the announced withdrawal of US military forces,
clearly indicating to Afghan forces the future government of Afghanistan
would be subject to Taliban preferences and potential vengeance.40 The
one-sided pattern of Taliban aggression persisted into mid-October 2020
when USFOR-A Commander General Miller again stated that the high

36. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”
37. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”
38. Lynne O’Donnell, “Defying Peace Deal, Freed Taliban Return to Battlefield,” Foreign Policy (website),
September 3, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/03/defying-peace-deal-freed-taliban-prisoners-return
-battlefield-afghanistan/; France 24, “Some Freed Taliban Prisoners Have Returned to Battle, Says Afghan
Negotiator,” France24.com (website), September 23, 2020, https://www.france24.com/en/20200923-afghanistan
-freed-taliban-prisoners-return-battle-abdullah-abdullah-doha-peace-talks.
39. Abubakar Siddique, “Are the Taliban Committed to Negotiating Peace in Afghanistan?” Gandhara
(website), March 31, 2020, https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/are-the-taliban-committed-to-negotiating-peace-in
-afghanistan-/30520521.html.
40. Quilty, “Taleban Opportunism and ANSF Frustration.”
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level of Taliban violence around the country “is not consistent with the
US-Taliban agreement and undermines the ongoing Afghan peace talks.”41
The disposition and orientation of ANDSF forces contributed to its
vulnerability in the post–Doha Accord fight. In November 2019, the Afghan
government estimated that the ANDSF had over 10,000 checkpoints nationwide,
with an average of 10 to 20 personnel at each. After the Doha Accord, as
Coalition forces stepped back from advising and assisting ANA forward elements,
they helped the ANA with a checkpoint reduction and base development plan
(CPRBD) for 2021 that reportedly reduced ANA checkpoints to just under 2,000
with another 600 patrol bases across Afghanistan.42 It still meant the ANDSF had
approximately one-third of its total force, 95,000 personnel, manning checkpoints
as of December 2020.43
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces checkpoint-heavy positioning
contributed to a largely static and defensive mission profile even as GIRoA political
leadership belatedly called for greater assertiveness against the resurgent Taliban
in 2020. Most ANA Corps reportedly refused to execute missions without ANA
Special Operations Command (ANASOC) augmentation. When ANASOC
Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) arrived, they were just as likely to be
misused to perform tasks intended for conventional forces such as route clearance,
checkpoint security, and quick-reaction force.44 From October to December 2020,
the ASSF took on more responsibility for ground operations, and conducting more
operations in a single quarter than they had since April–June 2019.45 Small and
overtaxed, the ASSF could not meet rapidly growing demand.46
As the Biden-Harris administration assumed control and began a
comprehensive review of Afghanistan policy in early 2021, the worst-case
scenario for ANDSF unfolded. The Taliban stepped up attacks, maintained
close ties with al-Qaeda, and actively planned for large-scale offensives—
all while IAN between GIRoA and the Taliban failed to make
any progress.47 The April 9, 2021, Annual Threat Assessment of the
41. USFOR-A Spokesman Colonel Sonny Leggett, “Taliban Need to Step Up,” October 12, 2020,
https://twitter.com/USFOR_A/status/1315602850186244096.
42. SIGAR, April 30, 2022 Quarterly Report to US Congress, SIGAR (website), n.d., 71-2, https://www.sigar
.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2022-04-30qr.pdf.
43. SIGAR, January 30, 2021 Quarterly Report to US Congress, SIGAR (website), n.d., 1, 68, https://www.sigar
.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2021-01-30qr.pdf.
44. SIGAR, April 30, 2021 Quarterly Report to US Congress, SIGAR (website), n.d., 75, https://www.sigar
.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2021-04-30qr.pdf.
45. See SIGAR, January 30, 2021 Quarterly Report, 63; and ASSF - Afghan Special Security Forces, ANA
Special Operations Command (ANASOC), https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/anasoc.
htm.
46. Also see SIGAR, January 30, 2021 Quarterly Report, 47.
47. Defense Department’s Office of Inspector General, May 18, 2021; and Courtney Kube and
Dan De Luce, “Taliban Ramped Up Attacks against Afghans as Peace Talks Faltered, Pentagon
Watchdog Says,” NBC News (website), March 2, 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/taliban
-ramped-attacks-against-afghans-peace-talks-faltered-pentagon-watchdog-n1267852).
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US Intelligence Community stated that prospects for an agreement between the
Afghan government and the Taliban “will remain low during the next year,” and
“the Taliban is likely to make gains on the battlefield, and the Afghan Government
will struggle to hold the Taliban at bay if the Coalition withdraws support.” The
assessment also concluded that the ANDSF “continues to face setbacks on the
battlefield, and the Taliban is confident it can achieve military victory.”48
Independent reporting indicates USFOR-A Commander Miller strongly
argued during the Biden-Harris administration comprehensive review that the
United States must keep forces in Afghanistan beyond the May 1, 2021, deadline
for fear of what would happen to the Afghan military once the United States
departed.49 General Miller wrote what he had earlier stated in public: the level
of Taliban military operational tempo could not be countered by the Afghan
military alone.

Full US Military Withdrawal and ANDSF Collapse
May to August 2021
On April 14, 2021, Biden announced the United States would end its military
presence in Afghanistan by September 11, 2021.50 American diplomats began
pressing for expedited IAN, even as the US military and allied NATO forces pivoted
to an accelerated withdrawal.51 In response, Afghan President Ghani tweeted an
aspirational message about the ANDSF, stating “Afghanistan’s proud security
and defense forces are fully capable of defending its people and country.”52 Ghani
seemed to hold out hope and made changes to leadership of the Afghan MOD
and MOI in March 2021 that bolstered Pashtun status and loyalty to him. At his
request, the United States and its European allies avoided evacuating their personnel
or Afghan associates for fear it would look like a rush to the exits and precipitate
a collapse of GIRoA.53
Yet, as the final US military withdrawal began in May 2021, Ghani was
mired in a political crisis that bode poorly for an already bedraggled ANDSF.
48. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence
Community (Washington, DC: ODNI, April 9, 2021), 25, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents
/assessments/ATA-2021-Unclassified-Report.pdf.
49. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”
50. “Briefing Room: Remarks by Joe Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan” White House (website),
April
14,
2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/14/remarks-by
-president-biden-on-the-way-forward-in-afghanistan/.
51. Associated Press, “Afghan Cease-fire Ends after Wave of Violence amid Calls for Fresh Peace Talks,”
NBC News (website), May 16, 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/afghan-cease-fire-ends-amid
-calls-fresh-peace%7C-talks-n1267517; and George Packer, “The Betrayal,” Atlantic (website),
January 31, 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/03/biden-afghanistan-exit-american
-allies-abandoned/621307/.
52. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”
53. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”
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Ghani and his small inner circle, led by National Security Adviser Hamdullah
Mohib, had not fully acted on the late 2020 US military recommendation to
consolidate ANDSF forces into a smaller array of more defensible positions focused
on strategic elements such as key roads, cities, and border crossings. In truth, the
politics and demographics of Afghanistan made it impossible for Ghani to comply
fully. Ghani reportedly told US Secretary of State Antony Blinken this sort of
repositioning would make GIRoA look weak.54 Mohib reportedly stated, “We’re not
giving up one inch of our country.”55
The Taliban already had de facto control of much of Afghanistan by then, but
Ghani and Mohib knew that to consolidate any further—away from ethnic Pashtun
areas and into ones more populated by ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras—
was political suicide. Under such a consolidation, he and any future national Pashtun
political leader would play third fiddle to a Taliban-dominated Pashtun political base
and to Tajik Co-president Abdullah Abdullah or another northern ethnic political
persona. SRAR Khalilzad later told American journalists Steve Coll and Adam
Entous that Ghani never had any interest in negotiating with the Taliban, for only
the status quo kept him in power.56 While far from exculpatory of SRAR Khalilzad’s
pivotal role in empowering the Taliban military success during peace negotiations,
Khalilzad properly understood Ghani’s political calculus.
Poorly positioned, insufficiently equipped, and politically isolated, ANDSF
morale was at a tipping point. Then, on July 2, 2021, the abrupt US military
departure from Bagram hit the ANDSF hard. Many in the ANDSF reported to
local and national news they felt abandoned to die trying to defend Bagram and
other such locations.57
Regrettably, Biden went on record in early July 2021 stating that a Taliban
military takeover or collapse of GIRoA was not inevitable.58 This statement
misappreciated the realities of low ANDSF morale, bad tactical positioning, and a lack
of confidence in GIRoA. Perhaps the American intelligence community supported
Biden’s ANDSF assessment, but such a conclusion would have been based upon its
evaluation of the Taliban shortcomings, not on the structural or emotional liabilities
of the ANDSF. By then, US military leaders lacked the onsite ability to evaluate

54. Jonathan Schroden “Lessons from the Collapse of Afghanistan’s Security Forces,” CTC Sentinel 14, no. 8
(October 2021): 45–61, https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/CTC-SENTINEL-082021.pdf.
55. Schroden “Lessons from Collapse.”
56. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”
57. Packer, “Betrayal.”
58. “Briefing Room: Remarks by President Biden on the Drawdown of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan,” White
House (website), July 8, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/07/08
/remarksby-president-biden-on-the-drawdown-of-u-s-forces-in-afghanistan/.
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ANDSF morale and cohesion dynamics reasonably, and US/Western abilities
to make such assessments accurately had been suspect for a long time.59
A lengthy Washington Post exposé later confirmed that by spring 2021, Afghan
forces were negotiating with the Taliban, often with the help of local elders rather
than fighting.60 Dealmaking featured arrangements for ANDSF surrender, parole,
and temporary local truces, all of which were well-established Afghan conflict
resolution practices, alongside those of revenge killings and summary executions.
Newly appointed Afghan Minister of Defense Bismillah Khan reported in
mid-July what outside accounts like those from the Afghan Advisor Network
(AAN) had foretold: the Taliban were offering ANDSF members money and a
letter of passage to protect them from harassment after they surrendered. By August
2021, “money was changing hands at a rapid rate,” a senior British military officer
said, with Afghan security forces getting “bought off by the Taliban.”61

Implications
The US-Taliban Peace Accord of February 29, 2020, put a 15-month “clock” on
what the ANDSF could expect from US or allied support. It did not generate the
perverse incentives underpinning the rapid collapse of the ANDSF, but it accelerated
negative expectations that the Taliban would ultimately prevail. From February 2020
until its collapse, ANDSF leadership was told to anticipate an Afghan political
settlement and subsequent security forces integration without ever witnessing a
viable IAN process. An AAN postmortem summary critiqued this period of political
negotiations scathingly, observing that SRAR Khalilzad’s faulty assumption that the
Taliban were truly pursuing negotiated peace spawned fantasy scenarios of TalibanGIRoA cooperation that never aligned with realities on the ground.62
Concurrently, ANDSF leaders and troopers could only reason the US military
would draw down to a point where it would stand alone against a resurgent
Taliban. An October 2020 AAN report cogently observed that in eight short
months since the Doha Agreement, US concessions to coax the Taliban to the
negotiating table sharpened its military edge and heightened its confidence while
simultaneously deflating and disempowering the ANDSF. The ANDSF bore the

59. Daniel P. Bolger, Why We Lost: A General’s Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (New York:
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014), 391; and Ben Connable, Embracing the Fog of War: Assessment and Metrics
in Counterinsurgency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012).
60. Susannah George, “Afghanistan’s Military Collapse: Illicit Deals and Mass Desertions,” Washington Post
(website), August 15, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/08/15/afghanistan-military-collapse
-taliban/.
61. Coll and Entous, “Secret History.”
62. Kate Clark, “The Taleban’s Rise to Power: As the US Prepared for Peace, the Taleban Prepared for War,”
Afghanistan Analysts Network (website), August 21, 2021, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports
/war-and-peace/the-talebans-rise-to-power-as-the-us-prepared-for-peace-the-taleban-prepared-for-war/.
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brunt of the Taliban’s growing eagerness to fight all the while knowing it could not
shoulder the accelerating fight alone.”63
On August 16, Biden addressed the nation and acknowledged the regrettable
outcome of America’s exit from Afghanistan, asserting that GIRoA and ANDSF
collapsed more quickly than anticipated. He also recited the mass of money and
equipment the United States had provided ANDSF over the years and called the
group it out for collapsing so quickly.64
Biden clearly articulated American frustrations with the enormous but
unsuccessful effort to build an autonomous Afghan military capability. However,
his remarks did not acknowledge that the ANDSF never was designed to defend
Afghanistan against a determined, resilient adversary alone or that Afghan culture
and tradition set the conditions for a rapid patchwork of local peace deals once
it was clear to “the monkey in the middle” that all US military forces would depart
and a strong, durable Taliban with tacit Pakistani backing would remain.
As the United States moves forward into a new geostrategic era of
great-power competition, it has backed away from counterinsurgency and
associated security-sector building and reform that featured in Afghanistan for
almost two decades. But American military advising and material support for
partner security forces will not vanish in this new era, instead it will morph. The
United States assuredly will find itself working with partner militaries, surrogates,
and even proxy forces requiring structural and operational support.65 Although
security-sector reform for a counterinsurgency environment is not the same as
advising and supporting a proxy force or surrogate military, a couple of insights from
the American experience with ANDSF seem germane.66
First, US policymakers should fully study and tailor mission support and package
profiles to a realistic set of security goals and outcomes appropriate to both the
conflict and the limitations on US military presence. Surrogates or proxy forces
aligned against adversaries with sustained backing from an American rival state
are not good candidates for structures or operations modeled after US institutions
or tactics. Afghanistan, like Vietnam, demonstrates that American-centric
approaches are unsustainable without a significant, long-term US military presence.
American military advisers and supporting packages must be tailored to understand
63. Kate Clark, “Behind the Statistics: Drop in Civilian Casualties Masks Increased Taleban Violence,”
Afghanistan Analysts Network (website), October 27, 2020, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports
/war-and-peace/behind-the-statistics-drop-in-civilian-casualties-masks-increased-taleban-violence/.
64. “Briefing: Remarks by President Biden on Afghanistan,” White House (website), August 16, 2021,
https: // www.whitehouse.gov /briefing - room /speeches - remarks /2021 /08 /16 /remarks - by - president-biden-onafghanistan/.
65. Frank Hoffman and Andrew Orner, “The Return of Great-Power Proxy Wars,” War on the Rocks
(website), September 2, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/09/the-return-of-great-power-proxy-wars/.
66. Ladwig III, Forgotten Front, 289–313; Biddle, “Building Security Forces,” 126–38; and Biddle,
“Afghanistan’s Legacy,” 73–86.
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the cultures and organizations before they deploy and be empowered to shape
operational and technological support in a manner that best complements the
forces they advise.67
Second, security partner fighting force morale must be factored into policy
options.68 Too often, American military advising reduces its evaluation criteria
to counting the quantity of material support and training time. Afghanistan
reminds us that the morale of the fighting force is determined by much more
than quantitative factors. The culture and incentives of the partner force must be
considered. Qualitative metrics based upon local cultural and political needs must
be developed and recurrently and fairly assessed. As the loss of fidelity in evaluating
ANDSF morale from 2018–21 demonstrates, accurate evaluations are impossible at
a distance. US policy must accept the inherent risk necessary to empower military
advisers down to the tactical level with partner formations—surrogates or proxies—
to generate reasonably reliable evaluations of fighting force morale.
Finally, the advising, training, and operational support for a partner military,
proxy, or surrogate force is inherently a principal-agent arrangement.69 Principals
and agents operate in accordance with their respective political objectives. When
these align, the relationship can be productive and enhance mutual security. When
these diverge, the relationship can fray and pose a security risk.70 Inevitably, even
mutually advantageous security relationships tend to expire under the accumulating
weight of political interest misalignment. In the case of Afghanistan, that expiration
occurred when the United States decided to negotiate peace with the Taliban alone
with an aim to terminate American military presence, leaving ANDSF without
the structure, sufficient capabilities, or morale to sustain autonomous security
operations against a strong and aggressive Taliban adversary. US policymakers
must assume that future proxy or surrogate relationships will eventually fray or
expire. Thus, the strategic interaction must be informed by a realistic termination
criterion and a viable military transition plan.71
The rapid collapse of Afghan security forces was heavily foretold and largely
anticipated. Cognitive dissonance alone explains why this certainty did not better
impact American contingency plans for terminating its military presence in

67. Hammes, “Raising and Mentoring Security Forces,” 330–31.
68. Schroden, “Lessons from Collapse.”
69. Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” Academy of Management Review 14,
no. 1 (1989): 58–59.
70. Biddle, “Building Security Forces,” 126–38.
71. Amos C. Fox, In Pursuit of a General Theory of Proxy War, Land Warfare Paper 123 (Washington, DC:
Institute of Land Warfare/Association of the United States Army, February 2019), 14.
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Afghanistan. Future American plans for security forces partnerships can and must
do better.
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ABSTRACT: This article argues the more trauma endured by a population,
the more civil war the country will experience in the future. Drawing on
mental health, trauma, and neurobiological research, it builds a new theory
of civil war that fills existing gaps in current civil-war literature, and then
tests the theory via statistical analysis of a large sample size (large-n statistical
analysis). The conclusions will help policymakers and US military leadership
better understand civil wars and the limits of American power to end them.
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aps in current civil-war research negatively impact the policymakers
who decide whether the United States will intervene in another
nation’s civil war and the military servicemembers who plan for and
fight in those wars. This article attempts to fill in these gaps by developing and
testing a new trauma theory of civil war.
One primary theory argues civil wars occur when citizens become sufficiently
motivated. Another argues civil wars occur when citizens have the opportunity to
rebel. Neither explains how or why the threshold for taking human life varies across
time and space. Additionally, quantitative researchers have failed to find support
for most proxies of motivation, such as government type and ethnolinguistic or
religious fractionalization. Furthermore, the opportunity theory appears to lack a
causal mechanism. Instead, the opportunity to rebel is more likely an enabling
condition rather than a theory.1 Beyond widespread consensus that poverty, slow
economic growth, and large populations are associated with an increased risk of
civil war, substantial debate exists about the significance of other factors.2
This lack of understanding has resulted in the United States intervening in
the civil wars of other nations yet remaining largely unaware of the underlying
1. Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1997), 10–12.
2. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science
Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90; Håvard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis, “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results
on Civil War Onset,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 4 (2006); Nicholas Sambanis, “A Review of Recent
Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil War,” Defence and Peace Economics 13
no. 3 (2002): 229; Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner, “Beyond Greed and Grievance,” Oxford
Economic Papers 61, no. 1 (2009): 1–27; and Håvard Hegre, “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy,
Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992,” American Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (2001).
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causes of the wars. Why, for example, was the prevalence of civil war so high
in Afghanistan yet so low in Bosnia before the United States intervened
in those countries? Answers to this question and similar ones could have
helped policymakers estimate the utility of military intervention and aided the
military in planning and executing a sound strategy for the achievement
of US objectives.
This article develops and tests a trauma theory of civil war. The potential
causal linkage is straightforward. The more trauma (for instance, torture, rape,
and disasters) endured by a country’s citizens, the more problems the citizens will
experience later, including mental illness, substance abuse, and diminished impulse
control. People dealing with these issues use violence more frequently to resolve
conflict and to achieve their goals than they would absent these conditions. As a
result, civil war becomes more likely.
Two key terms warrant further definition. Scholars typically define “civil war”
as armed conflict between a country’s government and a rebel group (or groups)
that takes place within the country’s borders and results in a minimum number
of fatalities over a specified period. Civil-war prevalence is thus the combined
probability of a war starting and an ongoing war continuing in a given year.3
The American Psychiatric Association defines a “traumatic stressor” as
“[a]ny event that may cause or threaten death, serious injury, or sexual violence to
an individual, a close family member, or a close friend.”4 Examples include being
tortured or raped, experiencing war, being assaulted with a weapon, experiencing a
natural disaster, and witnessing the death of a loved one. Intentional, man-made,
violent events directly experienced by the person have, on average, a more negative
effect than naturally occurring, indirectly experienced stressors.5
Three sections follow. The first builds the trauma theory by importing
theory from the trauma, mental health, and neurobiological fields. The second
reports the results of the statistical analysis of a large sample size. The final

3. Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, “How Much War Will We See? Explaining the Prevalence of
Civil War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 3 (2002): 311.
4. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th ed.
(Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association Publishing, 2013).
5. Maria Pacella, Bryce Hruska, and Douglas Delahanty, “The Physical Health Consequences of PTSD
and PTSD Symptoms: A Meta-Analytic Review,” Journal of Anxiety Disorders 27, no. 1 (January 2013): 42.
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section posits policy recommendations for military planners, warfighters, and
national security policymakers.

Building a Trauma Theory of Civil War
Trauma may increase the prevalence of civil war in three ways. First, people
often become more violent in response to severe and repeated, traumatic
stressors, lowering the threshold at which citizens will use deadly force against
their government. Second, trauma makes civil war more feasible by decreasing
the capabilities of the government and its security force while lowering the
opportunity costs of rebel recruitment. Third, trauma increases grievances among
the population, which further motivates them to rebel against their governments.
Mechanism 1: Trauma, Violence, and Goal Achievement
An event during my deployment to Afghanistan illustrates how previously
experienced trauma can lead people to use violence as a normal way to achieve
their goals and resolve their problems. Colonel “Naseri” began berating Colonel
“Habib” in the operations center in front of their subordinates and their American
counterparts. Habib, the police chief for the province, had angered Naseri, the
chief of the provincial security directorate, by arresting one of Naseri’s men in
connection with the serial raping of an Afghan boy. Naseri used the moment to
publicly mock Habib, who had spent most of his adult life in the midst of war
and the trauma that came with it. The American forces loved Habib, who was one
of the few brave men who consistently took the fight to the enemy, and the drug
addiction we assessed he had was understandable in a land where self-medication
was frequently the only medication available.
With their subordinates watching, Habib’s verbal responses proved no
match for Naseri’s rhetorical skewering. As though a switch had flipped, Habib
unholstered his handgun. There, in the Afghan equivalent of a war room,
Habib aimed his loaded weapon at Naseri. Fortunately, a nearby American officer
moved between the two men and the loaded firearm and persuaded Habib to
reholster his weapon.
As trauma increases, violence becomes progressively normalized within society
as a legitimate way to achieve goals and resolve problems. As the threshold for
the use of lethal force lowers, civil war becomes more likely.
An increase in exposure to trauma includes one or more of the following
situations. The traumatic stressors may become more severe. Intentionally caused
events directly experienced by an individual, such as a physical assault with
a weapon, typically lead to worse outcomes than do acts of nature or indirectly
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experienced events. The severest traumatic stressors include torture, rape, and war.
The amount of traumatic events experienced by a person may accumulate over
time, and individuals may be exposed to multiple events. The traumatic events may
continue or the time since the last exposure to a traumatic event might be recent.
Figure 1 shows the potential causal linkage between trauma and civil war.

Figure 1. Potential pathway from trauma to civil war

Step One: More Mental Illness, Substance Abuse, and Impulse-Control Problems
Increased exposure to traumatic stressors causes an increased in mental
illness and substance abuse and diminished impulse control.6 For example,
30 to 50 percent of populations caught in war zones with high rates of
torture will likely develop post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).7 Other mental
illnesses (such as major depressive disorder, anxiety disorders, and disruptive,
impulse-control) and conduct disorders are also relevant to the study of trauma
and civil war. Researchers have found more-severe traumatic stressors result in
worse outcomes for the victim than less-severe traumatic events do. For instance,
being the victim of torture or physical assault with a weapon is associated with
more severe and long-lasting mental illness than experiencing trauma from a
natural disaster or witnessing the death of a loved one.8
Trauma also leads to substance-abuse issues. Studies of participants in
substance-abuse treatment programs found the co-occurrence of trauma
and substance abuse to be as high as 90 percent.9 Additionally, on average,
6. Zachary Steel et al., “Association of Torture and Other Potentially Traumatic Events with Mental
Health Outcomes among Populations Exposed to Mass Conflict and Displacement: A Systemic Review and
Meta-analysis,” Journal of the American Medical Association 302, no. 5 (2009): 537–49, https://jamanetwork.com
/journals/jama/article-abstract/184348; Darrel Regier et al., “Comorbidity of Mental Disorders with Alcohol
and Other Drug Abuse,” Journal of the American Medical Association 264, no. 19 (1990); and Tim Weaver et al.,
“Comorbidity of Substance Misuse and Mental Illness in the Community Mental Health and Substance Misuse
Services,” British Journal of Psychiatry 183, no. 4 (2003).
7. Steel et al., “Association of Torture.”
8. Pacella, Hruska, and Delahanty, “Physical Health Consequences,” 42.
9. Melissa Farley et al., “Trauma History and Relapse Probability among Patients Seeking Substance Abuse
Treatment,” Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment 27, no. 2 (2004): 162; Nancy Wu et al., “Childhood Trauma and
Health Outcomes in Adults with Comorbid Substance Abuse and Mental Health Disorders,” Addictive Behaviors
35, no. 1 (2010): 70; and Merith Cosden et al., “Trauma Symptoms for Men and Women in Substance Abuse
Treatment: A Latent Transition Analysis,” Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment 50 (2015): 18.

War and Its Effects

Goepner

63

30 to 50 percent of individuals with a mental illness will be diagnosed with a
substance-abuse disorder at some point.10
Experiencing trauma (particularly during childhood) decreases an individual’s
impulse control, and more frequent and severe trauma intensifies the effect.11
Unsurprisingly, both PTSD and depression correlate with impulse-control
disorders.12 Additionally, diminished impulse control links to a “broad spectrum
of personal and social problems,” including violence and crime.13 In the
United States, an example of diminished impulse control can include a
road-rage incident, during which a driver displays uncontrolled anger in response
to another motorist’s actions.
In a high-trauma state like Afghanistan, examples are more plentiful.
I witnessed other violent outbursts during my deployment to a small Afghan
province. A mayor smacked a police officer in the face before the start of a shūrā.
The act apparently resulted from stress experienced during preparation for the
arrival of distinguished visitors. On another occasion, two field-grade officers
assaulted each other at the police headquarters over a petty squabble. On
another occasion, a firefight erupted at an illegal checkpoint. A district chief ’s
bodyguards, who had established the checkpoint, opened fire on plainclothes
police officers who were illegally providing security for a businessman’s convoy
and refused to pay the illegal toll.
Step Two: More Violence and a Lowered Threshold for Lethal Force
A consensus exists in psychiatric literature that severe mental illness increases
the risk of violence.14 On average, people with severe mental illness, especially
when combined with substance-abuse problems, act more violently, as do people
10. Regier et al., “Comorbidity of Mental Disorders,” 2,514, 2,517; and Robert Drake et al., “A Review of
Treatments for People with Severe Mental Illnesses and Co-Occurring Substance Use Disorders,” Psychiatric
Rehabilitations Journal 27, no. 4 (2004): 360–61.
11. John A. Fairbank, Frank W. Putnam, and William W. Harris, “The Prevalence and Impact of Child
Traumatic Stress,” in Handbook of PTSD: Science and Practice (New York: Guilford Press, 2007), 240;
Emil Coccaro, “Intermittent Explosive Disorder as a Disorder of Impulsive Aggression for DSM-5,”
American Journal of Psychiatry 169, no. 6 (2012): 584; and Bessel A. van der Kolk, “The Trauma Spectrum:
The Interaction of Biological and Social Events in the Genesis of the Trauma Response,” Journal of Traumatic
Stress 1, no. 3 (1988).
12. Michel Lejoyeux et al., “Impulse Control Disorders and Depression,” Journal of Nervous and Mental
Disease 190, no. 5 (2002): 310, 314; Moshe Kotler et al., “Anger, Impulsivity, Social Support, and Suicide Risk
in Patients with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder,” Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 189, no. 3 (2001); and
Byron Good and Devon Hinton, “Introduction: Culture, Trauma, and PTSD,” in Culture and PTSD: Trauma in
Global and Historical Perspective, ed. Devon Hinton and Byron Good (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2016).
13. Dianne Tice, Ellen Bratslavsky, and Roy F. Baumeister, “Emotional Distress Regulation Takes Precedence
over Impulse Control,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 80, no. 1 (2001): 53; and Menahem Krakowski,
“Violence and Serotonin: Influence of Impulse Control, Affect Regulation, and Social Functioning,” Journal of
Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences 15, no. 3 (2003): 294–95, 300.
14. Richard Van Dorn, Jan Volavka, and Norman Johnson, “Mental Disorder and Violence: Is There a
Relationship beyond Substance Use?,” Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology 47, no. 3 (2011): 487.
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with diminished impulse control. The research, however, contains variation.
For example, researchers debate the confounding factors that cause the
increased risk of violence among people with mental illness. For instance,
recent scholarship has focused on the potential effects of substance abuse, prior
violence, and familial factors.15
As the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders observes,
people with PTSD may engage in aggressive physical behavior with “little
or no provocation.”16 Richard Van Dorn and colleagues observe the strongest
associations with violence come from individuals with both severe mental illness
and substance-use disorders.17 The manual also notes individuals who suffer
from impulse control and similar disorders often exhibit behaviors that “violate
the rights of others . . . and/or bring the individual into significant conflict with
societal norms or authority figures.”18
Most studies treat the threshold when citizens will use lethal force to achieve
their goals as a constant. This treatment is puzzling because norms vary in related
areas (such as the prevalence of gun violence, murder rates, and the number of
active-shooter events)—even across similar countries. For example, the UN Office
on Drugs and Crime’s Intentional Homicide database indicates the United States
has a homicide rate four to eight times greater than Australia, Canada, France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom.19
In her work examining societal violence after civil conflict has ended, Chrissie
Steenkamp refers to a “culture of violence” in which the norms and values that
sustain the use of violence become established in a society. She attributes the
culture of violence, in part, to the effects of trauma, when previous norms and
values are replaced with ones perpetuating the use of violence in daily life.20
Roos Haer and Tobias Böhmelt advance a similar argument about child soldiers.
They find the effects of trauma plus the influence of learning by observation and
imitation during the war normalized the use of violence as a problem-solving
technique in the child soldiers’ postwar lives.21 Similarly, Elisabeth Schauer and
Thomas Elbert observed after war ends, child soldiers continue to use physical
15. Matthew Roché et al., “Prevalence and Risk of Violent Ideation and Behavior in Serious Mental Illnesses:
An Analysis of 63,572 Patient Records,” Journal of Interpersonal Violence 36, no. 5-6 (2021); and Hanna Pickarda
and Seena Fazelb, “Substance Abuse as a Risk Factor for Violence in Mental Illness: Some Implications for
Forensic Psychiatric Practice and Clinical Ethics,” Current Opinion in Psychiatry 26, no. 4 (2013): 350.
16. American Psychiatric Association, Manual of Mental Disorders, 272–73, 275.
17. Van Dorn, Volavka, and Johnson, “Mental Disorder and Violence,” 487, 491.
18. American Psychiatric Association, Manual of Mental Disorders, 461.
19. UN Office on Drugs and Crime, “Intentional Homicides (per 100,000 People),” World Bank Open Data
(website), n.d., http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5.
20. Chrissie Steenkamp, “The Legacy of War: Conceptualizing a ‘Culture of Violence’ to Explain Violence after
Peace Accords,” Round Table 94, no. 379 (2005): 254–55, 264.
21. Roos Haer and Tobias Böhmelt, “Child Soldiers as Time Bombs? Adolescents’ Participation in Rebel
Groups and the Recurrence of Armed Conflict,” European Journal of International Relations 22, no. 2 (2016): 414.
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violence frequently to resolve conflicts, even after the child soldiers return to their
prewar environments.22
Step Three: Rebels Kill Government Officials and Security Forces
More violent societies are likely to produce rebels willing to employ lethal
force against their governments than less violent societies are. Steenkamp’s
“culture of violence” argument suggests societies can develop norms that allow
and promote the use of violence to achieve goals or resolve problems. In such
cultures, citizens who have joined or are affiliated with a rebel group will be
more willing to use violence against their governments because violence has
already become socially acceptable.23
When cultural norms against violence erode and citizens increasingly use
violence to achieve goals or resolve conflicts, rebels are more likely to employ
lethal force in pursuit of their group’s objectives. Depression and PTSD correlate
with impulse-control disorders and substance abuse. Additionally, a relationship
exists between severe childhood trauma, brain development, and impulse control.24
All these elements increase the likelihood citizens who join a rebel group will
be more willing to use lethal force against their governments.
Step Four: More Civil War
Finally, a conflict can only qualify as a civil war if rebels and government
security forces do enough killing. For instance, the frequently used definitions
from the Correlates of War project and Uppsala Conflict Data Program and
Peace Research Institute Oslo require both sides to inflict a minimum number
of deaths on each other. In the Correlates of War project definition, at least 1,000
battle-related combatant deaths must occur in a 12-month period, with the
weaker side inflicting at least 5 percent of the fatalities, for the conflict to qualify

22. Elisabeth Schauer and Thomas Elbert, “The Psychological Impact of Child Soldiering,” in Trauma
Rehabilitation After War and Conflict, ed. Erin Martz (New York: Springer, 2010), 335.
23. Steenkamp, “Legacy of War,” 254.
24. Lejoyeux et al., “Impulse Control Disorders,” 310, 314; Kotler et al., “Anger,” 162–67; Good and Hinton,
“Introduction”; and Fairbank, Putnam, and Harris, “Child Traumatic Stress,” 240.
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as a civil war.25 By definition, civil war cannot occur unless rebels kill 50 members
of the government or security forces.
Mechanism 2: Trauma, Opportunity, and Civil War
Trauma may also serve as a remote cause for civil war by making war more
feasible. In this instance, instead of directly causing civil war, trauma amplifies
the direct cause—feasibility—such that an increase in trauma rates makes civil
war more achievable. This explanation argues civil war becomes more likely as
opportunity increases.26 For example, when the effectiveness of a government’s
security force decreases, the opportunity for civil war increases. Similarly, as
recruiting rebels becomes easier, the opportunity for civil war increases. In this
context, higher rates of trauma help explain how rebel recruitment can become
easier and why security force effectiveness might decrease, even if factors such as
the number of troops and defense spending remain the same.
In countries with high rates of trauma, governments recruit bureaucrats and
members of the security force from the pool of increasingly traumatized citizens.
Increased exposure to traumatic stressors results in more substance abuse, a
greater prevalence of mental illness, and negative changes to the brain.27 These
factors would make the government’s security force less capable and therefore
less effective. Although no studies of trauma’s effects on the effectiveness of
Afghan security forces, for instance, are available, RAND Corporation research
on US servicemembers provides context and a potential proxy for trauma’s impact
on effectiveness. For example, RAND found one-third of US servicemembers
diagnosed with PTSD were discharged for medical reasons between 2012 and
2015. More than a fifth of these servicemembers received an 80 percent or higher
disability rating, and all received at least a 50 percent disability rating.28
Mental illness can also play a role in recruiting rebels since it correlates strongly
with unemployment. An estimated 60 to 90 percent of people with mental illness
will be unemployed at some point.29 Unemployment results in loss of income,
which makes it easier to recruit rebels using financial incentives. In low-income
25. Meredith Reid Sarkees, “Codebook for the Intra-State Wars v.4.0: Definitions and Variables” (working
paper, Correlates of War project, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 2000), https://correlatesofwar.org/data
-sets/COW-war/intra-state-war-data-codebook.
26. Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner, “Beyond Greed and Grievance.”
27. Deborah Weber and Cecil Reynolds, “Clinical Perspectives on Neurobiological Effects of Psychological
Trauma,” Neuropsychology Review 14, no. 2 (2004); and Anke Karl et al., “A Meta-Analysis of Structural Brain
Abnormalities in PTSD,” Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews 30, no. 7 (2006).
28. Heather Krull et al., Post-9/11 Trends in Medical Separation and Separation for Service Members with
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain Injury (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021).
29. Deborah Schofield et al., “The Personal and National Costs of Mental Health Conditions: Impacts on
Income, Taxes, Government Support Payments Due to Lost Labour Force Participation,” BMC Psychiatry 11,
no. 1 (2011): 72; and Ruth Crowther et al., “Helping People with Severe Mental Illness to Obtain Work:
Systematic Review,” BMJ 322, no. 7,280 (2001).
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states, where the majority of civil wars occur, the effects of job loss are more
pronounced because a larger portion of the population lives paycheck to paycheck,
and unemployment benefits are not available.
In sum, trauma may serve as a remote cause for the feasibility (or opportunity)
argument for civil war, since more trauma may decrease security force effectiveness
and ease conditions for the recruitment of rebels. This in turn makes civil war
more likely.
Mechanism 3: Trauma, Motivation, and Civil War
Trauma may also serve as a remote cause for civil war by increasing grievances
among the population, which increases their motivation to rebel. This theory
suggests people rebel against their governments when sufficiently motivated
by grievances, greed, or a combination of both.30 Trauma provides a rationale
for the variation of grievances among countries when the traditional grievance
measures of government type, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and religious
differences remain the same. Scholars have argued civil wars should be more
likely in autocratic states because the citizens do not have a way to participate
in their governance. Conversely, democracies should be less likely to experience
civil wars because the citizens have ways (such as voting and petitioning elected
representatives) to participate in democratic processes.
People in high-trauma states should be more aggrieved and, therefore, more
motivated to rebel than their low-trauma counterparts. By definition, victims
of man-made trauma have legitimate grievances that often persist long after
traumatic events have ended. Casualties of torture, war, and rape can point to
a specific person or group as the source of their pain. In these cases, grievances
increase in a general sense, and these human-caused stressors contribute to an
“us versus them” mindset. In response, trauma victims and their loved ones are
likely to become more motivated to rebel, and they have a ready-made “them”
against whom to execute their violence.
Large-scale trauma and hatred go hand in hand. After experiencing a traumatic
stressor, people frequently manifest intense anger.31 In research conducted in
Afghanistan, Barbara Cardozo and her colleagues noted high levels of hatred
across survey respondents—84 percent reported feeling “a lot” of or “extreme”
hatred, and 62 percent reported they had endured four or more traumatic events

30. Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner, “Beyond Greed and Grievance.”
31. Linda Young and Elizabeth Gibb, “Trauma and Grievance,” in Understanding Trauma: A Psychoanalytical
Approach, ed. Caroline Garland (London: Duckworth, 1998), 81.
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within the past 10 years, which is approximately nine times the trauma rate found
in other countries.32
Many trauma victims look for an opportunity to redress their grievances.33
Linda Young and Elizabeth Gibb present a continuum along which grievances can
be assuaged. On one end of the spectrum, an apology suffices. At the other end,
justice requires violent revenge.34 A study of rape and nonsexual assault victims
revealed a “relatively high” preference for revenge. For some of these victims, even
“an eye for an eye” was insufficient; these victims desired acts of “extreme and
unending” violence against those who harmed them.35
Summary
Trauma helps improve our understanding of civil war in three ways. First, it
provides an explanation for why and how violence becomes normalized within a
society as a legitimate way to achieve goals and resolve problems. Second, trauma
may serve as a remote cause for the opportunity theory of civil war by decreasing
the effectiveness of the government’s security forces and making the recruitment
of rebels easier. Finally, trauma may serve as a remote cause of the motivation
theory for civil war by increasing the sense of grievance and the desire for revenge
among the population.

Testing the Trauma Theory of Civil War
This section reports the results of a large-n statistical analysis that included the
creation of a trauma index and trauma variables for testing and the results from
three statistical tests. For more information on the data and statistical analysis,
please contact the author at egoepner@masonlive.gmu.edu.
Trauma Index
The trauma index includes all countries in the international system in any
given year and the countries’ scores in four areas. The first three areas include the
most pernicious forms of traumatic stressors: torture, rape, and war. The fourth
32. Barbara Cardozo, “Mental Health, Social Functioning, and Disability in Postwar Afghanistan,” Journal
of the American Medical Association 292, no. 5 (2004): 575, 583; and Kate Scott et al., “Associations between
Lifetime Traumatic Events and Subsequent Chronic Physical Conditions: A Cross-National, Cross-Sectional
Study,” PLOS ONE 8, no. 11 (2013).
33. Young and Gibb, “Trauma and Grievance”; Uli Orth, “Punishment Goals of Crime Victims,” Law and
Human Behavior 27, no. 2 (2003); Garth Davies, Edith Wu, and Richard Frank, “A Witch’s Brew of Grievances:
The Potential Effects of COVID-19 on Radicalization to Violent Extremism,” Taylor and Francis Online,
May 10, 2021, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1923188?scroll=top&needAcces
s=true; and David Mendeloff, “Trauma and Vengeance: Assessing the Psychological and Emotional Effects of
Post-Conflict Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 31 (2009).
34. Young and Gibb, “Trauma and Grievance.”
35. Orth, “Punishment Goals,” 179, 183.
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captures more general forms of trauma, such as natural disasters. The trauma
index provides a country-by-country snapshot from 1990 to 2014. Each country
receives an annual score from zero to 100, with each of the four areas representing
25 percent of the score. (Earl Babbie and others recommend equal weighting
unless compelling circumstances suggest doing otherwise. No methodological or
theoretical concerns existed with the trauma variables, so I used equal weighting.)36
Higher scores indicate higher rates of trauma.
The four areas of the index comprise nine variables, eight of which come from
established data sets.

•

The author created the ninth variable, which measures the prevalence
of rape, using data from the Department of State and Amnesty
International. The methodology and scoring criteria for the rape
variable followed Dara Kay Cohen and Ragnhild Nordås’s work on
rape and sexual violence during war.37

•

The torture component comprises an average of the Political Terror
Scale and Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights dataset torture
measures.38 These data measure the amount of torture and political
violence occurring within each country.

•

The measure for war trauma comprises three variables: years of peace,
battle deaths per capita, and area of the country affected by fighting.
The data came from the Correlates of War project, the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program, the Peace Research Institute Oslo, and the
Center for Systemic Peace.

•

The general trauma category consists of disasters, mortality rates
for persons under the age of 40, and internally displaced persons
or refugees. These data came from the Centre for Research on the
Epidemiology of Disasters, the UN Population Division, the Center
for Systemic Peace, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

36. Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social Research, 14th ed. (Boston: Cengage Learning, 2015), 164; Frederik
Booysen, “An Overview and Evaluation of Composite Indices of Development,” Social Indicators Research 59,
no. 2 (August 2002): 127–28; and Michela Nardo et al., Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators:
Methodology and User Guide (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008), 31.
37. Dara Kay Cohen, “Explaining Rape during Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980–2009),”
American Political Science Review 107, no. 3 (2013); and Dara Kay Cohen and Ragnhild Nordås, “Sexual
Violence in Armed Conflict: Introducing the SVAC Dataset, 1989–2009,” Journal of Peace Research 51,
no. 3 (2014).
38. “Data,” Political Terror Scale (website), n.d., https://www.politicalterrorscale.org/Data/; and “The CIRI
Human Rights Dataset, Version 2014.04.14,” Harvard Dataverse (website), n.d., https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN
/UKCPXT.
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Table 1 shows the 10 countries with the highest and lowest trauma averages for
the 25-year period.
Table 1. Countries with highest and lowest trauma averages for 25-year period

Highest Trauma

Lowest Trauma

Country

Score

Country

Score

Sudan

76

Luxembourg

0

Afghanistan

75

Finland

2

Somalia

74

Iceland

2

Democratic Republic of the Congo

69

Norway

3

India

68

Brunei

4

Colombia

67

Malta

4

Iraq

64

Denmark

5

Myanmar

63

Netherlands

5

Uganda

63

Grenada

6

Sri Lanka

62

Samoa

6

As Table 2 shows, countries that descended into civil war had experienced
substantially higher trauma levels before the wars began. For instance, trauma
scores more than doubled from an average of 27 for all countries not at war to 57
for those that would experience civil war within three years’ time.
Table 2. Trauma index means

Trauma Scores
No Civil War

Three Years Prior

Two Years Prior

27.34

57.00

54.22

One Year Prior Civil War Ongoing
57.49

68.90

Tests and Results
As trauma increased, so did the likelihood of civil war. Trauma consistently
showed a positive and statistically significant relationship with the prevalence of
civil war across all three statistical tests.
This study analyzed every country in the international system with a
population of at least 100,000 for the 25-year period (1990–2014). Previous
studies have found only three variables consistently significant: population size,
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income per capita, and economic growth rates. More specifically, more populous
countries have more civil war, as do poorer countries and countries with shrinking
economies. As such, all tests controlled for these variables.
Because everyone accepts civil war results in more trauma, steps should
be taken to ensure the tests measure trauma’s effect on civil war rather than
inadvertently capturing civil war’s effect on trauma. Without taking appropriate
steps to deconflict the confounding effect of war-related trauma, the argument
can become circular. Trauma may increase the prevalence of civil war, but civil war
also increases the prevalence of trauma. In circumstances like these, quantitative
researchers recommend the use of instrumental variable estimation to address the
possibility trauma and civil war simultaneously cause each other. (Instrumental
variable estimation produces a consistent estimator when, for instance, concerns
x causes y and y causes x exist simultaneously).39 In the civil-war literature,
however, researchers rarely use instrumental variables. Instead, researchers use
logistic regression and lag the independent variables. As a result, their statistical
models would compare, for example, income levels in 1999 with civil wars in 2000.
By lagging variables like income levels, researchers hope to eliminate the second
half of the circular argument, which says civil war lowers income levels. This study
used both instrumental variables and logistic regression with lagged variables.
The statistical analyses used three variations of the dependent variable for
civil war: the Armed Conflict Dataset with a minimum of 1,000 battle-related
deaths, the Armed Conflict Dataset with a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths,
and the Correlates of War data set with 1,000 or more battle-related deaths. Data
for the control variables—population size, income, and economic growth rates—
came from the World Bank.40
Finally, to parse whether the trauma index may be a proxy for previous war, the
study ran models to determine whether trauma remained a significant factor after
controlling for previous war (trauma remained significant).
First Test: Logistic Regression with Random Effects
In the first test, trauma had a significant effect on the prevalence of civil war.
The model indicated for each one-point increase in the trauma index score, the
likelihood of future civil war increased by 9 percent. In addition, population was
significant; as population size grew, so did the likelihood of civil war. Economic

39. Peter Kennedy, A Guide to Econometrics, 6th ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008), 139–41.
40. “Population, Total,” World Bank Open Data (website), n.d., https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP
.TOTL; and “GDP per Capita (Current US$),” World Bank Open Data (website), n.d., https://data.worldbank
.org/indicator/NY.GDP. PCAP.CD (page discontinued).
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growth was also significant; as the economy shrank, the risk of civil war increased.
Income, however, was not a significant factor.
Second Test: Logistic Regression with Fixed Effects
In the second test, trauma again had a significant effect on the prevalence of
civil war. The model indicated for each one-point increase in the trauma index
score, the likelihood of future civil war increased by 7 percent. Population was
again significant. As population size grew, so did the likelihood of civil war. Income
was also significant. As personal income shrank, the risk of civil war increased.
Nevertheless, economic growth was not a significant factor.
Third Test: Two-Stage Least Squares
In the third test, trauma had a significant effect on the prevalence of civil
war. The models indicated for each one-point increase in the trauma index score,
the likelihood of future civil war increased by 7 percent. Population was again
significant. As population size grew, so did the likelihood of civil war. Economic
variables returned inconsistent results. Economic growth was significant in one of
the two model specifications, and income was not significant in either.
Marginal Effects of Trauma on the Probability of Civil War
When trauma and the three control variables were held at their averages,
civil war had a near-zero, 0.30 percent probability of occurring in any given
country in any given year. A 10-point increase in trauma from its median value
of 26 (to 36) only increased the probability of civil war to 0.95 percent in any
given country in any given year. Once a country reached a trauma score of 57,
however, the likelihood of civil war rose to one in 10. If a trauma score rose to 65,
the country had a 20 percent chance of experiencing civil war the following year.
Summary
Trauma appears to have a significant and positive relationship with the
prevalence of civil war. The use of instrumental variables to test the trauma
theory suggests the relationship may be causal—higher trauma levels among
a population cause more civil war, regardless of whether the countries experienced
war previously. The relationship appears to be robust because it remained strong
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across all four areas of the trauma index, multiple statistical tests, and alternate
specifications of the dependent variable.

Recommendations
Do Not Intervene Militarily in the Civil Wars of Trauma States
Countries with high rates of trauma will experience more future civil war. This
correlation appears to be driven partly by the normalization of violence that follows
severe and repetitive trauma exposure, which presents intervening actors like the
US military with a dilemma. Intervention in a trauma state such as Afghanistan
has a low chance of achieving an enduring peace, leaving the intervening party
stuck in an enduring conflict. Each new surge of military forces and financial
aid may become tomorrow’s sunk costs, and no president wants to admit failure
occurred on his or her watch. Moreover, military intervention may inadvertently
make the situation worse. For example, Afghanistan’s trauma score rose during the
five-year period after US forces arrived when compared to the country’s trauma
score from the five-year period prior to intervention, and the level of trauma
remained elevated as of 2014 (the last year of the trauma index). An increase in
the number of combatants increases trauma rates for the population, intensifying
trauma’s negative effects and further normalizing the use of violence. The likelihood
of continued civil war increases in response to military intervention.
Plan for the Negative Effects of Trauma before Intervening
Currently, US policymakers, intelligence professionals, and military planners
do not consider a nation’s trauma before intervening in the nation’s civil war.
Ignoring this important factor suggests US policies have been suboptimal.
Since the beginning of the “global war on terrorism,” the US military has
adapted significantly in multiple areas. Intelligence estimates that once focused on
the physical terrain now analyze the “human terrain”—the psychological, cultural,
and behavioral attributes of the populations American forces seek to protect.41
Military members have learned the languages, customs, and histories of the

41. Nomination of General David H. Petraeus, USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of General, and to Be Commander,
International Security Assistance Force, and Commander, United States Forces Afghanistan, Before the Senate Committee
on Armed Services, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of David H. Petraeus, commander, United States Central
Command); and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Counterinsurgency, Joint Publication 3-24 (Washington, DC:
JCS, 2018), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_24.pdf.
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countries in which the members fight. But the degree to which Afghans and Iraqis
have already been traumatized has gone unexamined.
As the Department of Defense now recognizes the significant effects PTSD
and other mental health problems can have on American troops, military planners
and policymakers should account for a foreign nation’s mental health status before
intervening in an ongoing civil war. Had planners and policymakers analyzed
the Afghan population before embarking on a decade-and-a-half of nation
building, the analysis would have cast significant doubt on the prospects for
peace. If planners and policymakers continue to ignore the impact of trauma on
a population’s mental health status, they will fail to account for important factors
that affect the war outcome they seek to control.
Treat Trauma as a National Security Concern
Although it has traditionally been viewed as a humanitarian crisis,
the traumatization of a population is also a legitimate security concern.
Naturally, human suffering should elicit empathy among concerned citizens
and a humanitarian response from the agencies available to provide help.
Additionally, trauma should cause international organizations and sovereign
states to estimate the future security impacts of war. If more trauma in a
population’s past results in more future civil war, then security-focused entities
like the Department of Defense and the CIA should be using the data to
predict and plan accordingly.
Deploy Evidence-Based Mental Health Capabilities to Trauma States
Optimally, support would be deployed before a trauma state descended
into civil war. Failing that, the military or a government partner should apply
mental health capabilities to mitigate trauma’s negative effects, especially as
related to host-nation government officials and security force members who will
be essential in achieving an enduring peace.
To the ears of warfighters, including such soft capabilities may sound
incompatible with the nature of war. But these capabilities align with US Joint
doctrine, which states countering an insurgency requires “the blend of comprehensive
. . . efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its
root causes.”42 In simpler language, such effort means killing and capturing rebels
while also supporting the population through “political, psychological, and economic
methods.” Although current counterinsurgency doctrine does not mention the
mental health of the host nation, trauma and its negative effects fit nicely with
42.

JCS, Counterinsurgency, xiii.

War and Its Effects

Goepner 75

the military’s emphasis on addressing “root causes” and supporting the population
through psychological methods.43
Use the Trauma Index in Predictive Models to Anticipate Civil-War Locations
Organizations like the CIA, the Department of Defense, and the Department
of State have used predictive modeling to anticipate state failure and national
crises.44 The addition of the trauma index and its variables should improve
such models’ predictive power. Initial comparisons with models that include
widely used variables (income, economic growth, and population size) indicate
the addition of the trauma index improves the models. This is suggested by
the results of different measures often used in model selection, such as Akaike
information criterion, Bayesian information criterion, and receiver-operating
characteristic analysis.45

Conclusion
The data suggest a statistically significant relationship exists between the level
of trauma previously experienced by a national population and the prevalence of
civil war in the country’s future (which holds regardless of past war). The theory
underlying this observation proposes a causal linkage between trauma and civil
war. As citizens are exposed to more frequent and severe traumatic stressors,
they succumb to higher rates of mental illness, substance abuse, and diminished
impulse control. On average, traumatized individuals use violence more frequently
in their daily lives, and violence becomes increasingly normalized as a way to
resolve problems and achieve goals. As a result, the threshold at which potential
rebels use deadly force against their government decreases and the likelihood of
civil war rises.
Trauma may also increase the prevalence of civil war indirectly by amplifying
factors associated with the opportunity and motivation theories. First,
governments and security forces should become less effective as they recruit from
increasingly traumatized populations. Second, rebel recruitment should be easier
because more trauma results in more unemployment, which lowers opportunity
costs. Third, traumatized individuals have genuine grievances that can motivate

43. JCS, Counterinsurgency, III-4, IV-2.
44. Daniel Etsy et al., “State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings,” Environmental Change & Security
Project Report 5 (Summer 1999): 49–72; and Sean O’Brien, “Crisis Early Warning and Decision Support:
Contemporary Approaches and Thoughts on Future Research,” International Studies Review 12, no. 1 (2010).
45. Kennedy, Guide to Econometrics, 95; and Kelly H. Zou, James O’Malley, and Laura Mauri,
“Receiver-Operating Characteristic Analysis for Evaluating Diagnostic Tests and Predictive Models,”
Circulation 115, no. 5 (February 6, 2007): 654–57.
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them to use violence, and they often have a specific person or group they hold
responsible for their pain.
The relationship between trauma and civil war has profound implications
for policymakers, planners, and warfighters. Once started, the vicious cycle
of trauma and violence is hard to stop. This feedback mechanism decreases the
likelihood intervening actors like the United States will be able to end a civil war.

Erik W. Goepner
Dr. Erik W. Goepner has a PhD in public policy from George Mason University.
A retired US Air Force colonel, he currently works as a civil servant in the
federal government.

War and Its Effects

Goepner

Select Bibliography
American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, 5th ed. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association
Publishing, 2013.
Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner. “Beyond Greed and Grievance”
Feasibility and Civil War.” Oxford Economic Papers 61, no. 1 (2009): 1–27.
Elbadawi, Ibrahim, and Nicholas Sambanis. “How Much War Will We See?
Explaining the Prevalence of Civil War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 3
(2002), 307–34.
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.”
American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90.
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Counterinsurgency, Joint Publication 3-24. Washington, DC:
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018.
Karl, Anke, et al. “A Meta-Analysis of Structural Brain Abnormalities in PTSD.”
Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews 30, no. 7 (2006): 1004–31.
Steel, Zachary, et al. “Association of Torture and Other Potentially Traumatic
Events with Mental Health Outcomes among Populations Exposed to Mass
Conf lict and Displacement.” Journal of the American Medical Association 302
no. 5 (20 09): 537– 49, https://jamanet work.com /journals/jama /article
-abstract/184348.
Van Dorn, Richard, Jan Volavka, and Norman Johnson. “Mental Disorder and
Violence: Is There a Relationship beyond Substance Use?” Social Psychiatry and
Psychiatric Epidemiology 47, no. 3 (2011): 487–503.

77

Future Force Development

Assessing the Army’s Cyber Force Structure
John Fernandes, Nicolas Starck, Richard Shmel, Charles Suslowicz, Jan Kallberg, and Todd Arnold

ABSTRACT: The skill and capacity of Army cyber forces have grown in the
decade since their creation. This article focuses on needed structural changes
to the Army’s portion of the Cyber Mission Forces that will enable their
continued growth and maturity since the Army’s past organizational and
structural decisions impose challenges impacting current and future efficiency
and effectiveness. This assessment of the current situation highlights the areas
military leadership must address to allow the Army’s cyber forces to continue
evolving to meet the needs of multi-domain operations.
Keywords: workforce development, task organization, cyberspace operations,
unity of effort, unity of command

T

raining and equipping a new military force capable of conducting
operations in a new domain is an iterative process. The last time the
United States embarked on such an effort was the birth of aviation
units and the emergence of the air domain at the dawn of the twentieth century.
Tactics, force structures, and strategies for utilizing the new capabilities evolved
after the establishment of military aviation but were defined and limited
by the lack of crisis at the time. World War II forced the rapid maturation of
the Air Corps and resulted in the creation of the US Army Air Corps, a
cohesive fighting force designed for the challenges of the air domain.1 Like the
Army Air Corps, the Army’s cyber forces are reaching maturity with tangible
capabilities and operational experience against adversaries and will benefit
from assessing the impacts of prior organizational and personnel decisions in
preparation for multi-domain operations.
A significant and sophisticated intrusion into military networks provided
the impetus for standing up US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and for
cyberspace to join air, sea, land, and space as a warfighting domain. The Army
and the Department of Defense (DoD) have made significant strides to establish

1. Tami Davis Biddle, Air Power and Warfare: A Century of Theory and History (Carlisle, PA: US Army War
College Press, 2019), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/378/.
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competence within the domain.2 From a force structure perspective, major
highlights include:

•
•

establishing US Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) in 2010;

•

creating the Cyber Protection Brigade (CPB) in 2014 to house the
defensive force;

•

establishing the 915th Cyberspace Warfare Battalion (CWB) in
2019 for tactical cyberspace electromagnetic activities requirements,
and all Cyber Mission Force (CMF) teams; and

•

achieving full operational capability in 2018.

forming an offensive cyber force by creating the 780th Military
Intelligence Brigade (Cyber) in 2011;

On the personnel front, the Army established the Cyber branch in 2014
and integrated electronic warfare in 2018. Recently, the Army formalized the
cyberspace capabilities development officer/warrant officer military occupational
specialties (MOSs) to provide the organic ability to design and create specific
cyberspace capabilities.
From doctrine to training to organization, the branch and the cyber units
have had to identify needs, experiment, and develop solutions to meet the
evolving demands of cyberspace operations. In this article, we examine the
challenges associated with two initial force structure decisions and provide
considerations for overcoming them.
First, when the Army created its cyber units, offensive and defensive
cyber operations were isolated within two distinct and separate brigades. The
historical divide continues with unintended consequences. Despite creating
a new branch and military occupational specialties, the organizational decision to
separate offensive cyber operations (OCO) and defensive cyber operations (DCO)
negatively impacted personnel and resourcing.
Second, these units have complex chains of command with separate
administrative control (ADCON) and operational control (OPCON)
relationships. Currently, the operational command of a cyber team is not
aligned with the team’s administration and leadership, including personnel
ratings, property accountability, Unified Code of Military Justice authority, and
2. William J. Lynn III, “Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy,” Foreign Affairs,
September/October 2010, 97–108, https://www-foreignaffairs-com.usawc.idm.oclc.org/articles/united-states
/2010-09-01/defending-new-domain.
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command itself (for example, a company commander tracks a cyber team’s training
and medical readiness while the team lead is responsible for daily operations).
These complexities cause confusion and consternation and hamper unity of effort.
While these organizational decisions were deliberate and motivated by
operational demands, they hindered unity of effort within the Army’s cyber
forces, imposing organizational and operational costs. Introspection is occurring
across the joint cyber community. With all CMF teams recently achieving full
operational capacity, US Cyber Command is evaluating its current size and
requesting additional teams to be fielded by the Army and Air Force.3 To bring
a more unified approach to cyberspace, the Air Force realigned its internal
components’ structure and composition by redesignating and reassigning several
units under the 67th Cyberspace Wing.4 Now is an ideal time to re-examine the
Army’s internal structures to support cyberspace operations better. The Army
would be remiss to ignore the implications of past decisions made of necessity
without reassessing their effectiveness. We argue the Army must push for greater
unity within the Cyber branch so the organization continues to progress as an
effective fighting force in cyberspace.

Background
The majority of the decade since US Cyber Command and US Army Cyber
Command’s establishment was dedicated to building and training the force. While
the inchoate force stood up teams, designed—and redesigned—training pipelines
for various specialties, and struggled to recruit and retain talent, the forces were in
constant contact.5 The Army’s original concept was to provide 41 teams, and shortly
after that the mandate expanded to include 21 reserve component defensive Cyber
Protection Teams (CPTs) (11 Army National Guard and 10 Army Reserve).6
To meet this immense manning requirement, planners drew soldiers primarily
from the Military Intelligence (MI) and Signal Corps (SC) branches, the two
branches already engaged in offensive and defensive cyber operations. The rapid
3. Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Request for U.S. Cyber Command and Operations in Cybersopace: Hearings before
the Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Emerging Threats and Capabilities,
US House of Representatives, 116th Cong. (2020), https://www.congress.gov/116/chrg/CHRG-116hhrg40605
/CHRG-116hhrg40605.pdf; and Mark Pomerleau, “Cyber Command’s Force Is Growing, in Part, to Support
Space,” FEDSCOOP (website), April 8, 2022, https://www.fedscoop.com/cyber-commands-force-is-growing
-in-part-to-support-space/.
4. Mark Pomerleau, “Air Force Revamps Its Teams for U.S. Cyber Command,” C4ISRNET (website),
September 18, 2020, https://www.c4isrnet.com/cyber/2020/09/18/air-force-revamps-its-teams-for-us-cyber
-command/.
5. Jim Garamone, “Rogers Outlines Cyber Challenges Facing DoD, U.S.,” Department of Defense (website),
September 9, 2015, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/616569/rogers-outlines-cyber
-challenges-facing-dod-us/.
6. Edward Cardon, “2014 Green Book: Army Cyber Command and Second Army,” US Army (website),
September 30, 2014, https://www.army.mil/article/134857/; and US Army Cyber Posture: Hearing before the Armed
Services Committee, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Lieutenant General Paul M.
Nakasone, Commanding General, US Cyber Command), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media
/doc/Nakasone_05-23-17.pdf.
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assembly of personnel into “cyber” units (the branch was not yet approved)
brought the unique attitudes, traditions, and perspectives of the previous branches
to the units. Given the immediate operational necessity created by adversary
activity, personnel assignments and missions aligned with the previous branch’s
mission. Signal Corps soldiers were assigned to the cyber protection brigade, and
intelligence soldiers were assigned to the 780th Military Intelligence Brigade. As a
result, the early incarnations of the branch’s units did not share a common attitude,
mission, or understanding of each other’s capabilities.
Similarly, the Army’s basic manning requirement to field 41 teams placed
immense stress on the entire chain of command of its nascent cyber units.7 The
Army Cyber School, responsible for individual MOS training, was not established
until 2015, so training fell upon the cyber brigades.8 The preponderance of training
still falls on the brigades due to specific training requirements for each cyber work
role—a jointly defined job standard similar to a MOS (we discuss work-roles in
more detail later in the article).
Training and equipping incoming personnel and organizing them into teams
was the brigades’ all-consuming mission. When a team achieved initial operational
capability, it was turned over to its operational command. Once a team achieved
full operational capacity, the ADCON chain of command maintained the team’s
full operational capacity manning and began building the next team. This task
separation enabled the Army chain of command to focus on building teams
while separate operational commands focused on employing the teams. However,
this process crystallized the administrative control and operational control split
into a permanent fixture. The decision to build units aggressively and prioritize
arbitrary checkpoints enabled the Army to achieve required operational
readiness conditions rapidly, but at the expense of developing the most effective
and efficient units.
Ultimately, these organizational challenges—the offensive cyber operations
and defensive cyber operations split and divided chains of command—and the
resulting personnel challenges are a by-product of the herculean effort necessary
to overcome the traditional glacial pace of the Department of Defenseand Army
bureaucracy. However, the cyber force has matured and gained operational

7. Cardon, “Army Cyber Command.”
8. George I. Seffers, “U.S. Army Builds Cyber Branch One Step at a Time,” Signal Magazine, Armed
Forces Communications and Electronics Association, April 1, 2015, https://www.afcea.org/signal-media
/education/us-army-builds-cyber-branch-one-step-time.
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experience, and the situation has changed. The Army must reassess prior decisions
and adjust to meet the force’s and nation’s long-term needs.

Offense and Defense Split
Siloing the force’s offensive and defensive elements created barriers within
the force that are continually being reinforced, including operational and cultural
challenges and impacting the soldiers and civilians who comprise the Army’s
cyberspace forces.
Under the current structure, the Cyber branch has effectively created
specialization in offense or defense roles, with soldiers’ designations determined
by their initial assignment. Once inside the offensive or defensive silo,
personnel cannot easily move between workspaces, discuss missions, or build a
cohesive culture. Personnel in both offensive and defensive units complete a job
qualification record ( JQR) to demonstrate proficiency for a specific work role.
This time-consuming process entails specialized training, requires operational
experience, and introduces a significant organizational cost to transfer between
offense and defense. These artificial barriers foster the incorrect belief that
experience in one form of cyber operation does not translate to the other and
bifurcates the branch.
The centralized selection lists exemplify the reinforcement of this bifurcation.
Individuals selected to lead offensive cyber units primarily have an offensive
background (and military intelligence origin). Defensive units are generally led
by officers with defensive (and Signal Corps) experience. Although introducing
the Assignment Interactive Module (AIM) Marketplace provided increased
autonomy to soldiers, it created another avenue through which a soldier can be
designated as a specific type of cyber soldier. Leaders now have an opportunity
to screen future subordinate leaders for previous experience within a particular
operational facet. While valuable on the surface, this possibility reinforces the
chance of a first assignment determining a soldier’s career path.
Since military operations and the cyberspace domain are complex, specialization
can be beneficial and desirable. However, structural separation between offense
and defensive cyberspace units and operations combined with the inadvertent
individual specialization in defensive or offensive cyber operations creates
potential problems.
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Challenges
While the barriers have changed over time, the potential for real or perceived
preferential status exists while two distinct silos exist. Initially, the DCO forces
were built from scratch, while OCO forces could leverage existing, albeit
limited, expertise. The additional accesses, authorities, infrastructure, and
training required for successful offensive cyber operations fostered a feeling
of superiority or preferential status for the units rather than a recognition
of the requirements for successful offensive cyber operations. This perception
is exacerbated by the additional support attached to offensive cyber units (for
example, military intelligence support and developer capacity). This skewed
perspective—of importance, impact, and necessity—can damage morale and result
in dangerous implications for planning and resourcing.
These perceptions regarding superiority and preferential treatment can
have resounding impacts on unit morale, retention, and culture. Consequently,
members of the negatively perceived group (defensive cyber operations) may
attempt to become a member of the positively perceived group (offensive cyber
options) if possible.9 Since mobility between offense and defense has been
relatively constrained, the members of the negatively perceived group may
change their valuation method.10 For example, defensive cyber operations could
redefine their internal value as the total number of missions executed rather than
resources allocated. However, these changes in valuation can increase differences
in culture between defensive and offensive cyber operations. Alternatively, the
negatively perceived group may “activate competitive strategies to achieve a
positive social identity” with the unintended negative outcomes of subgroup
conflict.11 Specialization heightens this perception of conflict and may cause job
dissatisfaction, frustration, and morale problems.12 At the organizational level,
there may be a rise in the promotion of self-interest of the subgroups (defensive
and offensive), along with additional organizational cost to manage where the
subgroups intersect, such as requirements for schoolhouse training, operational
support from ARCYBER or CYBERCOM, or the Army’s requirement process.13
The perspective mentioned above results in the Army’s defensive cyber forces
being unnecessarily deprioritized. Specialized skillsets like capability development
(creating hardware or software solutions) and reverse engineering (deconstructing
9. Samuel Fernández-Salinero and Gabriela Topa, “Intergroup Discrimination as a Predictor of Conflict
within the Same Organization: The Role of Organizational Identity,” European Journal of Investigation in Health,
Psychology and Education 10, no. 1 (May 2019), https://www.mdpi.com/2254-9625/10/1/1.
10. Fernández-Salinero and Topa, “Intergroup Discrimination.”
11. Fernández-Salinero and Topa, “Intergroup Discrimination.”
12. Bernard Oladosu Omisore and Ashimi Rashidat Abiodun, “Organizational Conflicts: Causes, Effects and
Remedies,” International Journal of Academic Research in Economics and Management Services 3, no. 6 (Nov 2014),
https://www.mdpi.com/2254-9625/10/1/1.
13. Omisore and Abiodun, “Organizational Conflicts.”

Future Force Development

Fernandes, Starck, Shmel, Suslowicz, Kallberg, and Arnold

85

an unknown piece of hardware or software to determine how it functions) were
seen as offensive functions and placed in OCO units, even though they are also
critical for effective incident response. Like personnel prioritization impacts
resource allocation, decisions will also be shaped by an environment where the
offense is viewed as superior, more critical, or more challenging. The unintended
personnel and resource implications of the perceptions of offensive and defensive
cyberspace operations work in opposition to the relative restrictions placed on the
conduct of different operations based on legal authorities. Given the potential
global implications, the authority to conduct offensive cyber operations is held
by US Cyber Command, given the appropriate determinations by the National
Command Authority (the president, secretary of defense, or designee).14 By
contrast, a standing authority requires defensive cyber operations be conducted on
the Department of Defense information networks, with authority delegated to the
service-component organizations like Army Cyber Command.15 This requirement
suggests defensive cyber operation should have fewer internal barriers and more
freedom of action. However, even when network owners fully cooperate with a
defensive mission, it can take days or weeks to work through organizational hurdles,
gather resources, and take necessary network actions. Deliberate effort and
attention by commanders are needed to address the inequalities in perception
and resourcing to resolve those issues and their resulting operational harms.
At the individual level, this disparity in treatment feeds myopia across the
branch regarding the capabilities and requirements of different cyberspace
missions. Bright young soldiers are lured to specific units with the promise of
more glamorous offensive work, preventing their exposure to the challenging,
multitudinous, and critical defensive cyber work required across the Army. Failure
to expose officers and noncommissioned officers to the full spectrum of cyberspace
operations feeds a dangerous misconception that advanced understanding is not
portable to different aspects of the cyberspace domain and that the highest levels
of proficiency do not require both perspectives.
Siloing reduces our effectiveness in planning and executing operations by
limiting cross-pollination between the offensive and defensive forces. A critical
tenet of Army planning is that the “enemy has a vote.” This belief is codified in
our doctrine, with the enemy being a mission variable and enemy analysis being
a portion of intelligence preparation of the battlefield and part of paragraph
14. Robert Chesney, “The Domestic Legal Framework for US Military Cyber Operations,”
Hoover Working Group on National Security, Technology, and Law, Aegis Series Paper No. 2003 (Stanford,
CA: Hoover Institution, July 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID3668463_code119080
.pdf?abstractid=3668463&mirid=1.
15. Center for Strategic Leadership, Strategic Cyberspace Operations Guide (Carlisle, PA: US Army War
College,
August
2021),
https://csl.armywarcollege.edu/USACSL/Publications/Strategic_Cyberspace
_Operations_Guide.pdf.
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one of the operations order.16 Soldiers with significant experience in either
offensive or defensive cyber operations can provide unique and critical insights
into the other forms of operation.17 When we look to the field Army, the billets
for cyber officers (17A and 17B) are primarily planner roles down to the brigade
level, where cyber officers will be responsible for planning and integrating
offensive, defensive, and electronic warfare capabilities. An officer whose career
has only exposed them to one facet may not be able to utilize the other two
aspects as effectively.
The partitioning of cyber forces exacerbates problems posed by the small
size of the branch. With a single brigade for both offense and defense, leaders
who stay within those silos can have outsized impacts. Battalion commanders
return as brigade commanders, and their leadership styles, command climates,
and assessments of subordinate leaders endure beyond the typical two-year
command and further reinforce the force’s cultural divide. It becomes less
likely commanders will bring a fresh perspective, and units become more
susceptible to dangerous forms of groupthink. Subordinates who interact
negatively with a leader can anticipate meeting with the leader repeatedly,
creating an environment suited to the establishment of fiefdoms and other
forms of counterproductive leadership.
Considerations for Mitigation
Without deliberate effort, the challenges stemming from the bifurcation
of offensive and defensive cyber capabilities will remain unsolved. While the
Military Intelligence and Signal Corps branch lineages are less immediate, the
resulting latent cultural and functional divisions remain. From senior leaders down
to individuals serving on offensive and defensive teams, we must acknowledge
all these challenges and actively work to minimize their effects. Bridging the
divide may include deliberately seeking the opposite perspective when planning
operations, seeking collaboration opportunities across silos, and conducting leader
professional development programs to expose personnel to the other areas. At
times, it may mean putting unit pride aside to acknowledge the contributions
of the entire force. Professional military education should provide the impetus
for this balanced exposure that is expanded through self-development and the

16. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), The Operations Process, Army Doctrine Publication
(ADP) 5-0 (Washington, DC: HQDA, July 2019), https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a
/ARN18126-ADP_5-0-000-WEB-3.pdf.
17. Chuck Suslowicz, Jan Kallberg, and Todd Arnold, “Government Cyber Breach Shows Need for
Convergence,” C4ISRNET (website), December 28, 2020, https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2020/12/28
/government-cyber-breach-shows-need-for-convergence/.

Future Force Development

Fernandes, Starck, Shmel, Suslowicz, Kallberg, and Arnold

87

operational domain. Below are three ways to address the challenges through the
Army’s systems.
Enforce Breadth of Assignments for Off icers

Some branches deliberately assign officers across segments of the branch to
increase the understanding of the broader branch. For instance, the Infantry
branch emphasizes officers serving in heavy and light units, while other
branches such as Logistics, Military Intelligence, and the Signal Corps balance
serving in division and brigade combat teams with the branch-specific strategic
units. The Cyber branch must do the same to prevent fracturing the force and
developing senior leaders with little understanding of or experience with entire
portions of the domain. As a whole, the branch must value and promote
breadth of experience. For officers, this training could be accomplished after the
career course, an ideal period to refresh knowledge of the other aspects of the
branch. The Cyber schoolhouse could provide additional specialized training
if required. Similar models are used with branch-detailed personnel and the
Cyber branch’s training for company-grade officers who voluntarily transfer
into the branch.
Determine Appropriate Specialization within the Cyber Force

While there is a need for understanding across offensive and defensive cyber
operations, the existence of work roles and the recent creation of capability
developers indicate specialization is required to establish and grow proficiency. This
need is especially true for enlisted personnel and warrant officers, who are typically
more specialized than commissioned officers. Specialization by mission, however,
may be less appropriate than specialization based on function or technology.
For instance, an expert at attacking Windows systems is probably well suited to
defending Windows systems as opposed to analyzing network traffic in a Linux
environment. Alternatively, soldiers who worked on electronic warfare systems for
four years may be challenged to train their subordinates on host-based forensics as
an NCOIC in a defensive unit.
Within the Signal Corps branch, warrant officers specialize as network
and system engineers (255N and 255A) and within the Cyber branch the new
cyberspace capabilities development MOSs (170D, 17D) are specialized by
technology, not as offense or defense. Determining the proper set and scope
of specializations requires analysis of individual tasks, knowledge, skills, and
behaviors across offense and defense jobs and the increasing billets outside those
units. Integrating job qualification records with existing Army programs, such
as Critical Task Site Selection Board, for entry-level and advanced institutional
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training, individual tasks refinement, and additional skill identifiers or special
qualifications identifier may help the Cyber branch identify and sustain the right
specializations in the correct billets.
Consider Specialized and Integrated Units

The lineage of divided offensive and defensive units is not the only solution.
The 915th Cyberspace Warfare Battalion and the Multi-Domain Task Force
are steps toward more integrated cyber units. Across the Army, units dedicated
to specific functions (such as combat support sustainment battalions) and units
(such as brigade combat teams) integrate multiple functions to provide greater
operational flexibility and internal support. The degree of mission specialization
and the echelon at which to integrate functions is a multifaceted problem
involving tradeoffs and should be based on careful analysis. As the cyberspace
domain continues to mature, leadership should consider specialized and integrated
units to meet the needs of the Army and Joint force.

Divided Chains of Command
Another structural challenge facing the Army’s cyber forces is the complex
chains of command constructed across the branch. At every level, cyber personnel
face disconnected and competing leadership chains with conflicting priorities.
Most cyber forces are assigned to Army Cyber Command, the force provider for
joint and service requirements. Active-duty CMF teams are assigned to one of
the two brigades for administrative control but fall under the operational
control of the Cyber National Mission Force, a combatant command, or a combat
support agency.
Further complicating matters, each brigade is assigned to the two-star
operational headquarters of their mission’s progenitor branch. The Cyber
Protection Brigade is subordinate to the Network Enterprise Technology
Command (a major subordinate command under the administrative control
of Army Cyber Command) and the 780th Military Intelligence Brigade to
the Intelligence and Security Command (a direct reporting unit to the Army’s
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence).18 Within this construct, the command
relationships and responsibilities are often muddled, while support relationships
are rarely used or defined. The persistent separation of administrative and

18. HQDA, Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units, Army
Regulation (AR) 10-87 (Washington, DC: HQDA, December 11, 2017), https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs
/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN2541_AR10-87_WEB_Final.pdf.
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operational control deleteriously affects the Army’s ability to conduct effective
cyberspace operations.
This divided chain of command diverges from the principles of unity of effort
and unity of command and degrades the units’ effectiveness and efficiencies.
Operational and administrative control is split for the detachments/teams
provided to the joint forces and the service-retained units. According to Army
doctrine, “the chain of command assists commanders at all levels to achieve
their primary function of accomplishing the unit’s assigned mission while
caring for personnel and property in their charge.”19 However, the Army cyber
force’s command structure adds complexities to the key command elements and
exacerbates the chain of command’s challenges to serve its function.
Challenges
While units have administrative and operational requirements, they do not
have enough training days to accomplish the requirements placed upon them—
a challenge not unique to cyber forces.20 Commanders, with the help of their staffs,
make decisions and assume risks to balance competing requirements. For the
nonservice retained teams, neither the commander nor the staff has administrative
and operational control, nor are there structural mechanisms to prioritize and
synchronize requirements. This oversight is reflected in resourcing and personnel.
OPCON headquarters plan and direct operations the ADCON headquarters must
fund. ADCON headquarters must also complete borrowed military manpower
tasks that may directly conflict with operational requirements. Formally, no two
headquarters simultaneously exercise the same command relationship on the
unit. However, both headquarters effectively exert tactical control–like control,
violating the principle of unity of command. Company commanders, detachment
commanders/team leads, and battalion/brigade leaders can find ways to overcome
these challenges and make missions happen. Based on individual personalities,
their successes are achieved by overcoming structural impediments rather than
being enabled by structure and processes.
Balancing operational and administrative requirements and having multiple
headquarters imposing requirements is not unique to the Army’s cyber forces.
The scale of requirements, the echelons involved, persistence, and the evolving
nature of cyberspace and the cyber force make it increasingly onerous. This
imbalance manifests in two ways. First, the requirements of the administrative
19. HQDA, Army Command Policy, AR 600-20 (Washington, DC: HQDA, July 2020), https://armypubs
.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN30074-AR_600-20-000-WEB-1.pdf.
20. Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras, Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession (Carlisle,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press, 2015), https://press.armywarcollege.edu
/monographs/466.

90

Parameters 52(3) Autumn 2022

headquarters exceed personnel support. While some units, like those supporting
the National Security Agency, need only provide an administrative structure
for detached personnel, Army cyber units must provide a mix of administrative
and operational support. Cyber units must conduct individual and collective
training for which the OPCON headquarters may have limited understanding,
responsibility, or capacity. Additionally, the Cyber branch is small and continually
evolving. As a result, the demands by operational forces for the continual
development of capabilities, doctrine, organization, and training often fall to
administrative headquarters. These practical demands exceed the scope and
capacity intended for administrative headquarters and exacerbate the challenges of
balancing requirements.
Second, cyber elements often lack intermediate supporting organizations like
a division or corps staff. Enduring operational control of cyber detachments,
typically led by a major or lieutenant colonel, is given to headquarters at
echelons above corps, like a combatant command, while administrative control
is retained by a brigade. In contrast to units like the 82nd Airborne Division,
which might be operationally aligned to a combatant command, these cyber
detachments lack the usual echelons of staff between a combatant commander
and a detachment. In more typical force structures, these absent echelons would
balance requirements across time and units. Instead, this responsibility falls
to the team leads of cyber detachments with an authorized strength of around
39 personnel, though rarely fully manned, and with minimal redundancy in work
roles. As a result, the persistently aligned detachments have little flexibility in
how they allocate requirements to their personnel without deployment cycles
or reset phases to provide time-based prioritization. Thus, the responsibility
for balancing operational and administrative requirements has devolved to
detachments lacking the capacity to do so, ensuring the problem persists.
This divided chain of command challenges normal Army processes. An
administrative chain of command with no formal role in operations executes
ratings, evaluations, awards, and other administrative processes. Contrary to the
normal application of Army regulations, a line company commander is not the
highest ranking regularly assigned officer. A company may have as many as five
field-grade officers rated by the battalion or brigade commander and operationally
controlled by a completely separate organization.
Soldier issues take on added complexity as the commander is less synchronized
with operational requirements and must coordinate with multiple layers of leaders.
The nuanced interplay of responsibility and authority between team leadership
and company commander complicates the delegation and oversight of command
responsibilities and can result in lieutenants and junior noncommissioned
officers missing key developmental experiences. Supporting and enabling
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functions, already ill-defined for cyberspace, are further complicated by decisions
regarding whether something is an ADCON or OPCON function and the
differing channels for each. Further complicating the situation, most teams are
externally controlled and actively on the mission, so there is no “garrison” time
between deployments to complete ADCON requirements, leaving soldiers pulled
between completing administrative tasks and executing the mission.
Most concerning are the operational challenges these command relationships
impose. First, they can hinder organizational energy. Competing requirements
and nonstandard processes require more communication and reporting and
reduce the availability of personnel for operational requirements. Second, these
relationships can reduce operational integration. Intent varies with commanders,
making disciplined initiative across elements challenging. With convoluted chains
of command, coordination may be slower or not happen because the correct
information did not get to the right person. Since these command relationships
lack support relationships or even full staffs, the command and operations
(S3/G3/J3) channels provide the primary means of communication and often
become overwhelmed. Similarly, it becomes less likely that the person making
decisions and handling prioritization has all the information. This problem
extends beyond the mission cycle into how we build and maintain combat power
in the cyberspace domain.
Considerations for Mitigation
Cyberspace as a domain is constantly evolving, but many of these challenges
are not. Artillery and logistics elements struggle with aligning by function or as
integrated teams. Special forces frequently operate as independent small teams
integrated with other organizations and headquarters with the goal to enable
unity of effort, ultimately a matter of mission command. Commanders across
the Army with complex command structures struggle to solve problems at the
lowest echelon. The principles below can guide how we reassess our current force
structures based on operational experiences to enable mission command in a
modern cyber force.
Embrace the Principles of Unit Integrity

According to the Army’s foundation doctrine for command and control,
“[w]henever possible, commanders should task-organize based on standing
headquarters and habitually associated groups.”21 For instance, if an operation
requires two teams, those teams should be from the same company. This principle
21. HQDA, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, ADP 6-0 (Washington, DC: HQDA,
July 2019).
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also applies to administrative tasks, which can reduce reporting requirements and
ensure that nontasked units remain organically capable of accomplishing assigned
missions; simplifying command and control; and reducing duplication, gaps in
effort, and coordination requirements. We can use the command relationships of
organic, assigned, and attached to preserve unit integrity but must carefully assess
the long-term situation and costs to ensure the most effective structure is codified
and unnecessary organizational chaos is not imposed.
Integrate Supporting and Enabling Functions

From property acquisitions to intelligence support, a variety of functions
support cyberspace operations. These functions, however, cannot reside at every
echelon. Instead, a clear process to coordinate and integrate support up and
down echelons must be established. In conjunction with the previously
recommended push toward unit integrity, clearly defined support relationships
will ensure coordination for the gaps and overlaps in requirements.
Systemically Deconflict Requirements

Deployments provide clear transitions that shape unit priorities, distinguishing
between training cycles, conducting operations, and synchronizing readiness
cycles. While physical deployments might not be the right answer, time-based
deconfliction measures (such as “mission windows,” “long range training calendars,”
and “red, amber, green cycles”) could be useful. The mechanism(s) should include
the purpose, be acceptable to ADCON and OPCON, meet readiness and
operational priorities, and clarify the responsibilities of the different headquarters,
including operational support and reporting.
Provide Commander Latitudes in Execution

Unity integrity, clarity on roles and responsibilities, and channels for elevating
support enable unit leaders to operate effectively. Units must also have the
latitude to employ their resources optimally. Combining resources with latitude
in execution, enables decentralized execution and the exercise of disciplined
initiative. The emphasis on purpose in mission orders supports this principle.
Providing units more time to complete requirements allows commanders to
sequence priorities effectively and determine the force levels required to accomplish
a mission, enabling more efficient use of personnel.
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The Path Forward
The Cyber branch has grown in scope since its initiation and has not
adjusted to meet the expanded needs of the Army, which now include
electronic warfare, billets in the multi-domain task forces, billets in corps units
and below, and the 915th Cyberspace Warfare Battalion. Military leadership
should approach the recommendations made with a view toward the long-term
growth of the Cyber branch to prevent repeating past mistakes. The Cyber
branch must develop individuals with electronic-warfare knowledge, skills,
and behaviors, and existing personnel should serve in units and on missions
outside the 780th Military Intelligence Brigade and the Cyber Protection
Brigade. Additionally, the Cyber branch must continue to recruit and
integrate officers from other branches through the voluntary transfer incentive
program. Acknowledging the manifest challenges in the existing cyber
organizations can assist the successful development of the newly established
portions of the branch.
With a broader scope, the potential to mismanage specialization increases.
It becomes less plausible that officers can achieve competency in offensive,
defensive, and electronic warfare mission sets, especially if they become cyber
officers four or more years into their careers. For warrant officers and enlisted
soldiers, growth represents additional specialization. A single billet, or even
a limited number of billets, cannot bring mastery of all branch functions.
Similarly, members of the branch cannot achieve advanced competency without
specialized training and assignment. The branch must carefully consider its
doctrine, organization, and training to ensure sufficient specialization and
mastery while maintaining adequate integration across these specializations to
deliver maximal effects.
The growth in the Cyber branch’s scope will also have implications for the
complex chains of command, introducing additional headquarters and longer
coordination chains. The cyber billets have a relatively low density in the field
Army and provide a limited set of organic capabilities for commanders at those
echelons. Instead, capabilities will often be integrated or assigned from higher
headquarters. Authorities, network ownership and visibility, and MOS density
dictate that this integration must occur with the already complex chains of
commands within Army Cyber Command, the 780th Military Intelligence
Brigade, and the Cyber Protection Brigade. If unresolved, these complexities
will affect combat power. Cyber personnel in noncyber units will duplicate
capabilities available to other echelons or be unable to integrate and mass
sufficient capabilities effectly. A revised modern cyber force structure that
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applies the principles outlined in this article will better equip the Army to
meet the needs of multi-domain operations and beyond.
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ABSTRACT: Concerns raised over the impact of changing demographics,
domestic polarization, and the return of near-peer competition on US military
manpower challenges are overstated. Drawing on open-source materials and
interviews, this article discusses factors often neglected in conversations on
this topic and provides leadership and policymakers with a scholarly overview
of an important yet understudied issue facing the US armed forces.
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T

he question of whether the manpower needs of the Armed Forces
might be solved with volunteers has been debated since the draft
was abolished and the all-volunteer force (AVF) introduced as
US operations in Vietnam began winding down in the early 1970s. The Gates
Commission, which examined the implications of moving to an all-volunteer
force, raised concerns about ending the draft. Would a career military become
increasingly isolated from the rest of US society? Would this isolation lead
to a military unrepresentative of the US population in terms of class and race?
Consequentially, would the broader public become less interested in US foreign
and security affairs?1 Moreover, Samuel Huntington famously argued that civilian
control would be harder to assert if a military organization is not representative of
its population.2 Over the years, experts and pundits have addressed these concerns
by arguing that reinstating the draft is the best way to meet future manpower
needs.3 Doing so is unpopular and unlikely to happen.
Nevertheless, manpower remains a central issue for the US military. In 2018, the
Army failed to meet its recruitment target for the first time since 2005, when the
Iraq War was at its peak, and there was widespread talk of an emerging “manpower
crisis” in the Army and the military at large. Unlike strategy and weapon systems
The author gratefully acknowledges very helpful discussion on the themes of this article with Mark Cancian
(CSIS), Anthony Cordesman (CSIS), Eric Gomez (CATO), and Kate Kuzminski (CNAS) and also thanks
Professor Kjell Engelbrekt and Associate Professor Antoine Bousquet, as well as two anonymous reviewers, for
helpful feedback. The views expressed in this article, however, are the sole responsibility of the author.l
1. President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, The Report of the President’s Commission on
an All-Volunteer Armed Force (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 1970), https://www
.nixonfoundation.org / wp- content / uploads / 2012 / 01 / The - Report-Of -The -Presidents- Commission-On -An - AllVolunteer-Armed-Force.pdf.
2. Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957).
3. See Thomas E. Ricks, “Let’s Draft Our Kids,” New York Times, July 9, 2012; and David Barno and
Nora Bensahel, “Why We Still Need the Draft,” War on the Rocks (website), February 23, 2016,
https://warontherocks.com/2016/02/why-we-still-need-the-draft/.
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questions, manpower issues remain understudied in the scholarly community. This
article examines the current manpower challenges in the US military within the
context of changing demographics, increased domestic polarization, and a change
in strategic focus to near-peer competition. It argues that the long-term manpower
supply is not the crisis others have made it out to be despite the issues first raised
in 2018 and the additional problems arising from an increasingly polarized public.
The projected 2050 recruitment pool is sufficient to meet the Army’s needs, and the
Army should focus on modernization and investment in high-end technologies to
meet the challenges posed by near-peer competition with China and Russia.
This article examines the main factors influencing recruitment and retention
numbers, the changing demographic facing the US military, the significance of
domestic polarization, and the manpower challenges caused by the strategic shift
to near-peer competition. The final section summarizes the main findings.

Recruitment and Retention
Recruitment and retention are core concerns for staffing organizations,
including militaries. Much of the discussion of manpower challenges facing the
US military focuses on recruitment rather than retention. In the last few years,
retention goals have mostly been met or exceeded, and retaining personnel is,
therefore, usually considered less of an issue than recruitment—except for female
retention, which is considerably lower than male retention.4
Applicant numbers increased dramatically following 9/11, and the 2008
economic recession further bolstered these numbers. Then, combat operations
were gradually cut back in Iraq and then Afghanistan, reducing the number of
recruits needed.5 In 2018, however, the Army failed to meet its recruitment target
for the first time since 2005, when the Iraq War was at its peak, and there was
widespread talk of an emerging “manpower crisis” in the Army.6 This failure, which
likely resulted from the booming US economy at the time, provoked debate within
the Army about future recruitment efforts. While all service branches reached
their 2020 and 2021 targets, many believe this achievement was due to the weak

4. Ben Werner, “GAO: Women 28 Percent More Likely to Leave Military Service than Men,”
USNI News (website), May 20, 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/05/20/gao-women-28-percent-more-likely-to
-leave-military-service-than-men.
5. Meghann Myers, “The Army Needs to Attract Gen Z’s Best and Brightest, So It’s Working on Its Sales
Pitch,” Army Times (website), November 14, 2018, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2018/11/14
/the-army-needs-to-attract-gen-zs-best-and-brightest-so-its-working-on-its-sales-pitch/.
6. James Long, “It’s Not the Economy: Why the Army Missed Its Recruitment Goals and What to Do
about It,” Modern War Institute at West Point (website), February 14, 2019, https://mwi.usma.edu/not-economy
-army-missed-recruitment-goals/; and Dennis Laich, “Commentary: Recruiting’s Slippery Slope,” Army Times
(website), July 27, 2018, https://www.armytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2018/07/28/recruitings-slippery
-slope/.
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COVID-19 afflicted economy.7 In the competitive 2022 job market, all service
branches experienced difficulties meeting recruitment targets, raising alarms about
the challenges of maintaining a large enough force.8
From the quality of applicants to the state of the economy, many factors impact
recruitment numbers. First, scholars have observed a strong correlation between
unemployment and higher recruitment and retention. In a strong economy,
there are naturally more options for people considering leaving the armed
forces.9 Hence, some analysts believe the uncertain post–COVID-19 economy
may provide fertile ground for military recruiters.10 Second, the total pool the
military recruits from is small. Moreover, awareness of what a military career
entails among youth is limited; 50 percent of youth claim to “know little” about
serving in the US military.11 Studies have shown that approximately 136,000
individuals of the 33-million Americans between 17 and 24 meet the minimum
enlistment standards and express a willingness to serve. According to 2017
Pentagon data, over 70 percent of Americans between 17 and 24 are ineligible
to serve in the military—meaning 24 million individuals from the 33-million
pool do not meet miimum enlistment requirements.12 A 2018 Heritage
Foundation report described these numbers as an “alarming situation which
threatens the country’s fundamental national security.”13 The main reasons for
ineligibility were lack of education, previous criminal records, and obesity.
Many eligible recruits are from military families, which opponents of the
all-volunteer force feared would happen. They believe this tendency led to the

7. Guest Editorial, “US Military Needs Recruits,” Day (website), July 15, 2021, https://www.theday.com
/article/20210715/OP01/210719637; and Ellie Kaufmann, “US Military Struggled to Attract National
Guard and Reserve Troops but Met Targets for Full-time Recruits in 2021 Fiscal Year,” CNN (website),
January 19, 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/01/14/politics/military-recruitment-numbers-2021/index.html.
8. Courtney Kube and Molly Boignon, “Every Branch of the Military Is Struggling to Make Its 2022
Recruiting Goals, Officials Say,” NBC News (website), June 27, 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/military
/every-branch-us-military-struggling-meet-2022-recruiting-goals-officia-rcna35078; and Thomas Spoehr,
“Military Recruiting Faces Its Biggest Challenges in Years,” May 13, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/defense
/commentary/military-recruiting-faces-its-biggest-challenge-year.
9. John T. Warner, “The Effect of the Civilian Economy on Recruiting and Retention,” in Report of the
Eleventh Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation: Supporting Research Papers (Washington, DC:
Department of Defense, 2012), https://militarypay.defense.gov/Portals/3/Documents/Reports/11th_QRMC
_Supporting_Research_Papers_(932pp)_Linked.pdf.
10. Meghann Myers, “In Uncertain Economic Times, Some of the Services Are Upping Their Recruiting
Goals,” Military Times (website), February 2, 2021, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military
/2021/02/02/in-uncertain-economic-times-some-of-the-services-are-upping-their-recruiting-goals/.
11. US Army Public Affairs, “Recruiting Facts and Figures,” US Army Recruiting Command (website), n.d.,
https://recruiting.army.mil/pao/facts_figures/.
12. Meghann Myers, “Top Recruiter: Just 136,000 Out of 33 Million Young Americans Would Join the
Army,” Army Times (website), October 12, 2017, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2017/10/12/top
-recruiter-just-136000-out-of-33-million-young-americans-would-join-the-army/.
13. Thomas Spoehr and Bridget Handy, “The Looming National Security Crisis: Young Americans Unable
to Serve in the Military,” Heritage Foundation (website), February 13, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/defense
/report/the-looming-national-security-crisis-young-americans-unable-serve-the-military.
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unintended creation of an American “warrior caste.”14 So-called “professional
inheritance” is not exclusive to the military. Many occupations display similar
tendencies, such as US police forces. However, 2015 Department of Defense
data indicated that over 25 percent of new recruits have a parent who previously
served in the military.15 In itself, professional inheritance is not a problem, but
it could become one if the appearance of a “family business” impedes efforts to
reach new demographics.
When assessing the current state of recruitment, military leadership should
consider trends likely to impact the recruiting pool in the medium- to long-term
future. First, there does not seem to be much cause for alarm regarding high-school
completion rates, and there are few reasons to believe the situation will deteriorate
further. The National Center for Education Statistics reports the graduation rate
for public high-school students in 2018 was 85 percent—the highest rate since it
was first measured in 2010–11.16 Although the federal government has a limited
role in the education system, the Biden-Harris administration invests heavily in
school districts with a higher proportion of low-income students, which should
encourage the positive trend in high-school graduation rates.17
Second, the number of Americans with criminal records is high—as many
as one in three US adults is estimated to have a criminal record.18 The service
branches often grant waivers for minor offenses, and over time, the percentage of
waivers has closely reflected recruitment needs.
Third, unlike education and criminal records, obesity is not improving,
particularly in the southern United States, which provides a disproportionally
large number of recruits.19 There are strategies, however, to help potential recruits
deal with obesity. Local recruitment offices often run informal fitness camps to

14. Amy Schafer, “Generations of War: The Rise of the Warrior Caste and the All-Volunteer Force,” Center
for a New American Security (website), May 8, 2017, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/generations
-of-war.
15. Kristy N. Kamarck, Diversity, Inclusion, and Equal Opportunity in the Armed Services: Background
and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report R44321 (Washington, DC: CRS,
June 5, 2019), 58.
16. “Public High School Graduation Rates,” National Center for Education Statistics (website), May 2021,
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator/coi/high-school-graduation-rates.
17. Nicholas Tampio, “How Biden’s Request for More Education Funding Would Shift More Power to the
Federal Government,” Conversation (website), April 26, 2021, https://theconversation.com/how-bidens-request
-for-more-education-funding-would-shift-more-power-to-the-federal-government-159489.
18. Rebecca Vallas, Sharon Dietrich, and Beth Avery, “A Criminal Record Shouldn’t Be a Life Sentence to
Poverty,” Center for American Progress (website), May 28, 2021, https://www.americanprogress.org/article
/criminal-record-shouldnt-life-sentence-poverty-2/.
19. Craig M. Hales, Margaret D. Carroll, Cheryl D. Fryar, and Cynthia L. Ogden, “Prevalence of
Obesity and Severe Obesity among Adults: United States, 2017–2018,” National Center for Health Statistics
Data Brief No. 1, National Center for Health Statistics (website), February 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs
/products/databriefs/db360.htm.
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get potential recruits in good enough physical shape to enlist.20 Current recruiting
and retention have challenges and problem areas, but there are many ways to work
around these issues.

Shifting Demographics and Manpower Challenges
Although the military has found ways to address current challenges, the
United States is experiencing rapid demographic shifts that will raise new issues.
The US Census Bureau projects that the United States will become “minority
white” around 2045, meaning the white population will constitute less than
50 percent of the total population.21 As a result, future military ranks will be more
racially and ethnically diverse. In response to these projections, the Department
of Defense implemented various diversity initiatives that have been debated
for decades. Addressing diversity and inclusivity within the armed forces is “a
strategic imperative,” with implications for the future ability to carry out grand
strategy.22 A growing emphasis on diversity in all US sectors has also impacted
the armed forces.
The military has made significant progress in diversifying its workforce
overall, and the composition of all active-duty personnel closely reflects the
ethnic/racial composition of the US population.23 The senior officer corps,
however, is still significantly less diverse than the US population. Moreover,
the majority of recruits come from middle-class backgrounds, and are not
disproportionately recruited among poor Americans, as observers critical of
US foreign policy sometimes claim.24 Women remain underrepresented at all
levels (around 16 percent), and ethnic and racial minorities are underrepresented
at higher ranks.25 As of May 2018, Black Americans made up 16.8 percent of
active-duty personnel, with a total share of 13.7 percent of the US resident
20. Yuki Noguchi, “Fighting Weight: How Military Recruiters Take on Obesity, Case by Case,” National
Public Radio (website), May 17, 2021, https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2021/05/17/994241471
/fighting-weight-how-military-recruiters-take-on-obesity-case-by-case?t=1652777676533.
21. William H. Frey, “The US Will Become ‘Minority White’ in 2045, Census Projects: Youthful Minorities
Are the Engines of Future Growth,” Brookings Institution, Avenue (blog), March 14, 2018, https://www
.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2018/03/14/the-us-will-become-minority-white-in-2045-census-projects/. At
the same time, what might happen is more Hispanics will start self-identifying as whites. See Ezra Klein, Why
We’re Polarized (New York: Avid Reader Press, 2020), 106.
22. Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Defense Board on Diversity and Inclusion Report:
Recommendations to Improve Racial and Ethnic Diversity and Inclusion in the U.S. Military (Washington, DC:
DoD, December 18, 2020) 43, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Dec/18/2002554852/-1/-1/0/DOD
-DIVERSITY-AND-INCLUSION-FINAL-BOARD-REPORT.PDF.
23. Helene Cooper, “African-Americans Are Highly Visible in the Military, but Almost Invisible at the Top,”
New York Times (website), May 20 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/25/us/politics/military-minorities
-leadership.html.
24. Andrea Asoni, Andrea Gilli, Mauro Gilli, and Tino Sanandaji, “A Mercenary Army of the Poor?
Technological Change and the Demographic Composition of the Post-9/11 U.S. Military,” Journal of Strategic
Studies 45, no. 4 (January 30, 2020): 568–614, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1692660.
25. Lori Robinson and Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Women Warriors: The Ongoing Story of Integrating and
Diversifying the American Armed Forces,” Brookings (website), May 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/essay
/women-warriors-the-ongoing-story-of-integrating-and-diversifying-the-armed-forces.
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population ages 18 to 64.26 In the officer corps only, Black representation
decreases to 8.1 percent. Within the top echelons of the armed forces
(generals/flag officers), Black representation amounts to 8 percent. When
examining the top 41 most senior commanders (four-star ranking) in 2021, two
are Black, and one is a woman.27 Under Joe Biden’s presidency, the Department
of Defense has prioritized diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives to ensure the
military remains an attractive career choice for minorities.28 When it comes to
female retention, momentum is building in Congress to change how the military
deals with sexual violence within the services. These potential changes may
facilitate the retention and recruitment of women. Whether such efforts will yield
tangible results remains to be seen.

Domestic Polarization and Manpower Challenges
A tendency toward polarization may be understood as foundational to
the US political system, which combines a majoritarian electoral system with
strong support for minority interests. To fully comprehend the challenges of a
rapidly diversifying population, one needs to examine how the military has been
impacted by increased domestic polarization in recent decades. Many Democratic
voters moved to the left. In what a Vox journalist called “a Great Awokening,”
White Democrats have changed their political preferences to the left over the
last few years, especially in terms of social justice issues such as race.29 Political
scientist Lilliana Mason has shown how a variety of social, economic, religious,
and racial cleavages have aligned themselves into a simple binary—Republican
or Democrat. She argues Donald Trump’s election may be understood as “the
culmination of a long process by which the American electorate has become
deeply divided along partisan lines.”30 By the end of Trump’s presidency,
analysts at the Pew Research Center concluded “Americans have rarely been as
polarized as they are today.”31
The controversies surrounding the military’s diversity initiatives must be
understood within the context of an increasingly polarized society. The most
26. Numbers are taken from Kamarck, Diversity, Inclusion, and Equal Opportunity.
27. Robert Burns and Lolita C. Baldor, “Top US General Urges Greater Racial Diversity in Military,”
Associated Press (website), May 5, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/race-and-ethnicity-government-and
-politics-1deffc0ef b652716aa44dab756b614d1.
28. Terri Moon Cronk, “Austin Speaks Out on Importance of Diversity in White House Roundtable,” DoD
(website), February 10, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2930883/austin
-speaks-out-on-importance-of-diversity-in-white-house-roundtable/.
29. Matthew Yglesias, “The Great Awokening,” Vox (website), April 1, 2019, https://www.vox
.com/2019/3/22/18259865/great-awokening-white-liberals-race-polling-trump-2020.
30. Lilliana Mason, Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2018), 3.
31. Michael Dimock and Richard Wike, “America Is Exceptional in the Nature of Its Political Divide,” Pew
Research Center (website), November 13, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/11/13/america-is
-exceptional-in-the-nature-of-its-political-divide/.
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controversial parts of diversity initiatives are wholly or partly based on critical
race theory (CRT).32 A slide with information on “white privilege,” a key concept
within critical race theory, was included in a 2015 diversity training session at
Fort Gordon, Georgia, drawing criticism. An Army spokesperson immediately
backtracked and said that the slide’s content was not authorized.33 The Trump
administration banned federal diversity training based on CRT precepts in
September 2020, and the service branches then canceled contracts with contractors
who provided diversity training based on critical race theory.
Critical race theory, however, continued to gain traction in an increasingly
polarized domestic setting. On his first day in office, Biden rescinded the ban, and
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III issued a memo instructing the armed
forces to resume CRT-based diversity training.34 Scattered reports of pushback
started to appear shortly after the memo’s release. For instance, a high-profile
incident erupted around the incorporation of critical race theory in workshops on
equity, diversity, and inclusion conducted at the United States Military Academy. In
April 2021, Congressman Mike Waltz (Florida Sixth Congressional District) sent
a letter to Lieutenant General Darryl A. Williams, superintendent of the United
States Military Academy, characterizing this training as “inflammatory” and
“detrimental to the mission and morale of the U.S. Army.”35 Some commentators
and members of Congress have gone so far as to speak of a “woke military.”36
The high degree of contestation surrounding military diversity initiatives
presents challenges for recruitment efforts. The military needs to remain
an attractive career choice for minorities since the US population is rapidly
diversifying. Therefore, recruiters are actively attempting to attract minorities.
Although recent data on political preference within the military is lacking,
available research suggests conservatives are overrepresented within the military,
particularly among officers.37 Given the polarized public, one may suspect some
32. See John McWhorter, “John McWhorter on How Critical Race Theory Poorly Serves Its Intended
Beneficiaries,” Economist (website), May 24, 2021, https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2021/05/24
/john-mcwhorter-on-how-critical-race-theory-poorly-serves-its-intended-beneficiaries; and Jason Stanley
“Jason Stanley on Critical Race Theory and Why It Matters,” Economist (website), May 24, 2021, https://www
.economist.com/by-invitation/2021/05/24/jason-stanley-on-critical-race-theory-and-why-it-matters.
33. Tom Vanden Brook, “Army Says Diversity Training Sent Wrong Signal,” USA Today (website),
April 3, 2015, https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/04/03/army-diversity-training/25250733/.
34. Stephen Losey, “The Military Is Resuming the Diversity Training That Trump Banned,” Military
(website), March 8, 2021, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/03/08/military-resuming-diversity
-training-trump-banned.html.
35. “Press Release: Waltz Requests Critical Race Theory Materials & Presentations from West Point,”
Mike Waltz (website), April 8, 2021, https://waltz.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=486.
36. Konstantin Toropin, ”Top Leaders Again Reject Claims That Military Is Becoming Too “ ‘Woke,’ ”
Military (website), July 1, 2021, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/07/01/top-leaders-again-reject
-claims-military-becoming-too-woke.html.
37. Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds., Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American
National Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001); and Leo Shane III, “Troops See Rising Political Tension
in the Ranks, Poll Shows,” Military Times (website), October 17, 2018, https://www.militarytimes.com/news
/pentagon-congress/2018/10/17/troops-see-rising-political-tension-in-the-ranks-poll-shows/.
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officers are put off by too strident a focus on diversity, equity, and inclusion, as
seen in recent controversies surrounding diversity training based on critical race
theory, which some observers believe could be harmful to military effectiveness.38
Others are concerned diversity initiatives, to the extent that they involve informal
quotas or “soft” affirmative-action programs, would undermine the military’s
strict meritocratic system.39 The military will need to balance the appeal to ethnic
and racial minorities while not alienating rural Southern and more conservative
Americans who have traditionally been its largest recruiting pool.

Near-Peer Competition
The shift from focusing on anti-terrorist operations and counterinsurgency
(COIN) to near-peer competition with China and Russia raises new manpower
challenges. As the 2018 National Defense Strategy observed: “[i]nter-state
strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national
security.”40 This concern remains in the 2021 Interim National Security Strategic
Guidance and the 2022 National Defense Strategy. China and Russia, however,
are struggling with low birth rates that will affect their projected pool of recruits
in 2050. In 2050, the United States will have an estimated total recruitment
pool (ages 15 to 24) of 44 million people, compared to 138 million in China and
14.6 million in Russia.41 Given the total size of the US military has remained
stable since the end of the Cold War, these numbers, while important to monitor
carefully, should not cause concern.42
Further, the strategic focus on near-peer competition with China calls for
investment in expensive technologies rather than expanding conventional armies.43
With Russia, though, strategists see the need for retaining large conventional
armies. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, some
observers argued for an increased permanent presence of US troops in Eastern
Europe.44 As Mark Cancian pointed out, the scenarios considered most likely in
great-power conflict do not require large conventional ground forces. The Pacific
38. Kamarck, Diversity, Inclusion, and Equal Opportunity, 59–60; and Conner Bolanos and Thomas Spoehr,
“Military Readiness Takes Back Seat to Wokeness at the Pentagon,” Daily Signal (website), June 21, 2022,
https://www.dailysignal.com/2022/06/21/military-readiness-takes-back-seat-to-wokeness-at-the-pentagon.
39. Kamarck, Diversity, Inclusion, and Equal Opportunity, 59–60.
40. James N. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening
the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: DoD, 2018), 1, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1
/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
41. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division, World Population
Prospects 2019: Demographic Profiles, vol. 2 (New York: United Nations, 2019), https://population.un.org/wpp
/publications/Files/WPP2019_Volume-II-Demographic-Profiles.pdf.
42. Mark F. Cancian, discussion with author, September 2021.
43. Mark F. Cancian, “U.S. Military Forces in FY 2020: Army,” Center for Strategic and International Studies
(website), October 15, 2019, 4, https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-military-forces-fy-2020-army.
44. Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Strengthening the US and NATO Defense Postures in Europe after Russia’s
Invasion of Ukraine,” Brookings (website), June 21, 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/strengthening
-the-us-and-nato-defense-postures-in-europe-after-russias-invasion-of-ukraine.
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theater consists mostly of oceans, and the geographical features involved in an
attack on the Baltic countries would make it difficult to deploy large numbers
of US ground forces.45 In addition, many US strategists believe Europeans
should assume more responsibility for their defense, freeing up American resources
for Asia.
To pay for expensive technologies, many strategists favor a reduction in force
size.46 In light of the strategic focus on China, the different service branches are
adopting their own approaches. Since the Navy and Air Force are likely to play
the most important roles in a conflict with China, the Army is likely to shrink.
The Army, however, would play a critical role in a conflict with Russia. At the
same time, it is trying to develop capabilities that will also be useful in the Pacific
theater, such as long-range anti-ship missiles.47 Even when large numbers of
ground combat troops are not needed, the Army has historically provided large
numbers of troops to support other services.
The Air Force will likely cut its force to finance modernization efforts. The
Marine Corps is currently restructuring its forces (Force Design 2030) for the
Pacific theater.48 It plans to shrink to pre-Iraq and pre-Afghanistan levels to pay
for long-range precision weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles.49 The Navy, for
some time, has been perceived as an outlier because it plans to grow its force
structure and increase its fleet considerably, though its earlier goal of reaching a
355-ship fleet collapsed due to staggering costs.50 Although Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine may delay the long overdue pivot to Asia, the future focus on China will
require modernization and investment in high-end technologies rather than large
numbers of troops.
Analysts agree the biggest challenge for the armed forces in an age of nearpeer competition is the quality rather than the quantity of servicemembers.51
Recruiting and retaining personnel with high-end technical and cyber skills,
(since the cyber domain is projected to increase rapidly) must be a priority. The
2018 National Defense Strategy highlights the necessity to modernize professional
45. Mark F. Cancian, “U.S. Military Forces in FY 2020: The Struggle to Align Forces with Strategy,” Center
for Strategic and International Studies (website), November 8, 2019, 17, https://www.csis.org/analysis/us
-military-forces-fy-2020-struggle-align-forces-strategy-1.
46. Mark F. Cancian, “U.S. Military Forces in FY 2021: The Last Year of Growth?,” Center for Strategic
and International Studies (website), March 18, 2021, vii, https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-military-forces-fy
-2021-last-year-growth.
47. Cancian, “Last Year of Growth.”
48. David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “A Striking New Vision for the Marines, and a Wakeup Call for the
Other Services,” War on the Rocks (website), October 1, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/a-striking
-new-vision-for-the-marines-and-a-wakeup-call-for-the-other-services/.
49. Cancian, “Last Year of Growth?,” 62.
50. Cancian, “Last Year of Growth?,” 38.
51. Michael E. O’Hanlon and James N. Miller, “Focusing on Quality over Quantity in the US Military
Budget,” Brookings 2020 Big Policy (website), December 2, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020
/bigideas/focusing-on-quality-over-quantity-in-the-us-military-budget/.
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military education (PME), implement improved talent management, and better
utilize civilian workforce expertise.52 In May 2020 the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued
a vision and guidance for professional military educatoin and talent management,
noting “[t]he return of great power competition raises the stakes for readiness
and for innovation.”53 The document acknowledges the US military must prepare
for facing adversaries, which may outnumber US forces and possess technologies
equal to the United States, and provides a vision for a continuous PME and talent
management system that produces leaders who “achieve intellectual overmatch
against adversaries.”54
Prioritizing talent management is essential from a manpower perspective
since it makes the military a more attractive employer and helps recruitment and
retention. For some years, a better talent management system has been discussed.55
Essentially, the armed forces face the problem of moving from an industrial-era
model for labor force management, where individuals are interchangeable, to a
talent management model, where management must consider the particular
skills and knowledge of each individual.56 The Army has been using an online
marketplace—the Army Talent Alignment Process (ATAP)—for several years.
Officers may easily see available assignments for which they are qualified, rankorder their preferences, and upload their CVs. The system gives users recruiting
and designing PME programs a better overview of needed skills.57 While more
work is needed to improve talent management, its higher prioritization may
enhance personnel retention.

Conclusion
In 2018, analysts sounded the alarm when Army recruitment numbers were
not met for the first time in over a decade. On closer inspection, it turned out
71 percent of American youth did not meet minimum enlistment standards
due to obesity, previous criminal records, and lack of education. Recruitment
and retention numbers for all services recovered in the following years, and the
services met their fiscal year 2021 goals. In 2022, however, all service branches are

52. Mattis, Summary of 2018 National Defense Strategy, 1.
53. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Developing Today’s Joint Officers for Tomorrow’s Ways of War: The Joint Chiefs
of Staff Vision and Guidance for Professional Military Education & Talent Management (Washington, DC:
JCS, May 1, 2020), 2, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/education/jcs_pme_tm_vision
.pdf?ver=2020-05-15-102429-817.
54. JCS, Developing Today’s Joint Officers.
55. See Brennan Randel, “The Army Has a Revolutionary New Talent Management System. Now We Have to
Make It Work,” Modern War Institute at West Point (website), December 23, 2019, https://mwi.usma.edu/army
-revolutionary-new-talent-management-system-now-make-work/.
56. Kate Kuzminski (Center for a New American Security), discussion with author, September 2021.
57. Duane A. Gamble, “Talent Management: Enabling Total Army Readiness,” US Army (website),
February 16, 2021, https://www.army.mil/article/242952/talent_management_enabling_total_army_readiness.
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struggling to meet recruitment targets, most likely due to the highly competitive
civilian US job market.
While acknowledging that manpower supply is a serious concern, this article
has argued that the notion of a “manpower crisis” needs to be nuanced. Although
the relatively small recruitment pool of qualified youth remains a serious challenge
for the armed forces, the underlying issues of obesity, previous criminal records,
and lack of education may, to various degrees, be worked around. Nor do all
of these issues trend in the wrong direction, particularly when it comes to the
educational attainment of young Americans.
The Department of Defense has historically found ways to overcome manpower
shortfalls.58 First, the Armed forces have used more contractors at home and
abroad. Contractors are less expensive and easier to recruit and terminate. The
US military has adopted a practice empoyed by private companies for a long
time—outsourcing certain activities that do not need a highly skilled workforce.
Outsourcing is problematic since the practice makes the military dependent on
a private sector driven by different incentives than the public sector. Second,
reservists have been used more efficiently—and could be used even more efficiently
if appropriately managed.
Third, the number of Department of Defense civilians has increased.
Over time, the military has shifted active-duty personnel functions to other
workforces to overcome recruitment and retention problems because active-duty
servicemembers are expensive. Although much of the discussion focuses on
recruitment, some analysts think retention is a more significant concern since it
is easier for the military to mask the numbers. Some believe the most talented
people tend to leave and continue their careers elsewhere.59
Finally, in light of the Biden-Harris administration’s prevailing focus on China,
there is pressure to prioritize technological modernization over a force structure
increase. Russia’s war in Ukraine may delay but will not fundamentally change
the long overdue pivot to Asia. The Marine Corps has led the way in this respect
and adopted a future vision based on a conflict scenario in the South China
Sea. Additionally, US leadership needs to focus on implementing better talent
management systems within the military that bolster the quality rather than
quantity of servicemembers. Although these actions are necessary for improvement,
in comparison to Russia and China, the future US recruitment pool in the
long-term looks good. While complacency about manpower challenges is never

58. Cancian, discussion with the author.
59. Anthony Cordesman, discussion with author, September 2021.
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a virtue, there should be no significant problems recruiting a sufficiently large force
in the medium- to long-term.

Stefan Borg
Stefan Borg is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science and
Law at the Swedish Defence University.
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ABSTRACT: The special operations community could best address the
perceived ethical crisis it faces by professionalizing as an institution. While
earlier assessments have attributed special operations forces’ ethical issues to a
focus on mission accomplishment that led to a broken force generation process
and a high operations tempo, such diagnoses obscure a more comprehensive
solution. Using sociologist Andrew Abbott’s work on professions as a
framework, this article explores the benefits of building the kinds of institutions
that can claim a jurisdiction, develop and certify expert knowledge, and
establish and apply a code of ethics that addresses special operations unique
concerns so that it builds trust and better serves the American people.

Key words: special operations, militar y ethics, professional studies,
professional expertise, professional jurisdictions, civil-military relations

S

pecial operations forces (SOF) appear to be experiencing an ethical
crisis. According to a report last year in Rolling Stone, special operators
routinely abused and even smuggled drugs while conducting operations.
More concerning are the times special operators were involved in, and occasionally
got away with, murder.1 Another report described special operators engaging in
extremist, radicalized, and racist discussions, sometimes advocating violence
against elected US officials in secret Facebook groups.2 Additionally, multiple
high-profile war-crime cases have recently occurred, including those of Eddie
Gallagher (who was accused of one count of murder and two counts of attempted
murder but convicted for posing for a photo with the corpse of a detainee) and US
Army Special Forces Major Matthew Golestyn, who was accused of murdering an
Afghan man his unit had detained.3
This ethical crisis is not limited to US special operations forces. According to
the 2020 Brereton Report by the Australian Department of Defence, Australian
special forces have also been involved in killing civilians and other abuses in
1. Seth Harp, “The Fort Bragg Murders,” Rolling Stone (website), April 18, 2021, https://www.rollingstone.com
/culture/culture-features/fort-bragg-murders-1153405/.
2. Carol E. Lee, “In Secret Facebook Groups, America’s Best Warriors Share Racist Jabs, Lies about 2020,
Even QAnon Theories,” NBC News (website), April 16, 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/military/secret
-facebook-groups-america-s-best-warriors-share-racist-jabs-n1263985.
3. Stephen Losey, “Eddie Gallagher vs. the World: After War Crimes Trial, Notorious SEAL Is Out to
Settle Scores,” Military.com (website), June 26, 2021, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/06/26/eddie
-gallagher-vs-world-after-war-crimes-trial-notorious-seal-out-settle-scores.html;
and
Dave
Phillips,
“Army Denies Request by Soldier Pardoned by Trump, Setting Up Showdown,” New York Times (website),
January 9, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/09/us/mathew-golsteyn-army-war-crime.html.
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Afghanistan.4 The report cites credible evidence Australian special operators
wrongfully killed 39 Afghan civilians—news that has generated much of the same
kind of soul-searching currently happening in the United States.5
Crises like these are as attributable to the institution as they are to the individual.
Indeed, United States Special Operations Command issued the Comprehensive
Review in January 2020 to address this point. The report attributed these ethical
failures, in part, to a focus on force employment and mission accomplishment,
leading to a broken force generation (FORGEN) process and a high operations
tempo (OPTEMPO) that impeded the recruitment, assessment, and deployment
of fully trained operators and leaders.6
This diagnosis obscures the solution. Fixing these problems may result in a
highly skilled force, but that is not the same as a highly professional one. Whereas
a highly skilled force is proficient at performing tasks, a professional force
understands how these tasks collectively serve a greater social good. The point
here is not to assess whether the SOF community has a crisis but to emphasize
the opportunity the current situation provides to professionalize more fully by
addressing institutional shortcomings that diminish the ability to construct an
effective professional identity.
Special operators may be professionals of a sort. However, until special
operations designates a jurisdiction over which it has the autonomy to exercise
judgment, the organization is better characterized as a bureaucracy that manages a
highly skilled force. Sociologist Andrew Abbott describes professional expertise as
necessary to diagnose, treat, and make inferences about the problems professionals
are called upon to solve.7 Employing Abbott’s framework, I suggest a better way
to address these issues and enable the SOF community to examine its ethical and
operational challenges.

Diagnoses
Whether reported cases of ethical failure in special operations forces rise to
the level of crisis is difficult to say given the anecdotal nature of the evidence.
In 2018 and 2019, however, the severity of these failures motivated Congress
4. Ben Doherty, “How the ‘Good War’ Went Bad: Elite Soldiers from Australia, UK, and US Face a Reckoning,”
Guardian (website), June 1, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/jun/02/how-the-good
-war-went-bad-elite-soldiers-from-australia-uk-and-us-face-a-reckoning.
5. Christopher Knaus, “Key Findings of the Brereton Report into Allegations of Australian War Crimes in
Afghanistan,” Guardian (website), November 18, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020
/nov/19/key-findings-of-the-brereton-report-into-allegations-of-australian-war-crimes-in-afghanistan.
6. Inited States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Comprehensive Review (MacDill Air Force Base,
FL: USSOCOM, January 23, 2020), 5–7.
7. Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1988), 52.
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to direct a review of special operations accountability, misconduct, ethics, and
professionalism.8 In response, United States Special Operations Command issued
a report in January 2020 that found no “systemic” ethical failures. The report
acknowledged a high operational tempo and certain aspects of special operations
culture had set conditions for ethical failures. Specifically, the high operational
tempo disrupted the normal FORGEN process and caused a “cascading effect”
impacting leader development and unit integrity.9
Additionally, the review found some services overemphasized physical
training at the expense of professional development. Thus, special operators
were highly skilled when they joined special operations organizations, but they
lacked a fully developed professional identity and ethos. The report also found
the lack of exposure to originating service cultures, and the specialized attention
and amenities operators received further risked creating a sense of entitlement.
Moreover, the level of quality control over assessment, selection, and training
varied among services and special operations components, causing acculturation
to be inconsistent.10
The report’s findings were met with a mixed response. Writing in the Washington
Post, David Ignatius described the report as an “important step,” though the report
may have been “careful . . . perhaps to a fault” in its language.11 Less receptive,
Rolling Stone described the report as “mostly a whitewash, full of vague language
about improving leadership and accountability.”12 Both responses likely hold
truth. The report helpfully describes how ethical failures are attributable to the
institution as much as the individual. By understating the role the institution (as
a system) plays in setting the conditions for these failures, the report obscures the
institutional remedies available to address the conditions for ethical failure.
As an institution, special operations has been hampered in its ability to control
the recruitment, assessment, and professional development of its personnel
because of its dependency on external organizations to manage those processes.
Although the establishment of US Special Operations Command as a unified
command solved many operational concerns at the time, the most important
elements of what it means to be in a profession were left to the other services,

8. Meghann Myers, “The Pentagon Is Reviewing the Special Operations Community after a Series of
High-Profile Scandals,” ArmyTimes (website), December 5, 2018, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your
-army/2018/12/05/the-pentagon-is-reviewing-the-special-operations-community-after-a-series-of-high-profile
-scandals/.
9. USSOCOM, Comprehensive Review, 25–32.
10. USSOCOM, Comprehensive Review, 42.
11. David Ignatius, “Special Operations Forces Are Stretched to the Danger Point,” Washington Post (website),
January 28, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/special-operations-forces-are-stretched-to-the
-danger-point/2020/01/28/c6c3898a-421a-11ea-aa6a-083d01b3ed18_story.html.
12. Harp, “Fort Bragg Murders.”
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which are effectively other professions.13 At this point, no single institution
oversees the professional development and certification of special operators over
one jurisdiction.
Compounding these institutional difficulties, the complexity of the operating
environment also contributes to the current crisis. Writing on the Small Wars
Journal website, one special operations officer argued the community’s ethical issues
primarily arise from special operations soldiers being “selected for a willingness
and aptitude to conduct traditionally immoral acts, trained to be proficient at
the conduct of those acts, but then expected to refrain from those acts outside
of approved operational circumstances.” In response, the author recommends
a “bifurcated ethics system” that differentiates operational and nonoperational
environments.14 Echoing this sentiment, another special operator serving a federal
prison sentence told Rolling Stone special operators act in the “grey zone” where
morality and ethics are “in the eye of the beholder,” “everything goes” as long as
the mission is accomplished, and any indiscretions remain outside the public eye.15
Although anecdotal, both views reflect a misunderstanding of the roles
professionals play in society. Where professions serve a social good (such as health,
justice, or security), professionals have a prima facie ethical obligation to provide
that service. For example, emergency rooms are required to ensure patients are
stabilized and treated, regardless of their ability to pay.16 Thus, professionals are
not asked to do unethical things; rather, professionals are asked to do things that
would be unethical for nonprofessionals to do. Professional knowledge is highly
specialized, and those without it will be unable to provide the profession’s service
and, in some cases, could harm the client.17
Notably, Abbott rejects the idea professions must somehow serve society.
Yet, Abbott acknowledges some professions, like the military, could qualify as a
“special calling” because of the nature of the work and a sense of corporateness
in members’ individual roles. Writing in 1988, Abbott observed such
professionalism was generally in decline in the United States.18 This point is
important because an occupation can count as a profession without needing to
reconcile its professional ethics with personal ones. But where the provision of a
13. Bryan D. Brown, United States Special Operations Command History: 1987–2007 (Tampa, FL: USSOCOM
History and Research Office, 2007), 12.
14. Dan Pace, “A House Divided: A Look at SOF Values,” Small Wars Journal (website), February 25, 2021,
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/house-divided-look-sof-values.
15. Harp, “Fort Bragg Murders.”
16. “Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) Fact Sheet,” American College of
Emergency Physicians (website), accessed on May 10, 2022, https://www.acep.org/life-as-a-physician/ethics
--legal/emtala/emtala-fact-sheet/.
17. Eliot Freidson, Professionalism, Tte Third Logic: On the Practice of Knowldege (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2001), 17.
18. Andrew Abbott, “The Army and the Theory of Professions,” in The Future of the Army Profession,
ed. Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins (Boston: McGraw-Hill Publishing, 2002), 528–30.
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good or service risks harm—whether to the client or others—professions must
ensure they have effective institutions able to educate, train, certify, and, perhaps
most importantly, govern professionals to ensure their acts serve the greater good
and can stand up to ethical scrutiny.
This obligation points to another challenge for special operations forces.
Although a subjective approach to ethics like the ones expressed above is wrong
in any environment, the norms for operations below the threshold of war are not
well established, well understood, or even normative. In this environment, weaker
adversaries “punch above their weight” by employing technology, proxies, and other
means to bypass stronger actors’ military forces and inflict substantial harm, often
while avoiding accountability. Where actors evade accountability, their targets have
little choice but to engage in reprisals to discourage and deter future aggressions.
Reprisals, of course, set conditions for escalation, which risks a wider conflict for
otherwise limited ends.19 These conditions, however, do not mean unethical acts
are permitted or ethics does not apply. Rather, the under-governed environment in
which special operators work requires professionals who can conduct themselves
ethically within a profession that can tell them how.

Treatment
To remedy the situation, the Comprehensive Review recommends US
Special Operations Command improve its validating requirements to ensure
the FORGEN process can generate fully manned and trained organizations.
The review also recommends better development of leaders who can provide
increased accountability and oversight.20 These recommendations are good,
but they miss the gap the review identifies in special operations recruitment,
assessment, and professional development. As the review notes, individuals enter
special operations before they have been fully acculturated into their service
profession, and, after joining, their development focuses on skills rather than
the profession.21 Consequently, a gap between professional identity and practice
emerges that is unlikely to be remedied by more professional or ethics training or
education. Rather, this gap suggests special operations as an enterprise must fully
professionalize before it can expect its members to act as professionals.
Before examining what fully professionalizing special operations means, it is
worth clarifying how a professional perspective can improve ethical reasoning
and create conditions for more ethical behavior. Take for instance the approach
articulated in A Special Operations Force Ethics Field Guide: 13 Ethical Battle Drills
19. C. Anthony Pfaff, “Military Ethics below the Threshold of War,” Parameters 50, no. 2 (Summer 2020):
69–70, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol50/iss2/10/.
20. USSOCOM, Comprehensive Review, 69.
21. USSOCOM, Comprehensive Review, 41–43.
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for SOF Leaders. Produced by the US Special Operations Command chaplain’s
office, the field guide is based on a business ethics text developed by two Brigham
Young University business professors.22 The guide characterizes moral dilemmas
as a finite set of choices between “right versus right,” where actors understand
their options as two “highly prized values,” such as keeping a promise to honor
confidentiality versus loyalty to a friend.23
The problem with this “right versus right” framing is it oversimplifies the
complexities of practical moral reasoning and downplays the importance of
professional judgment and experience. For example, one “battle drill” poses a
dilemma in which one special operator observes another stealing thermal scopes.
The dilemma arises because the thief saved the life of the special operator, and
turning the thief in would ruin his career, if not land him in prison. The situation
appears to pit loyalty to a friend to whom one has a special obligation against the
organization, which would suffer from the loss of thermal scopes.
Framing the situation in this way creates a false dilemma from a professional,
ethical perspective. Loyalty alone is insufficient to generate ethical obligation; to
whom or what one is loyal matters in the context of ethics. As legal scholar George
Fletcher stated, “Blind adherence to any object of loyalty—whether friend, lover,
or nation—converts loyalty into idolatry.”24 More to the point, constructing the
dilemma in this way obscures the professional obligation special operators have as
stewards of their profession to conserve and employ appropriately the resources
the American people have provided. Upon more careful analysis, seeing the two
rights here is difficult. The special operator should have turned in his friend, and
his friend, if he had any professionalism left, should understand why the special
operator had to do it.
Another more tragic dilemma illustrated in the battle drills is an operator’s
choice whether to shoot an armed nine-year-old child who is about to
shoot other soldiers maneuvering in a firefight.25 This case could easily
be framed as a choice between two wrongs, which would better reflect its
tragic nature. Under the laws of armed conflict, shooting the child may be
permissible because the laws allow one to attack persons participating in

22. Dan Rascon, “BYU Professors Create Ethics Field Guide to Help US Special Forces,” KSL TV (website),
February 23, 2021, https://ksltv.com/456124/byu-professors-create-ethics-field-guide-to-help-us-special
-forces/?.
23. George T. Youstra, A Special Operations Force Ethics Field Guide: 13 Ethical Battle Drills for SOF Leaders
(MacDill Air Force Base, FL: USSOCOM, 2021), 7.
24. George P. Fletcher, Loyalty: An Essay on the Morality of Relationships (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993), 6.
25. Youstra, Ethics Field Guide, 30.
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hostilities. Seeing shooting the child as right, however, is difficult.26 A more
professional frame would account for professionals incurring an additional
burden of risk, requiring them to consider alternative responses such as finding
ways to disrupt the child’s aim or warn the soldiers the child is about to engage.27
In tragic dilemmas, regardless of the choice made, moral residue and reasons
for regret and remorse will always exist; that is what makes the situation tragic.28
Seeing either choice as “right,” in any sense of the word, downplays the complex
emotional response a special operator might have. If these emotional responses
are left unaddressed, they can contribute to psychological stresses that potentially
create the conditions for future unethical behavior. A code of professional ethics
can help individuals mediate these stresses by providing a framework for evaluating
practical choices, even in the heat of the moment. Moreover, institutions are
obligated to provide the tools for better ethical outcomes, resulting in better
alternatives and preparing professionals practically, ethically, and psychologically
to reduce the chance for and degree of stress.
US Special Operations Command has engaged in efforts, such as those
associated with the Preservation of the Force and Family initiative, that address
physical, psychological, cognitive, social, and spiritual conditions that can enable
ethical violations.29 Such initiatives are an important part of any comprehensive
solution, but they do not address the fundamental professional and ethical
concerns necessary for effective reform.
The field guide is not a governing document for special operations; therefore,
one must be careful about drawing too broad a conclusion about special operations
ethics. Also, in fairness to the guide, the battle-drill examples are real-world cases,
and the special operators may have perceived their situations as “right versus
right” dilemmas. Well-trained and well-educated professionals should not see
such situations in this way. While ethical dilemmas may be difficult and tragic,
a well-conceived professional ethic resolves the tension by reconciling personal
values to professional ones.

Inference
Based on the above analysis, special operations forces may not be having an
ethical crisis so much as a professional one. Exacerbating the problem is special
26. John Cherry and Michael Rizzotti, “Understanding Self-Defense and the Law of Armed Conflict,”
Lieber Institute (website), March 9, 2021, https://lieber.westpoint.edu/understanding-self-defense-law-armed
-conflict/.
27. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 4th ed. (New York:
Basic Books, 2006), 155.
28. Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999), 71–75.
29. “About USSOCOM Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF),” USSOCOM (website),
April 20, 2021, https://www.socom.mil/POTFF/Pages/About-POTFF.aspx.
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operations is not really a profession. A profession entails specialized knowledge
in service to society, allowing professionals to exercise autonomy over a specific
jurisdiction.30 The medical profession, for instance, involves specialized knowledge
about human health applied to sustain or improve the health of patients. Because
these professional have autonomy over a specific jurisdiction, they can act in ways
nonprofessionals cannot.31 For example, only medical professionals are certified
and permitted to conduct surgery or prescribe drugs.
Moreover, membership in a profession is contingent upon completing a
certification process created and assessed by other members of the profession.
Doctors, nurses, and other medical professionals are certified by attending
medical school. As they progress within their chosen specialties, the professionals
undergo additional education and training. Professions also have a code of ethics
to ensure their members continue to serve a greater good.32 Again, the medical
example is instructive because the codes obligate members to practice competency,
compassion, and the provision of care, among other qualities necessary for the
medical profession to fulfill its role.33
Professional codes require an understanding of professional purpose and
the knowledge required to fulfill this purpose. Samuel Huntington famously
argued the essential function of the military is successful armed combat, and he
characterized military expertise as the “management of violence.”34 Managing
violence requires more than tactical skill; it also involves organizing, training,
and equipping the force and planning and directing its operations and activities
in and outside combat.35 Within the military, services carve out jurisdictions and
build expert knowledge around them. For instance, the Army claims Landpower
as its jurisdiction and “the ethical design, generation, support, and application of
landpower, primarily in unified land operations, and all supporting capabilities
essential to accomplish the mission in defense of the American people” as its expert
knowledge.36 Other services have similar statements specifying their jurisdictions,
roughly corresponding to the five domains of warfighting: land, air, maritime,
space, and information (including cyberspace).37 Regardless of the jurisdiction

30. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge,
MA: Belknap Press, 1957), 8–10.
31. Abbott, System of Professions, 60.
32. Huntington, Soldier and the State, 9–10.
33. “Code of Medical Ethics Overview,” American Medical Association (website), accessed on July 8, 2021,
https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/code-medical-ethics-overview.
34. Huntington, Soldier and the State, 11.
35. Huntington, Soldier and the State, 11.
36. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), The Army Profession, Army Doctrine Reference
Publication 1 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2015), 5-1.
37. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: JCS, October 22,
2018), IV-1.
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a service claims, the burden is on the service to determine the knowledge the
members need to claim the jurisdiction.
Military expert knowledge comprises four fields: military-technical,
moral-ethical, political-cultural, and human development.

•
•

Technical expertise ensures the profession is effective.

•

Political expertise includes cultural knowledge and covers how the
profession interacts with external actors—which, in the case of the
military, includes the US government, the American people, allies
and partners, and civilian populations where the military operates.

•

Human development involves inspiring people to serve and then
providing them with the professional development necessary to
become effective certified leaders.38

Ethical expertise determines the norms governing the service the
profession provides and ensures the trust of the client.

These different elements of professional expertise are necessary so professionals
can fulfill client needs, maintain client trust, develop the talent necessary for
sustaining and growing the profession, and manage relations with external actors
who have a stake in the profession’s activities.
The trust of the client is critical to the health of a profession. Professionals must
put the needs of their clients first.39 Without this trust, clients will look elsewhere
for service, undermining the profession’s jurisdiction, or impose external regulation
and oversight, thus eroding the profession’s autonomy. Unlike the professions of
law and medicine (the clients of which are members of society, the military’s client
is the state to whom it must provide expert advice on the application of force in
defense of the society the state represents.40
No occupation is ever fully professionalized because humans are frequently
neither fully competent nor fully ethical. This limitation is also built into the design
of professional practice. Professions usually require extensive bureaucracies to
sustain their practices and manage scarce resources, so they are used to maximum
effect. Bureaucratic demands, however, are often at odds with professional ones.
Where professionals create expert knowledge and apply it to new situations,
38. Richard A. Lacquement Jr., “Mapping Army Professional Expertise and Clarifying Jurisdictions
of Practice,” in The Future of the Army Profession, ed. Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins (Boston:
McGraw-Hill Publishing, 2002), 217.
39. Anne C. Ozar, “The Plausibility of Client Trust of Professionals,” Business and Professional Ethics Journal 33,
no. 1 (2014): 90.
40. Huntington, Soldier and the State, 11–18.
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bureaucrats emphasize efficiency and maintaining the status quo.41 The resulting
tension is evident in the medical field where, for example, a doctor may wish to
prescribe an expensive treatment, but the hospital administrator will not approve it
because the treatment will result in fewer resources for other patients.
Favoring the professional ideal over the bureaucratic may encourage an
innovative service, but one that is likely incapable of delivering on a large scale.
If the bureaucratic is favored over the professional, service provision can get
overwhelmed by process and regulation.42 For this reason, a profession’s status as
a profession should never be taken for granted. Resolving the tension in either
direction undermines the service provided, which, in turn, undermines the trust
of the client. Such an effect occurred in the post–Vietnam War Army, wherein
stifled innovation and diminished training and discipline were not overcome until
the Army renewed its emphasis on defeating the Soviets and developed education,
training, and capabilities to match.43 The Army’s professional status was questioned
again in the 1990s, when the emphasis on large-scale combat operations displaced
other security concerns related to failed states in the Balkans and elsewhere.44
The point here is not that clients set a profession’s jurisdiction. When
confronted with a problem that falls outside the profession’s capabilities but within
its jurisdiction, professionals are obligated to generate new capabilities—especially
if no other profession would be a better fit for the problem. For instance, when
the coronavirus pandemic broke out in early 2020, it was the role and obligation
of medical professionals to develop a vaccine. The pandemic also required
the medical profession to expand capacity—a feat it was not always able to
accomplish. Because capacity was limited, the profession recommended restriction
on movement and social contact to lower demand. Some of these restrictions drew
objections from the public and brought into question—rational or not—how much
the public trusted the medical profession. Therefore, in pursuit of the social good,
the execution of professional responsibilities can require constant negotiation
between the needs of the client and the particular social good the profession was
created to provide.
This tension between the profession and the bureaucracy is enduring.
Professional services are a finite resource rarely sufficient to meet demand.
Bureaucratic hierarchy, process, and other requirements often displace notions of
41. Don M. Snider, “The US Army as a Profession,” in The Future of the Army Profession, ed.
Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins (Boston: McGraw-Hill Publishing, 2002), 15.
42. Snider, “Army as a Profession,” 15–16.
43. Leonard Wong and Douglas V. Johnson II, “Serving the American People: A Historical View of the
Army Profession,” in The Future of the Army Profession, ed. Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins
(Boston: McGraw-Hill Publishing, 2002), 102; and Suzanne C. Nielsen, An Army Transformed: The US Army’s
Post-Vietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change in Military Organizations (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College Press, 2010), 36–39, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/343/.
44. Snider, “Army as a Profession,” 14–20; and Wong and Johnson, “Serving the American People,” 103–4.
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personal and social responsibility, especially when they conflict with bureaucratic
efficiency. The choice for the professional is not “either/or”; the choice is
“both/and.” Bureaucratic requirements are necessary for the large-scale provision
of a professional service and critical for accountability and transparency.
Professionals must “do the heavy lifting” to balance bureaucratic requirements in
ways that maintain a level of efficiency that preserves clients’ trust and bolsters the
jurisdiction and autonomy necessary to ensure professional effectiveness.
Thinking a particular professional practice consisted of one group of
expert professionals and another group of skilled bureaucrats would be wrong.
A healthy profession’s members must play both roles. They can, however, rely
on nonprofessionals or professionals from other fields to improve operations.
While human resource professionals working in a law firm are not members
of the legal profession, this status does not make their contributions any less
important. Professionals must know how to use nonprofessional contributions
to apply expert knowledge successfully.
Bureaucracies are not the only things able to undermine a profession. Often,
specific policies that seem effective can set conditions for ethical failure in
practice. As Peter Olsthoorn observes, the military encourages social cohesion and
physical courage by instilling a sense of shame should soldiers fail their comrades
in combat.45 High social cohesion, however, can crowd out the conditions
necessary for moral courage—understood here as overcoming the fear of
humiliation, shame, or loss of status when confronting wrongdoing.46 When
overcoming these fears and confronting wrongdoing negatively affects membership,
members of highly cohesive groups often perceive the cost of confrontation
to be too high.
Thus, the Rolling Stone article describing the special operations ethos as
focusing almost exclusively on mission accomplishment and avoiding
embarrassment is not surprising. However, a better-developed professional
identity can address the negative conditions high social cohesion can create
and preserve the positive conditions necessary for an effective fighting force.
Professional obligations require the individual’s reputational cost to be
subordinated to the reputational cost of the profession.

Professionalizing Special Operations Forces
Absent a professional framework, things can go wrong because they are also
going right. The professional framework demands the professional maintain the
45. Peter Olsthoorn, Military Ethics and Virtues: An Interdisciplinary Approach for the 21st Century (New York:
Routledge, 2011), 54–55.
46. Olsthoorn, Military Ethics, 49–50.
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client’s trust and get the job done in ways that reflect the client’s values. As the
foregoing analysis suggests, creating and integrating a professional framework
requires establishing a jurisdiction, creating expert knowledge, certifying members
in the knowledge, and developing a code of ethics governing the application of
expert knowledge.
Establish a Jurisdiction
For Abbott, professions establish themselves by competing over jurisdictions.47
Without its own jurisdiction, the special operations community is not fully
professionalized. James Burk describes a professional jurisdiction as the
domain within which expert knowledge is applied. This domain is physical,
such as a hospital, courtroom, or battlefield. The domain, however, is equally
conceptual—for example, health, justice, or defense.48 Both physical and
conceptual domains can be further divided, creating additional professional
spaces. Given the four physical domains of warfighting have been claimed by
other services, special operations will have to look below the threshold of war
to find its place.49
Competition below the threshold of war is a natural fit for special operations.
In the 1960s, US President John F. Kennedy reoriented US Army Special Forces
to focus on unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency to combat the spread
of communism while avoiding escalation with the Soviet Union.50 More recently,
General Richard Clarke, commander of US Special Operations Command, stated
the future of special operations entails working with critical allies and partners
to ensure access, placement, and influence. The future of special operations also
involves ensuring the success of relevant information operations intended to
deny adversaries the ability to spread disinformation.51 These activities are critical
to how the Department of Defense supports international competition.
To claim a jurisdiction is not to say other services do not play a role. Rather,
in doing so a profession takes responsibility for success within that jurisdiction,
allowing other contributions to have maximal positive impact. Currently, no
single service or other entity owns the competitive space below the threshold

47. Abbott, “Theory of Professions,” 534.
48. James Burk, “Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession,” in The Future of the
Army Profession, ed. Don M. Snider and Gail L. Watkins (Boston: McGraw-Hill Publishing, 2002), 49–50.
49. JCS, Joint Operations, IV-1.
50. Allan R. Millet, Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the
United States from 1607 to 2012 (New York: Free Press, 2012), 624–25.
51. Howard Altman, “The Future of SOF: Exclusive Interview with SOCOM Commander Richard Clarke,”
Military Times (website), May 20, 2021, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2021/05/20/the
-future-of-sof-exclusive-interview-with-socom-commander-richard-clarke/.
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of war. Moreover, the other services have jurisdictions above the threshold that
take priority.
Create Expert Knowledge and a Process to Certify Professionals
Professional knowledge goes beyond the development of skills. Abbott
states professional knowledge is abstract in that it legitimizes professional
work; establishes the research necessary to diagnose, treat, and make inferences
about the problems professionals solve; and constructs the standards of instruction
from which the profession certifies its members. Additionally, professional
knowledge supports innovation because it reveals underlying regularities that
relying on skill does not.52
A significant challenge for professionalizing special operations is the diversity
of skills involved, including direct-action operations, foreign internal defense,
security force assistance, information operations, and civil affairs.53 Given this
range, seeing how these skills could be unified under one professional education
umbrella might be difficult. A professional jurisdiction will inform how the
profession educates and trains each member to apply each required skill.
Creating expert knowledge and its certification process means significant
investment in professional military education that focuses on the demands of
special operations. Special operations could still rely on the service components for
recruitment, accession, and training but would need to have greater involvement
in, if not oversight of, its programs (as the Comprehensive Review recommends).
Additionally, special operations must create a career-long standard of education
that produces professionals capable of stewarding the profession at the tactical,
operational, and strategic levels.
Develop a Code of Ethics
With a jurisdiction and expert knowledge established, special operations
will be in a position to establish and administer a professional ethic that
accounts for what the special operator, as a highly skilled individual, does;
who the special operator, as a moral agent, is; and what special operations, as
an institution, should achieve. Properly constructed, a robust professional
ethic describes the duties, outcomes, and character traits associated with
good special operators. Moreover, a professional ethic is not passive. Avoiding

52. Abbott, System of Professions, 56–57.
53. “Core Activities,” USSOCOM (website), accessed on July 12, 2021, https://www.socom.mil/about/core
-activities.
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ethical wrongdoing is not good enough; a professional must proactively seek
to do good.54
Developing such an ethic will be complex given the relative paucity of norms
below the threshold of war. Further complicating matters, no professional
ethic involves the effective provision of a service. Society gives professionals
the authority to engage in activities society does not grant nonprofessionals
because these activities could lead to harm. Especially in the military context,
professionals must further gain and sustain moral authority. In addition to
the functional imperative of the profession, professionals must integrate
social norms and relevant legislation, including international law and treaties,
into practice and their personal values.55

Conclusion
Implementing any of these recommendations, much less all of them, would
raise several concerns. The most obvious is designating a special operations
jurisdiction would place the organization on the same level as the other services.
This effect was almost achieved when then-Secretary of Defense Christopher
Miller directed the assistant secretary of defense for special operations and
low-intensity conflict to report directly to him, as other service secretaries
do.56 Current Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, however, partially reversed
this decision when he moved the position back under the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, where the position focuses on the broad
policies associated with its functional imperative. Nevertheless, Austin retained
a direct line over administrative matters involving organization, training, and
equipment.57 The reversal effectively provided additional oversight by the
Department of Defense without the additional autonomy US Special Operations
Command would have gained as a service equivalent.
Other concerns follow from the “chicken-and-egg” situation in which special
operations finds itself. To professionalize fully, special operations must set
itself apart from the other service professions. From a bureaucratic perspective,
this distinction would place special operations in competition rather than
collaboration with the other services. This competition could affect access
54. C. Anthony Pfaff and Keith R. Beurskens, “Introduction,” in Maintaining the High Ground: The
Profession and the Ethic in Large-Scale Combat Operations, ed. C. Anthony Pfaff and Keith R. Beurskens
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, 2021), 2.
55. Anthony Hartle, Moral Issues in Military Decision Making, 2nd ed. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
2004), 74–75.
56. Corey Dickstein, “Acting Defense Secretary Orders Top Special Operations Civilian to Report Directly
to Him,” Stars and Stripes (website), November 18, 2020, https://www.stripes.com/theaters/us/acting-defense
-secretary-orders-top-special-ops-civilian-to-report-directly-to-him-1.652557.
57. Lara Seligman, “Austin Rolls Back Trump-Era Policy on Special Ops,” Politico (website), May 5, 2021,
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/05/05/lloyd-austin-defense-special-ops-policy-485432.
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to important resources service components currently provide, making full
separation from the services difficult. The growing importance and complexity
of competition below the threshold of war and the distraction created by the
competition from the equally important task of warfighting suggest special
operations’ evolution into a full profession is in the organization’s interests.
Multiple options exist to move special operations from its current state
to one with the resources necessary to recruit, train, assess, and employ
effective individuals and teams that can avoid the current ethical failures of
the organization. Something like professionalization in the sense described
here must happen. Additionally, nothing is wrong with developing an ethics
curriculum to sensitize individuals to what is ethically relevant.
Without a professional framework, these measures will do little to set
conditions for better ethical behavior. Fixing force generation and operational
tempo will ensure a highly skilled force that may be blind to how functional
imperatives (like high social cohesion) can encourage unethical behavior. While
teaching individual ethics may better enable special operators to talk about ethics,
it cannot make them care about ethics. Divorced from the calling a professional
identity provides, individuals will have little reason to take the hard right and
avoid the easy wrong—and little reason to hold themselves accountable for
attaining the professional ideal.
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ABSTRACT: Nuclear weapons have vastly raised the stakes and potential
costs of crisis, making leadership and related human qualities of judgment
and temperament crucial. This article analyzes in depth one exceptionally
dangerous US-Soviet confrontation, which barely averted war. Military and
policy professionals will see how understanding the perspectives, incentives,
and limitations of opponents is important in every conflict—and vital when
facing crisis situations like nuclear war.
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he Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 between the Soviet Union,
the United States, and Cuba remains the closest the world has come
to nuclear war. The enormously high stakes involved and the fact the
two superpowers barely averted nuclear war provided powerful incentives to avoid
another such confrontation. However, there has been the potential for nuclear
war since then. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War, US President
Richard Nixon ordered a worldwide strategic alert of American military forces,
and Israel may have readied nuclear weapons. In 1983, Moscow misinterpreted
the annual Able Archer military exercise conducted by the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) as preparation for an attack. Professor John Lewis
Gaddis of Yale University described this event as “probably the most dangerous
moment since the Cuban Missile Crisis.”1
The Cuban Missile Crisis remains distinct for the closeness of
nuclear weapons to the United States; the proximity of American
and Soviet warships (particularly nuclear-armed submarines) to one
another; and the public unfolding of the crisis following US President
John F. Kennedy’s speech of October 22, 1962, which began the public turmoil,
though vital crisis resolution occurred privately. Nearly 60 years later, the Cuban
Missile Crisis reminds the international community of how nuclear weapons raise
the stakes and potential costs of any crisis. It is a regular topic for quantitative and
1. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random
House, 1988), 518–25 (Israel nuclear weapons), 585; and John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War – A New History
(New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 227–28. Excellent background information on the Yom Kippur War is provided by the Cold War Archives at George Washington University, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB
/NSAEBB98/index.htm.
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theoretical policy analysis, in particular game theory. While these approaches can
aid crisis analysis, they can also distort reality and encourage false confidence.2
Unlike theory, the reality of a crisis is that events can quickly become unpredictable,
and strong leadership becomes crucial to a successful resolution.

Start of the Nuclear Era
The detonation of atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
August 1945 brought Japan’s swift and unconditional surrender. Horror at the
destruction they caused tempered the world’s relief at the war’s end and acted
as a deterrent against their future use. In the following years, the expansion of
nuclear arsenals, the development of the hydrogen bomb, and the creation of
modern delivery devices, especially the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM),
reinforced this deterrence.
Following World War II, several major attempts were made to curtail the
use and stockpiling of atomic weapons. Named for financier and public servant
Bernard Baruch, the United States presented the Baruch Plan to the United
Nations in June 1946. Based on The Report on the International Control of Atomic
Energy, the plan proposed an internationally supervised phased reduction of the
US stockpile of atomic weapons. The Soviet Union vetoed this initiative. Other
arms control efforts included the 1959 demilitarization of Antarctica, achieved
by US President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
reached by. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in 1963.3 For most
of the early nuclear era, the atomic arms race and threat of mutual destruction
seemed reliable deterrents. Then Cuba became a central nation in the race to
expand one superpower’s sphere of influence.
Concern about Cuba as a security threat to the United States began early
in 1959—shortly after the victory of revolutionary forces led by Fidel Castro.
Support for Castro as a successor to corrupt dictator Fulgencio Batista ended
with mass executions and a new dictatorship. Castro’s steady drift into the Soviet
orbit raised alarm in the United States and elsewhere, and Cuba became a central

2. Ananyo Bhattacharya, The Man from the Future: The Visionary Life of John von Neumann (New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, 2022); and Edward C. Rosenthal, The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Game Theory
(New York: Alpha-Penguin Group, 2011), a serious, clear, and practical guide to this complex subject.
3. Bundy, Danger and Survival.
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topic during the 1960 presidential campaign between Vice President Nixon and
Senator Kennedy.4
Senior Soviet representatives consistently denied any intent of placing
long-range nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba. These statements were revealed as
lies early in the crisis, providing the Kennedy administration with a significant
advantage in world, public, and diplomatic opinion.5
Conferences among surviving participants of the Cuban Missile Crisis,
beginning with the initial meeting at Hawk’s Cay, Florida, in March 1987,
provided valuable information on what was happening in the command centers
of the two superpowers, plus Cuba, and within their militaries.6 Particularly
important, but not evident during the crisis, is that the Soviet Union already had
shorter-range tactical nuclear-capable missiles and warheads in Cuba.
On the Soviet side, General Anatoli I. Gribkov was responsible for the
planning and execution of Operation Anadyr, the top-secret shipment of
missile forces to Cuba. Gribkov testified premier and chairman of the Council
of Ministers Nikita Khrushchev gave General Issa Pliyev, commander of Soviet
forces on Cuba, “authority to use his battlefield weapons and atomic charges if,
in the heat of combat, he could not contact Moscow.”7 Gribkov was present for
Khrushchev’s conversation with Pliyev. Marshal Marvei Zakharov, chief of the
general staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, signed an order to Pliyev to that effect but
Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, minister of defense, chose not to sign the
document approving this order, telling Gribkov, “We don’t need any
extra pieces of paper.”8
As the crisis approached, an increasingly anxious Khrushchev contacted the
Soviet military in Cuba, emphasizing restraint. One particularly forceful message
occurred on October 22, about 30 minutes before Kennedy announced to the
American people and the world the discovery of Soviet long-range missiles in Cuba
and initial US responses.9 For Soviet personnel in Cuba, Khrushchev’s message

4. Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1960 (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1961);
W. J. Rorabaugh, The Real Making of the President: Kennedy, Nixon, and the 1960 Election (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 2009).
5. Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (New York: Bantam Books, 1966), 64.
6. James G. Blight and David A. Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile
Crisis (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1990).
7. Anatoli I. Gribkov and William Y. Smith, Operation Anadyr: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban
Missile Crisis, ed. Alfred Friendly Jr. (Chicago: Edition q, Verlags GMBH, 1994), 4.
8. Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, 6.
9. Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadry, 62.
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reiterated the status quo. Pliyev did not share the private verbal authorization he
had received.10
A related important interpersonal revelation concerns the exceptional heroism
of Vasili Arkhipov, a Soviet staff officer of a submarine flotilla off Cuba. During
the height of the crisis, he proved instrumental in preventing a Soviet submarine
commander from launching a nuclear torpedo.11

Prelude
As the spring and summer of 1962 unfolded, Kennedy came under
increasing domestic political criticism. The failed invasion of Cuba by
a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-backed anti-Castro force at the
Bay of Pigs in 1961 represented a massive political failure and military
defeat for the United States. Kennedy was widely criticized for refusing to
provide air support to protect the force, including leaks to the press from
US military officers incensed by the president’s decision and the consequent
failure. The White House had vetoed direct combat intervention by US forces.12
Observers have argued Khrushchev’s willingness to take the risk of placing
missiles in Cuba was spurred by the Bay of Pigs and the Vienna Summit shortly
after that, where the Soviet leader sized up the young and inexperienced American
president as a weakling.13
Both general and specific considerations were involved in the criticism and
concern. The Cold War had been intense but predicated on the idea that both sides
were “rational actors,” and the actions of the two sides likely would be limited.
Ideology and competition between the United States and the Soviet Union,
focused on Europe and made global by the Korean War, had possessed relative
geographic stability. Each side had been reluctant to engage in large-scale strategic
moves. The boundaries of conflict seemed known and relatively limited. Shifts
were minor (such as the neutralization of Austria in 1955 and the movement
of Yugoslavia toward an independent and neutral stance vis-à-vis Moscow).
The 1949 communist victory in taking control of China created a great political

10. Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, 6.
11. Serhii Plokhy, Nuclear Folly: A History of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
Inc. 2021), 259.
12. Jim Rasenberger, The Brilliant Disaster: JFK, Castro, and America’s Doomed Invasion of Cuba’s Bay of Pigs
(New York: Scribner, 2011).
13. Abel, Missile Crisis, 23–25. Abel also speculates the Bay of Pigs experience encouraged Kennedy to doubt
reports of missiles in Cuba, in other words “once burned, twice shy,” 28.
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and strategic shift, reverberating in the United States in intense, emotional
anti-communism, but that development was distinctive.14
Cuba’s alliance with the Soviet Union threatened the stability of the
Cold War in several important ways. First, there was the possibility of Castro’s
regime sponsoring communist insurgencies elsewhere in Latin America. Second,
as the Soviet military buildup in Cuba proceeded, the danger that the island
could become a direct strategic military threat to the United States grew. Senior
Kennedy administration officials, however, were convinced Moscow would never
introduce nuclear weapons on the island.15
This second graver possibility grew as a topic of concern in the American press
and public debate as the Soviet military involvement in Cuba increased in July and
August 1962. In July, Havana and Moscow reached their fateful secret accord to
emplace strategic nuclear missiles on Cuban soil. Meanwhile, poet Robert Frost
returned from a trip to the Soviet Union, quoting Khrushchev and other leaders
saying the United States was “too liberal to fight.” The Republican senatorial
and congressional campaign committees declared Cuba would be “the dominant
issue of the 1962 campaign,” and opinion polls indicated increasing American
frustration.16
New York Republican Senator Kenneth Keating derided the Kennedy
administration, repeatedly declaring that Soviet troops and missiles
were in Cuba before any confirmed evidence existed. Kennedy aide
Theodore C. Sorensen brushed off suggestions that the White House was
insensitive to the possibility of the missile move. In this regard, the loyal aide was
not alone—and the point is fundamental to this analysis.17
As the political atmosphere intensified, Kennedy engaged with the
public more directly. Various administration officials had made statements
about the distinction between “offensive” and “defensive” missiles, resulting
in inconsistency and confusion. In a September 4, 1962, statement and a
September 13 press conference, Kennedy defined long-range, ground-to-ground
missiles as offensive and unacceptable. U-2 reconnaissance photographs of
August 29 indicated the Soviets were installing surface-to-air antiaircraft
missile (SAM) sites in Cuba. At this point, Kennedy wisely avoided issuing an
14. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy
during the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, 2005). See the author’s publications about
Ambassador George F. Kennan, architect of containment.
15. Abel, Missile Crisis, 19; and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White
House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), 798–99.
16. Abel, Missile Crisis, 24; Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 821, argues Frost misinterpreted and misquoted
Khrushchev.
17. Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, Bantam Books, 1966), 754–58. Sorensen does
credit CIA Director John McCone’s accurate foresight regarding Soviet intentions.
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ultimatum. While indicating the United States would tolerate the presence of
the surface-to-air antiaircraft missile sites, the president stated that if evidence
emerged of “significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet
direction,” then “the gravest issues would arise.”18

Concerns
The United States received reports from Cuban refugees and sources
on the island that “missiles” were being introduced. However, when reports
could be verified, they turned out to be surface-to-air antiaircraft missiles or
politically motivated fiction. Although reports increased over summer 1962,
no evidence emerged to suggest a shift from the status quo of sometimes
heated rhetoric but caution regarding troops and weapons movements.
In August, Kennedy convened a series of White House meetings to review the
situation, emphasizing the particulars of Soviet involvement. The United States
photographed every Soviet ship en route to Cuba and patrolled the island twice
monthly with camera-equipped U-2s. Remarkably, the Kennedy administration
remained more concerned about Berlin and Germany. Sorensen quotes Kennedy,
“If we solve the Berlin problem without war, Cuba will look pretty small. And if
there is a war, Cuba won’t matter much either.”19
On September 19, the Board of National Estimates met in Washington.
CIA Director John McCone was convinced unfolding events could culminate
in Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. However, Board Chairman General
Marshall S. Carter and others felt McCone’s inexperience in intelligence was
misleading him. Following the Bay of Pigs invasion, Arthur Schlesinger Jr.,
another Kennedy aide, contended that Moscow might take steps to protect
Castro. He noted “No one in the intelligence community (with one exception;
for the thought flickered through the mind of John McCone) supposed that
the Soviet Union would conceivably go beyond defensive weapons.”20
On September 21, Washington received the first reliable report that more
than just surface-to-air missiles were being unloaded on the Havana docks.
An agent had seen long missile trailers moving down a highway. One night,
Castro’s pilot publicly stated that Cuba no longer feared the Yankees and their
nuclear weapons. He declared, “We will fight to the death, and perhaps we can
win because we have everything, including atomic weapons.” On October 3,
reports indicated strange activity “probably connected with missiles” in the
18. “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962,”
Office of the Historian (website), n.d., https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d411.
19. Sorensen, Kennedy, 754.
20. Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 798.
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Pinar del Rio region. These reports, transmitted through the CIA, failed to
heighten Washington’s concern, at least at the top.21
U-2 flights over Cuba on September 5, 7, 26, and 29 and October 5 and 7
failed to reveal evidence of unusual hostile military buildup, beyond MIG fighter
aircraft, or Komar torpedo boats armed with short-range missiles. Surprisingly,
only the September 5 flight covered the western portion of Cuba, where the
offensive Soviet missiles were eventually discovered. This restraint followed
a September 10 meeting of the administration’s Committee on Overhead
Reconnaissance, which made the self-limiting decision to dip in and out of
Cuban airspace rather than conduct extensive and continuous flyovers. A principal
reason was that a Taiwan-based U-2 was destroyed over mainland China the day
before. US Secretary of State Dean Rusk urged shorter, more frequent flights as
the new approach to avoid a similar incident. Along with the desire to protect
pilots’ lives, there was anxiety any incident could provoke an international
outcry and lead to curtailing flights indefinitely. The Committee on Overhead
Reconnaissance never considered dropping flights entirely.22
Contrary to Schlesinger’s assertion, McCone consistently advocated that the
Soviets and Cubans would install strategic missiles on the island. His sustained
defense of this position proved crucial in pushing the Kennedy administration to
discover the missile threat. When McCone returned to Washington following his
honeymoon, he was appalled to find the U-2s had avoided western Cuba, where
the surface-to-air missiles were concentrated for nearly a month. On October 4,
McGeorge Bundy, the president’s special assistant for national security affairs,
and his colleagues agreed that all of Cuba would be covered. Pentagon sources
reported a new SAM site, laid out in a distinctive trapezoidal pattern, had been
spotted near the village of San Cristóbal, and the decision was made to examine
the area closely.23
The debate over alternative approaches to gathering this intelligence, plus
reports of approaching bad weather, delayed the next flight until October 14.
Developing and evaluating the resulting film took until late afternoon of the

21. Abel, Missile Crisis, 13.
22. Abel, Missile Crisis, 14, 25–26. Sorenson, Thousand Days, 672, differs somewhat from other authors on
September flight dates.
23. Abel, Missile Crisis, 15–16.
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following day. Analysts declared evidence of long-range missiles not “conclusive”
but “compelling.” Bundy agreed.24

Reaction
Bundy presented the evidence to Kennedy, but not until the following morning.
Meanwhile, the always-efficient aide systematically double-checked and reviewed
the evidence and prepared answers to the questions he anticipated from Kennedy.25
There were no long-range missiles in these photographs, but there was telling
evidence. Experienced photo analysts pointed to missile erectors, launchers, and
trailers, all placed within a signature trapezoidal area. A SAM site guarded each
corner of the trapezoid. This additional detail was congruent with the profile of
intermediate- and medium-range missile deployments inside the Soviet Union.26
When compared with earlier photographs, the pace of constructing temporary
launching sites was remarkably rapid, with clear evidence of permanent missile
sites. The Soviets were constructing 24 launching pads for medium-range
missiles that could be used more than once and 16 for intermediate-range missiles.
A total of 42 medium-range missiles were known to be brought into Cuba.27
Kennedy and his advisers were stunned by a Soviet move contrary to their
assumptions and Moscow’s reassurances. In one of the most insightful analyses
of the missile crisis, Roberta Wohlstetter describes the American reaction.28 The
move was not a function of naiveté, for this administration emphasized worldliness
and hard-nosed realism; it was out of character based on history. Kennedy was
concerned about other disastrous experiences (such as the Bay of Pigs invasion),
while the White House escalated efforts to overthrow Castro covertly.29
Perhaps because official advisers had been mistaken, Kennedy relied from
the start of the crisis on an ad hoc handpicked team, later titled the Executive
Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm). This informal approach

24. Abel, Missile Crisis, 31–32, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara was more skeptical, 38.
25. Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 801–2.
26. Abel, Missile Crisis, 28–29, 43, 46–47.
27. Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 796.
28. Roberta Wohlstetter, “Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight,” Foreign Affairs (July 1965):
691–707.
29. See Mark J. White, ed., The Kennedys and Cuba: The Declassified Documentary History (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee,
1999), 78–80 and passim.
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is notable and consistent with the practices of other presidents throughout
American history.30

Crisis
The ExComm had to address two questions: What were the actual military
and political significance of the missiles, and what should be done about them?
Opinions ranged widely. Initially, McNamara argued they had no military value.
Paul Nitze, assistant secretary of defense, and others strongly disagreed and argued
for a “surgical” air strike to destroy the sites. Prompting by Kennedy revealed such
a strike would not be “surgical.” Collateral damage would be inevitable, killing
Soviet personnel and Cubans. As reality sank in, a consensus emerged for a naval
blockade or “quarantine” of Cuba. The latter term was preferable to declaring a
blockade, which under international law constitutes an act of war.31
Within a broader context, ExComm members employed legal and moral
arguments in their initial discussion. Professor Stanley Hoffmann of Harvard
University and others have observed that the US blockade was questionable
on legal grounds.32 The White House developed a legal brief defending the
move. While Kennedy gave less weight to the United Nations than his three
predecessors, he wanted the evidence of Soviet actions presented to that body
and the Organization of American States.33 His concerns included preventing
arguments that the United States was the aggressor.34 Moral considerations
also played a role. Most notably, Attorney General Robert Kennedy objected
to former Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s suggestion of a surprise
air attack on the missile sites, comparing it to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor.
An irritated Acheson made clear his disdain for the attorney general’s
reasoning. Elie Abel, in one of the first and most insightful published analyses
of the crisis, emphasized Kennedy’s concern for restraint and skepticism about
keeping military action limited.35
On October 18, Kennedy met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.
With self-control evident throughout the crisis, the president read aloud his
September statement on the definition of offensive missiles. Gromyko, who must
30. Theodore C. Sorensen, Decision-Making in the White House: The Olive Branch of the Arrows (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1963).
31. “The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law,” Médecins Sans Frontières (website), n.d., https://guide
-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/3/blockade/, Doctors Without Borders provides background on the
subject in the context of providing humanitarian relief; and Abel, Missile Crisis, 59, Leonard C. Meeker, deputy
legal adviser to the State Department, suggested the term “quarantine.”
32. Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver’s Troubles or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1968), also describes managing the crisis as Kennedy’s “finest hour,” 297.
33. Abel, Missile Crisis, 73; and Sorensen, Decision-Making, 796–97.
34. Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 807–12, indicates the importance of the UN dimension and Ambassador
Adlai Stevenson’s role.
35. Abel, Missile Crisis, 50, 66–67, 78.
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have known about the missiles and therefore was lying, repeated past Soviet
assurances. Kennedy said nothing in response and, through silence, maintained
American initiative. Bundy later argued this was the critical moment that sealed
the American case for Soviet duplicity and dishonesty: “It made all the difference—
I felt then and have felt since—that the Russians were caught pretending, in a
clumsy way, that they had not done what it was clear to the whole world they had
in fact done.”36
On October 22, after the text of Kennedy’s address to the nation on the Soviet
missiles in Cuba had been reviewed and rechecked, the president delivered the
televised speech. He summarized the situation in Cuba and listed the initial moves
taken by Washington, stressing these were only the first steps:

•
•

acceleration of surveillance of Cuba;

•

a clear declaration that any missile launched from Cuba would be
regarded as a Soviet attack on the United States and would bring a
full American response against the Soviet Union;

•

a call immediately to convene the Organization of American States
to consider the threat;

•

a call to convene an emergency session of the United Nations
Security Council; and

•

a personal appeal to Khrushchev to “abandon this course.”37

a “quarantine,” the euphemism for naval blockade, would be imposed
around Cuba;

A week of extraordinary tension followed. On October 24, the Soviet Union
had diverted 12 of 25 ships on course for Cuba, presumably because they carried
military cargo. The following day, influential columnist Walter Lippmann
proposed trading Soviet missiles in Cuba for American missiles in Turkey that
vexed Khrushchev. Soviet officials assumed Lippmann was publicly presenting
a White House suggestion. In fact, ExComm members put exceptional weight
on private meetings between Alexander S. Fomin, a Soviet embassy official, and

36. Abel, Missile Crisis, footnote, 64.
37. Abel, Missile Crisis, 104–6; and Schlesinger, Decision-Making, 812–13.
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John Scali, an American journalist, with the former assumed to have a direct
line to Soviet leaders.38
The evening of Thursday, October 25, witnessed the start of a dangerous duel
off the coast of Cuba between a Soviet submarine and United States surface ships
and aircraft, which came close to starting a nuclear war. Soviet submarine B-59,
spotted and identified by US aircraft, became the target of devices dropped by
antisubmarine surface ships as signals to surface. Explosive charges banged on the
sides of the hull and generated severe pulses that made breathing difficult.39
On Saturday, October 27, the duel escalated further. Three US destroyers, the
Beale, Cony, and Murray, unsuccessfully tried to establish contact and then began
dropping practice depth charges followed by hand grenades. The atmosphere in
the Soviet submarine was becoming extremely hot, with carbon dioxide rising
to dangerous levels as equipment began to break down. Men began to pass out
and collapse. B-59 Commander Valentin Savitsky tried to shake off the relentless
pursuers for four hours without success. The presence of the potentially lethal
Americans on the surface reinforced the claustrophobia and anxiety experienced
by the crew of the Soviet submarine.40
Finally, exhausted and enraged, Savitsky ordered the officer responsible for the
vessel’s atomic torpedo to arm and prepare the weapon for launch. The US Navy
also had nuclear torpedoes but gave them less priority. Nuclear weapons occupy
a distinct dimension—separate weapons in kind and degree. The Soviets were
more inclined to regard armed conflict as one continuum, at least through the
introduction of smaller nuclear weapons. This belief reflects the Soviet total war
doctrine, which involves a perspective different from the United States.41
On the precipice of nuclear war, Arkhipov made an unconventional move
and intervened. He was the chief of staff for the submarine flotilla, with a rank
equal to Savitsky but without direct-line authority over this specific vessel.
His presence on this submarine proved extraordinarily fortunate.42
The B-59 surfaced to recharge low batteries and secure desperately needed
fresh air. The US destroyer Cory was close by and aircraft hit the Russian officers
38. Abel, Missile Crisis, 155–58; and Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev
and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War (New York: Vintage, 2009), Dobbs argues Fomin (a.k.a Feklisov) had
no significant influence; and Plokhy, Nuclear Folly, 200, 271, disagrees and indicates influence.
39. Plokhy, Nuclear Folly, 267.
40. Plokhy, Nuclear Folly, 267–68.
41. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 355–79. Throughout the book, he compares Soviet and US approaches to strategy, with the former emphasizing maximum force, the latter much more inclined to intellectualize.
US President Ronald Reagan’s update of containment and Soviet reactions is particularly instructive.
42. Sergo Mikoyan, The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis: Castro, Mikoyan, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Missiles
of November, ed. Svetlana Savranskaya (Washington, DC/Stanford, CA: Woodrow Wilson Press/Stanford
University Press, 2012), 137. This book further confirms Arkhipov’s presence on B-59.
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with blinding searchlights and flares, as they walked up to the submarine’s deck,
to confirm identification and photograph the submarine. The flares made loud
booming noises as they exploded. American planes flew low over the submarine
and fired tracer bullets into the water. Savitsky, driven beyond endurance, decided
this was indeed war, and possibly general hostilities had already begun between the
two superpowers. He ordered the nuclear torpedo readied for firing. Torpedo tubes
on the Soviet submarine opened. The US Pentagon had assured civilian superiors
that Moscow was informed these explosive devices were purely for signaling. The
Soviet government, however, never acknowledged receipt of this message and
never relayed the contents of the message to commanders on the scene.43
Arkhipov successfully dissuaded Savitsky with American help. He demonstrated
impressive interpersonal skills and the advantage of equal rank. Savitsky calmed
down, and the psychology of intense crisis gave way to a willingness to at
least reconsider. Vadim Orlov, the head of the signals intelligence team on the
submarine, revealed Arkhipov’s heroism in detail many years later.44
Commander William Morgan, captain of the destroyer Cory, remained
calm throughout the ordeal. He ordered Ensign Gary Slaughter to transmit
by searchlight signals an apology to the Soviet military men on deck for the
dangerous, aggressive behavior of the American pilots. Slaughter’s message quickly
compensated for the reckless airmen, provided a reassuring tonic to the Soviets on
the submarine, and effectively defused the situation. Arkhipov saw the dramatic
signal and alerted his comrades. Savitsky, reluctant throughout to commence
hostilities, grasped the importance of Morgan’s gesture. He ordered the torpedo
tubes, which had been open and pointing at the Cory, to close. One of the tubes
contained the atomic torpedo. Slaughter remembered later that Arkhipov had
quickly gestured to him in reply to acknowledge with appreciation the American
signal. Slaughter also reported the follow-up order he received from Morgan:
“Keep that Russian bastard happy.”45
The early sentiments of a majority of ExComm members, under tremendous
emotional pressure, had been to respond to the Soviet missile deployments in Cuba
with a conventional military attack. Stresses resulting from the US naval blockade
and the ongoing direct yet uncertain Soviet-American military confrontation were

43. Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, 299–300; and Plokhy, Nuclear Folly, 267–68. US President Kennedy and
Defense Secretary McNamara clearly believed Soviet Navy personnel were aware the explosions were from
purely signaling devices. They were not.
44. Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight, 303, 317, 399.
45. Plokhy, Nuclear Folly, 271.
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comparable. Not surprisingly, Soviets on the islands—and at sea—had similar
desires to strike back militarily. The Cubans shared this sentiment as well.46

Resolution
Meanwhile, on October 26, ExComm officials received a long, rambling,
and conciliatory message from Khrushchev. The following day Radio Moscow
broadcast a harsh, inflexible message, insisting on the Cuba-Turkey missile
trade, which the White House publicly stated was unacceptable. That same day
an American U-2 inadvertently penetrated Soviet airspace, leading the Kennedy
administration to observe wryly that there “is always some so-and-so who doesn’t
get the word.”47 Even more ominous, a Soviet missile shot down a U-2 over
Cuba and killed the pilot, Major Rudolf Anderson. The Soviets on the ground,
isolated without communications and under pressure, fired. Wisely, Washington
maintained self-control and did not attack SAM sites or other targets in Cuba.48
Kennedy and the ExComm decided to ignore the second tougher message
and accept the first conciliatory one. Known only to a select few, Robert Kennedy
assured Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that if the Soviet missiles were
removed from Cuba, the United States would remove its missiles from Turkey.
The US withdrawal would occur after a sufficient interval to avoid the appearance
of direct trade. On October 28, Moscow publicly accepted the American offer to
pledge not to invade Cuba after the missiles were removed.49
Kennedy, suffering criticism since the Bay of Pigs invasion, realized the extent
of the victory.50 According to Schlesinger, Kennedy was relieved and fatalistic,
observing: “Now is the night to go to the theatre, like Abraham Lincoln.”51
What were the Soviet motivations for placing missiles in Cuba? Opinions
varied widely within the ExComm. They were an inexpensive way to secure nuclear
weapons equivalence with the United States. Additionally, they could deter the
invasion of Cuba, the claim consistently emphasized later by Soviet officials.52
Regarding the balance of nuclear forces, the ExComm members, by fall 1962,
were aware the alleged “missile gap” with the Soviet Union was nonexistent. Yet,
there seemed little realistic appreciation of how inferior the Soviet forces were.
Khrushchev was under enormous pressure to maintain substantial nuclear and
46. Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, 66–68.
47. Abel, Missile Crisis, 173.
48. Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 827.
49. Bundy, Danger and Survival, 428–45; Schlesinger, Decision-Making, 830; and Sorensen, Decision-Making,
807–9.
50. Sorensen, Decision-Making, 798.
51. Schlesinger, Thousand Days, 830.
52. See Gribkov and Smith, Operation Anadyr, 10–12.
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conventional military forces while responding to growing demands to provide
resources for the consumer sectors of the Soviet economy.53
The United States’ credibility to defend Europe in the event of an attack
by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact states would have been reduced if there
were strategic missiles in Cuba. Although Moscow’s initial plan for installations
appeared to involve 64 missiles, there is no indication the Soviets would have
stopped there. While missiles in Cuba most likely would not have resulted in true
nuclear parity with the United States, they would have significantly evened the
imbalance. The true strategic balance notwithstanding, Soviet missiles in Cuba
would have changed perceptions regarding the balance of power, and perceptions
matter in international affairs.

Lessons Learned
The passage of 60 years has brought significant new information on the
Cuban Missile Crises and altered the understanding of the factors contributing
to the events—the actual dangers at the time and the roles of principals on both
sides. To a remarkable degree, vital dimensions of the confrontation and resolution
of the crisis were kept secret for many years. Some of the most pivotal aspects,
such as the B-59 incident and Arkhipov’s heroism, became public recently.
Others actions, such as the intense US efforts to assassinate Castro, became
public in the mid-1970s through hearings of the special US Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence.54
The Eisenhower administration managed a successful secret program to topple
dangerous regimes, including those in Guatemala, Iran, and probably the Congo.
The now well-known CIA effort to assassinate Castro, which included cooperation
with organized crime, began under Eisenhower. The operation was accelerated
following the Bay of Pigs invasion and was directly supervised by Robert Kennedy.
Castro knew of this effort and alluded to it on at least one public occasion.55
A review of the lessons learned strongly reconfirms the twin difficulties of
accurate perception of developments and effective crisis management. Wohlstetter
produced seminal work on the difficulty of separating accurate “signals” of an
opponent’s intentions from the sea of confusing information “noise” surrounding
them. She applied pathbreaking analysis of the Pearl Harbor attack to the
missile crisis. Technology can complicate and clarify in this regard. Kennedy
administration officials appear to have been misled by a combination of false
53. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an American
Adversary (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), 23.
54. Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1979), 7, 12–14, 129–31, 138, 338.
55. Powers, Man Who Kept Secrets, 106–7, 119–22, 132–58.
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assumptions about Soviet intentions and false confidence related to advancing
photoreconnaissance capabilities rapidly. The U-2 flights over Cuba revealed the
Soviet missile ploy only just in time and thanks to the persistence of one official—
John McCone, who illustrates the vital human dimension.56
Kennedy’s performance is highly commendable. In the prelude to the
Bay of Pigs invasion, he did what Eisenhower would never do—
signed off on an operation without a thorough, detailed review. Kennedy
questioned and expressed concern but delegated the details.57
In the missile crisis, Kennedy demonstrated the reverse behavior, including
constant skepticism, probing questions, and innovative approaches. He absented
himself from discussions to facilitate freedom of debate and interchange
by subordinates likely to be intimidated by his presence. The president
surreptitiously taped conversations of ExComm, a practice begun after the
Bay of Pigs invasion. The transcripts confirm a striking sentiment early in
the crisis favoring a military attack. Kennedy skillfully deflected this view.
The quarantine of Cuba bought time. Finally, he moved decisively to resolve
the crisis by privately accepting the Cuba-Turkey missile trade. Kennedy
guided people and the crisis to an acceptable resolution through attentiveness,
inquisitiveness, skepticism, and initiative.
The Cuban Missile Crisis reconfirmed the importance of the human factor
in human affairs, including military competition. A related conclusion is that
abstract analysis of matters, often conducted under the label of game theory,
is of limited value. Working hard to understand the perspectives, incentives,
and limitations of opponents is vital. McNamara, in particular, publicly
emphasized this theme.58
In the last 60 years, a tendency has emerged to minimize the danger of
nuclear war. This perspective reflects wishful thinking and the relative security
of the post–Cold War international system. For example, Harvard University
Professor Steven Pinker in 2018 wrote, “The records show that Khrushchev and
Kennedy remained in firm control of their governments.”59 This viewpoint, with

56. Abel, Missile Crisis, 7–8, 12–16; and Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962).
57. Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), 321–27.
58. James G. Blight and Janet M. Lang, The Fog of War: Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005). See Errol Morris, dir., The Fog of War:
Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara (New York: Sony Pictures Classic, 2003), https://www
.errolmorris.com/film/fow.html.
59. Steven Pinker, Enlightenment NOW: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress (New York:
Viking/Penguin RandomHouse, 2018), 312.
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no further comment, provides powerful evidence for review and reanalysis of the
Cuban Missile Crisis and other high-stakes crises.
In the end, Kennedy possessed important partners on the other side.
Khrushchev resisted enormous military pressures within his government,
agreed to remove the missiles, and stepped back from Armageddon, which
was paramount. Arkhipov and Morgan, his American counterpart, also played
essential roles. Understanding the perspectives, incentives, and limitations of
opponents is important in every conflict and vital regarding nuclear war—
the ultimate holocaust.
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utgoing US President Barrack Obama warned President-elect
Donald Trump that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program would
be the greatest danger he would face as president. By late 2017, the
Korean peninsula seemed to be the closest to war as it had ever been since July
1953, when the armistice ending the hostilities of the Korean War was signed. On
September 3, 2017, North Korea conducted its sixth nuclear weapons test (the last
to date). The device, claimed by North Korea to be a hydrogen bomb, triggered
a 6.3 magnitude earthquake and had an explosive yield of about 250 kilotons.
Throughout 2017, North Korea also conducted 17 missile tests. The final test on
November 28 was of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a range
capable of striking anywhere in the United States and doing so within as little as
30 minutes after its launch.
The Trump administration’s policy of “maximum pressure” against the Kim
family regime in North Korea sought to compel dictator Kim Jong-Un to end
his pursuit of nuclear weapons. The comprehensive set of sanctions was precedent
setting in scope and even had public support from the People’s Republic of China
(PRC)—North Korea’s closest, and nearly only, ally. While the North Korean
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people were feeling the bite of these sanctions, the tough measures had yet to
change Kim’s aggressive actions.
As a result, the United States conducted a massive buildup of military power
on and near the Korean peninsula to ensure readiness for potential combat
operations against North Korea. United States Forces Korea (USFK) and its
service components, especially the US Eighth Army, executed this buildup over
several months in 2017. Vast quantities of supplies, especially ammunition and
medical stocks, were rushed to the region. Extensive preparations were made to
train and receive additional US units to fight as part of USFK alongside South
Korean forces. As the director of plans (G5) for Eighth Army during this time,
it was apparent to me, from our discussions with senior civilian and military
leaders, that the United States was seriously considering military options to end
the North Korean nuclear program. It is safe to assume Kim could see these same
preparations (perhaps through the PRC sharing intelligence with him) and arrived
at the same conclusion about US intent.
Whether the increase in USFK military readiness was the decisive factor in
pushing Kim to pursue diplomacy with the United States is impossible to say.
Perhaps he realized his nuclear program had only pushed the United States
and South Korea closer together, especially within the military alliance, and
that it was time to adopt a new track with better near-term prospects. He
recognized Trump’s expressed dissatisfaction with the US share of the financial
burden in defending South Korea. Kim also knew South Korean president
Moon Jae-In was a progressive and much more open to dialogue and improving
relations with North Korea. Plus, the Winter Olympics scheduled to take place
in South Korea in February 2018 presented a fantastic opportunity to off-ramp
tensions and burnish Kim’s standing on arguably one of the largest stages in
the world. Regardless of his exact calculus, throughout 2018 and up to his final
meeting with Trump at the Korean demilitarized zone on June 30, 2019, Kim
demonstrated the wiles and skills to preserve his regime and drive his nuclear
program further forward.
Understanding Kim Jong-Un’s thinking and how he develops strategy is the
central issue in Becoming Kim Jong Un: A Former CIA Officer’s Insights into North
Korea’s Enigmatic Young Dictator by Dr. Jung H. Pak. While Pak’s book is not an
academic work and is intended for a popular audience, it is a serious examination
of Kim and his regime and deserves a careful read. Pak is currently a deputy
assistant secretary for multilateral affairs and for global China issues with the
US State Department and a deputy special representative for North Korea.
Previously with the Central Intelligence Agency and as the deputy national
intelligence officer for Korea at the National Intelligence Council, Pak leverages

SRAD Director’s Corner

Shatzer 147

her vast expertise on North Korea to deliver a work that is as analytical as it
is engrossing.
What makes her focus on Kim and the regime especially relevant is the
peculiar nature of the Kim family’s dynasty. The regime is a paradoxical blend
of communism with a heredity cult-of-personality grounded in a largely
mythologized self-view as anti-Japanese guerillas. North Korea’s extreme isolation
from the rest of the world, and a relatively small population (approximately
26 million people) locked inside a tight police state, means Kim’s decision
making is comparatively insulated from the typical range of factors contended
by other heads of state. This isolation greatly complicates outsiders’ efforts to
understand Kim’s motivations or to attack his strategies. Hence, works that
illuminate the person are of special significance.
Early after the start of Kim’s rule in North Korea, following the death of his
father (Kim Jong-Il) in December 2011, some dared wonder if Kim would take
a different path as the national leader. As a teen, he had been educated briefly in
Switzerland and seemed to have an affinity for certain aspects of Western culture,
such as professional basketball. If anyone still clings to those hopes, Pak’s analysis
of Kim’s evolution as dictator over the past decade should dispel them.
Rather than reform himself or the family regime, Kim has effectively doubled
down on the legacies both of his grandfather (Kim Il-Sung) and his father by
tightening even further the surveillance and control over the populace while
charging ahead with nuclear weapons development. Kim recognizes, though, that
outside influences will only become harder to block. Shrewdly, he has sought to
consolidate his control over the elite class by building a self-contained internet
and creating a pocket of wealth around the capital city of P’yŏngyang. Kim has
done this while ordering the murder of his rival half-brother (Kim Jong-Nam);
the execution of his uncle ( Jang Song-Thaek); and purging several top military,
government, and business officials. On top of all that, Kim has become something
of a television and social media star—a twisted development that, as Pak notes,
undermines the sanctions regime that took so much effort to build (221).
Pak’s analysis really shines in her assessment of Kim’s goals and perspectives.
Her judgment that Kim sees possession of nuclear weapons as vital to elevating
North Korea’s status and preserving his regime is nothing new. However,
she makes additional points that are novel or at least overlooked by many. First,
a viable nuclear deterrent sets North Korea apart from South Korea after decades
of South Korea surpassing it in every other way. Where South Korea remains
dependent on the United States’ extended deterrence, North Korea is on the
cusp of having its own. Not only does this give North Korea a domestic military
advantage over South Korea, but it also reinforces North Korea’s claim the
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government of South Korea is an illegitimate puppet of the United States. Second,
Kim has made possession of nuclear arms an essential component of North Korean
national identity and placed it at the core of his regime’s legitimacy. Where, in the
past, his father had been at least temporarily willing to negotiate on aspects of
the nuclear program for economic gain, Pak assesses Kim’s stance hardened as the
program matured and his leverage increased. As a result, she believes Kim may no
longer be willing to compromise on any part of the nuclear program (228).
Perhaps most worrisome are Pak’s assertions that Kim’s hubris is increasing
and that he believes he has greater freedom of action than ever before. She notes
Kim has been very good at reading the United States and calibrating his actions.
But she also argues that Kim has “witnessed how Washington has no desire for a
military conflict and that South Korea and the United States would restrain each
other from taking actions that could potentially spark a war” (237). Combined
with a strong sense that the PRC would not abandon North Korea in a crisis,
and that the United States would prevent South Korea or Japan from developing
nuclear arms, Kim might well be emboldened to take increasingly aggressive
actions to undermine the US-South Korean alliance or pursue reunification of the
peninsula, seemingly secure in the knowledge no serious combined force is willing
to confront him. So, the Kim family regime remains rational but increasingly
dangerous, as it feels more secure than perhaps at any moment in recent decades.
In his book, Rationality in the North Korean Regime: Understanding the
Kims’ Strategy of Provocation, Dr. David W. Shin squarely tackles the question
of Kim’s rationality. Shin, a former US Army colonel and current faculty
member at the National Intelligence University, settles this question firmly.
The book opens with an excellent discussion of rationality and strategy making.
He correctly points out that many observers are quick to render a judgment of
the Kims’ rationality but fail to define rationality. Shin uses a seven-component
framework to analyze the actions of the Kim family regime through each
of its ruling leaders. The framework components are achieving the desired
outcome (success), the role of emotion, assessments based in fact (truth), a logical
design (strategy), the use of appropriate resources, the probability of success,
and accounting for supporting and opposing actors. In assessing nearly every
instance of major aggressive action by North Korea since 1950, Shin convincingly
finds the three Kim leaders have been quite rational. Overall, the book was
a welcome find and should be essential reading for anyone wanting to
understand North Korea.
Shin buttresses this assessment with a strong accounting of Kim JongUn’s rationality. Shin correctly notes that Kim understands he cannot survive
by relying solely on his lineage. Accordingly, Kim has taken several steps
to consolidate his control of the regime through killings, purges, and tightened
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surveillance, as noted previously. But, Kim also recognizes an iron grip alone can
prove self-defeating, so he has returned to his grandfather’s policy (byungjin) of
prioritizing economic and military development simultaneously. In addition to
creating an island of wealth around P’yŏngyang, Kim has permitted once-banned
local markets (jangmadang) to operate under heavy regulations. Where some
might see such action as limited reform that could one day seriously threaten
regime control, Kim recognizes the markets are an opportunity to reinforce his
control since many people are wholly dependent on the markets for survival.
Shin also points out, like Pak, that Kim has proven to be quite savvy in his
dealings with the United States and the PRC. Not only has he prevented any
new significant US action from undermining his regime or his nuclear program,
but he has also managed to retain the strong support of the PRC to the same end
(evidenced recently by the PRC’s veto of proposed new United Nations sanctions).
Finally, Kim had done all this while pushing forward with further development of
the nuclear weapons program, conducting 31 missile tests in 2022 alone (through
June). As Shin summarizes, “Kim could use high-level nuclear negotiations to
weaken the U.S.-South Korea alliance as a part of his demands for a U.S. security
guarantee, and take advantage of opportunities to gain support from the North’s
traditional allies to resist the U.S.’s maximum pressure” (289).
Shin’s analysis of Kim’s rationality is also impressive because it accounts for
the possibility that emotion can play a positive role in supporting rationality and
successful outcomes (9–10). This uncommon view is important to consider, given
the peculiar history and nature of the Kim family regime. As Shin points out,
the Kims have imbued North Korean national history with a deep sense of being
a guerilla state, first defeating the Japanese occupation and now defending itself
from the constant threat of attack from the United States and its South Korean
lackeys. The Kim doctrine of national self-reliance (juche) has been criticized by
some observers as a sham, given its turgid, propaganda-style language and the
reality of North Korea’s heavy dependence on support from the PRC over the
decades. Yet, this siege mentality and self-view of underdog self-reliance is clearly
a strong motivating factor in Kim’s strategic thinking. So far, he has seemed adept
at balancing emotional motivation with the practical calculation of ends, ways,
and means. This balance is evident in Kim’s emotional characterization of nuclear
weapons as a “treasured sword” that will protect North Korea—which is also a
calculated recognition that states who have given up on nuclear weapons programs
(for example, Iraq, Libya, and Ukraine) have been attacked by larger powers. Shin
also notes the reunification of the Korean peninsula, on North Korean terms,
remains Kim’s ultimate deeply emotional aim (286).
In the end, Shin (like Pak) expresses concern that the chance of miscalculation
on Kim’s part is increasing as he feels emboldened by the progress of his nuclear
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weapons program. Shin cites Kim’s 2017 threats of preemptive use of nuclear
ICBMs against the United States as an indication of this. However, Shin concludes
Kim’s strong desire to possess a nuclear deterrent and his willingness to talk with
Trump in 2018 means Kim can be deterred from using nuclear weapons (290).
What readers take away from both books is a clear sense that the North Korean
problem has potentially entered a dangerous new phase. Kim Jong-Un is young
and charismatic. He has proven himself to be ruthless and highly intelligent. For
over 10 years, he has skillfully manipulated two global powers to his advantage. He
is adapting his regime and his nation’s economy to preserve his rule. Kim likely
possesses the ability to strike the United States with nuclear weapons, and he is
presumably building a so-called “second strike” capability to prevent preemptive
strikes against his nuclear weapons program. He also continues to enjoy the PRC’s
backing, which is a strong counterbalance to almost any threat the United States
can pose to him.
Additionally, Kim possesses a massive and capable conventional deterrent
capability primarily in his long-range artillery and stockpiles of chemical and
biological weapons. As both authors point out, war with North Korea is simply
an unacceptable option. Conventional strikes against Seoul, South Korea’s capital
city, would quickly kill tens of thousands of people, wound hundreds of thousands
more, and devastate one of the world’s top economic centers. A nuclear strike
against any major Japanese or US city would do the same.
Both authors make sensible, necessary US policy and strategy recommendations
for dealing with North Korea. These include maintaining strong alliances with
South Korea and other regional allies like Japan, continuing to use economic
sanctions and diplomatic pressure to constrain Kim’s resources and options, and
working toward regional dialogue that places more burden on the PRC and
Russia to deal with North Korea. None of these measures alone or combined are
sufficient to end the North Korean threat, as the past many years have shown.
As Pak and Shin point out, Kim may be willing to risk increasingly aggressive
actions to achieve his aims. Future conditions such as economic crises or
natural disasters in North Korea, perceptions of instability in the South Korean
government, fissures in the US-South Korea alliance, perceived slights from the
United States or South Korea, or even just a desire to claim a victory, might well
encourage Kim to lash out. A sudden attack against US forces (such as on the
USS Pueblo in 1968 or the shoot down of the EC-121 in 1969) or on South Korean
forces (such as the sinking of the navy corvette Cheonan in 2010) is quite possible.
Such an incident is a no-win situation for the United States. It would force
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US leaders to balance a desire to punish North Korea with the risk of escalation a
response in kind would entail.
Planners today must prepare detailed contingency plans to deal with such
provocations from North Korea. These issues, while serious, are near-term
problems that require containment. Planners must remember North Korea’s
so-called provocations are just as likely intended to deter more significant US and
South Korean actions. The larger, unpalatable choice facing the United States is
a question of very long-term strategy—attempt to change the regime in North
Korea or accept it as a nuclear power.
Seeking regime change would require the United States to play the long
game against North Korea. Both Pak and Shin point toward the possibility of
undermining the Kim family regime or that it might destabilize on its own due to
outside influences. Despite predictions of collapse or overthrow of the Kim family
regime for many years, it has not happened, nor do any requisite conditions seem
to exist. The United States has no practical, sustained access to the North Korean
people, nor does any of the broader populace seem to possess the means or drive
to organize a coup. Kim appears to control the elite firmly, who are probably too
few in number to overcome the vast security apparatuses monitoring them and
defending the regime, or he has co-opted them. It is possible some portion of
the security services might choose to seize power, but they would be checked by
other sectors of the security services, which all watch one another. There is also
no assurance a usurper would be friendly to the United States and South Korea.
Also, the PRC is likely to intervene to stabilize North Korea in the event of a
leadership crisis there. Finally, the challenge of reunifying the Korean peninsula
would be enormous and complex. Its success would almost certainly depend on
the United States organizing a vast international financing and support effort to
assist a South Korean–led campaign to reintegrate with and rebuild the North.
Shin more squarely advocates for considering the alternative—accepting
North Korea as a nuclear state and learning to coexist with it. He argues that
good-faith US negotiations with North Korea, and military confidence-building
measures between the two Koreas, could normalize relations between all parties.
These actions would permit peace treaties that could assuage North Korean fears
of US aggression and perhaps even persuade it from fully developing a nuclear
ICBM capability. Others, such as Victor Cha, have argued the United States
provided North Korea a nonaggression guarantee in the 2005 Six-Party Talks
Joint Statement, but North Korea quickly dismissed it as disingenuous. Shin does
not explain what it would take to alter Kim’s siege mentality or to have him accept
the South Korean government as legitimate. Also, Shin’s suggested approach
seems to be grounded in a view that Kim is pursuing only regime survival and not
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reunification of the peninsula under his control. Finally, Shin correctly states the
PRC will play an important role in trying to influence North Korean behavior.
Indeed, the United States must recognize North Korea and the
People’s Republic of China are a package deal. Beijing may well be playing the
long game concerning North Korea. The two nations have a shared cultural
history stretching back many centuries. While the two do not share the warmest
relations today, China views North Korea as vital to its security, as evidenced
by its direct intervention in the Korean War to fight against US forces. Beijing
has also spent vast sums on keeping the Kim regime afloat and retaining
North Korea as a territorial buffer zone. Should North Korea become a fully
nuclear state, it would still be almost solely dependent on PRC support, giving
China an unmatched degree of leverage over the Kim family regime. It would
also provide the People’s Republic of China with something the United States
does not have in the region—a nuclear-capable ally. This possibility gives
Beijing a potentially significant counterweight for any effort it wants to
undertake, including the forceable seizure of Taiwan. As such, Korea may well
be the future key to regional security in East Asia.

George Shatzer
Colonel George Shatzer is the director of the Strategic Research and Analysis
Department in the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College.
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To Consider – Recent Books on Similar Topics
The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future
by Victor Cha

On the Brink: Trump, Kim, and the Threat of Nuclear War
by Van Jackson

The Armed Forces of North Korea: On the Path of Songun
by Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans

Kim Jong Un and the Bomb: Survival and Deterrence in North Korea
by Ankit Panda

Kim Jong-un’s Strategy for Survival: A Method to Madness
by David W. Shin

Guns, Guerillas, and the Great Leader: North Korea and the Third World
by Benjamin R. Young
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A Violent Peace:
Race, U.S. Militarism, and Cultures of Democratization
in Cold War Asia and the Pacific
By Christine Hong

C

Reviewed by Eric Setzekorn, historian, US Army Center of Military History

hristine Hong, in A Violent Peace: Race, U.S. Militarism,
and Cultures of Democratization in Cold War Asia and the
Pacific, uses critical theory to redefine America’s post-1945
Asia-Pacific experience around militarism and domination.
While the central role of the US military in the Asia-Pacific
since 1945 deserves more study, A Violent Peace confuses rather
than clarifies the interrelationship of militarism, race, the
impact on local communities, and the connections between
US foreign policy and domestic programs.

Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2020
320 pages

Hong primarily argues US military supremacy in the
$90.00
Asia-Pacific in the aftermath of World War II enabled
the construction of new hegemonic racial and political structures shaped
by “catastrophic violence and world-altering terror” (3). A key element of this
post-1945 environment was the development of new ideas about race and military
power. The US military served as a major player, assimilating the peoples of the
region and drafting African Americans—who experienced the opportunities and
dangers of Cold War militarism—into military service.
An associate professor of literature and critical race and ethnic studies at the
University of California, Santa Cruz, Hong often relies on the works of Cold War–
era authors James Baldwin, Carlos Bulosan, Ralph Ellison, and Kenzaburō Ōe
to illustrate intercultural conceptual linkages across the Pacific. By mining their
ideas on race and power, Hong shows “an untold tale of midcentury U.S. fascism”
and her analysis “dilates junctures of political solidarity and alliances during the
Cold War among [B]lack Americans, Asian Americans, Pacific Islanders and
Asians” amid American military power (12). Recent domestic political debates
contextualize the work, which has tenuous connections to the Cold War–era
Asia-Pacific.
The book’s complex, often murky structure poses a significant challenge
for readers. Its numerous narrative threads and digressions complicate the
core argument. For instance, chapter 7, “Militarized Queerness,” begins
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with a discussion of Dan Choi, an advocate against the military “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell” policy in 2009–11. Hong, however, never clarifies the connection
between this segment and the book’s themes. The chapter then fails to advance
the main argument with a five-page discussion on the US military’s use of dogs
in Vietnam. “Militarized Queerness” concludes with a discussion of Korean
children living near US military camps in the early 1950s. Readers must labor to
connect such subjects to the work’s themes.
The book’s citations also create confusion. Hong alternates her use of in-text
references and footnotes and does not supply a bibliography. Readers will find
it challenging to refer to sources supporting key themes. For example, chapter
six references Noam Chomsky, with in-text citations with his name and
a page number in every other paragraph. Without a clear system of footnotes or
a bibliography, I could not determine which of Chomsky’s many books
was referenced.
Hong also misdates several events, which, while a minor issue, cultivates
a rushed feel to the book. I understand the commercial pressures to release a book
while a topic is hot, like critical theory, but these errors hinder the work’s impact.
A Violent Peace offers some original theoretical perspectives but largely resembles
other critical assessments of US foreign policy. Many of Hong’s references
come from the 1970s when academics jaded by the US experience in Vietnam
castigated Cold War policies as discriminatory and militarized. Hong provides
little new historical information or theory to improve the understanding of the
Cold War–era Asia-Pacific. Readers seeking a more historical approach to issues
of race and the American military’s encounter with the Asia-Pacific should read
Marc Gallicchio’sThe African American Encounter with Japan and China
(University of North Carolina Press, 2000) or Michael Cullen Green’s
Black Yanks in the Pacific (Cornell University Press, 2010). Readers seeking insights
into America’s Cold War–era domestic perspective should read Christina Klein’s
Cold War Orientalism (University of California Press, 2003), which explores
cultural viewpoints, or Kori A. Graves’s A War Born Family (New York University
Press, 2020), which examines the adoption of Korean War orphans by African
American families.
Overall, A Violent Peace makes bold theoretical assertions about an interesting
topic but the book’s uneven source material and tangled organization impede
its effectiveness.

Book Reviews: Defense Studies 157

Nuclear Reactions:
How Nuclear-Armed States Behave
By Mark S. Bell

M

Reviewed by Amy F. Woolf, specialist in nuclear weapons policy,
Congressional Research Service

ark S. Bell, in his book, Nuclear Reactions:
How Nuclear-Armed States Behave, develops the
“theory of nuclear opportunism” to explain how states alter
their foreign policy after acquiring nuclear weapons (6, 22).
While much of the research into nuclear proliferation examines
why states seek to acquire these capabilities, Bell focuses
on what they might do after acquiring them. The important
answer to this latter question would not only help the
international community respond to the effects of nuclear
proliferation, but it would also afford that community the
opportunity to outline the military, political, and economic
costs it might face in preventing a state from succeeding
in that effort.

Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2021
234 pages
$19.95

Bell notes the difficulty of establishing a single theory to explain how all
nuclear-armed states will behave. The theory of nuclear revolution, which posits
nuclear-armed states become less aggressive due to the resolution of central
security dilemmas, helps account for the lack of a great-power war but says little
about broader foreign policy goals nuclear states might pursue. Theories asserting
states become more aggressive after acquiring nuclear weapons only explain
reasons for aggression and not the full scope of changes in a state’s foreign policy.
With the theory of nuclear opportunism, Bell suggests opportunistic states will
use nuclear weapons to improve their position in international politics and achieve
political goals. He contends nuclear weapons do not necessitate states change their
goals; they reduce neither security worries nor competitiveness. Nuclear weapons
facilitate a range of foreign policy behaviors extending beyond the reduction
or expansion of aggression, depending on unique policy goals.
Bell begins his explanation of the theory of nuclear opportunism by describing
a number of possible behaviors a state might engage in after acquiring nuclear
weapons, including: aggression, compromise, goal expansion, the pursuit
of independence from an ally, the bolstering of an alliance, and steadfastness in the
face of threats. Moreover, the goals a state might pursue, along with the military
and political tools it might employ to achieve them, depend on the state’s unique
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strategic situation. For example, a state faced with a serious territorial threat
or ongoing war might use nuclear weapons to improve its security. If it has
a senior ally, then nuclear weapons might allow it to gain independence
to pursue its security interests. If a declining power, then it might seek to affect its
political trajectory, and if a hopeful rising power, then it might seek to bolster its
political image.
Bell tests his theory with detailed reviews of the foreign policy behaviors
of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States after each state
acquired nuclear weapons. He reviews the historical record to determine why each
state acquired nuclear weapons and to describe how its foreign policy changed
after it had a deliverable capability. In each case, he finds the model offers insights
into how the state pursued its goals and confirms each state exhibited expected
behaviors. For example, prior to acquiring nuclear weapons, the United Kingdom
had been wary of responding to challenges with military force. After it had
a deliverable capability, however, it became more willing to use unilateral force,
less attentive to US preferences, and less compromising. Bell concludes nuclear
weapons helped the United Kingdom preserve its global position and avoid
dependence on the United States.
In Bell’s review of other proliferation cases—including those in China, France,
India, Israel, and Pakistan—he determines the model, though imperfect, offers
insights into how nuclear weapons facilitated the pursuit of these states’ foreign
policy goals. He notes the seeming exception of China. The theory predicts
China would use nuclear weapons to expand its international influence, defend
the status quo, and bolster junior allies. China, however, has asserted its nuclear
weapons exist only to resist coercion. The study seems to accept this assertion
without addressing the recent steps China has taken to expand its influence in
international politics and to bolster its regional position. The model may explain
China’s current behavior as it expands nuclear capabilities but does not predict
what China’s behavior will be after it has acquired deliverable nuclear weapons.
Bell’s research reveals opportunistic states have used nuclear weapons
to improve their positions in international politics and to achieve political goals.
The theory postulates, and research confirms, nuclear weapons do not change
states’ political goals but facilitate goal-oriented behaviors. Nuclear weapons affect
different states’ behaviors in different ways because states have their own aims and
means to achieve them. This statement may seem obvious, but it is at odds with
current research, which attempts to identify a few overriding goals nations will
seek once they have acquired nuclear weapons and to define and design policy
responses to block those goals. If nuclear-armed states exhibit different behaviors
and pursue different goals reflective of their unique security circumstances, then
policymakers will have to deepen their understanding of these states’ goals and
broaden the range of policy tools to mitigate the risks of nuclear proliferation.
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Full Spectrum Dominance:
Irregular Warfare and the War on Terror
By Maria Ryan

M

Reviewed by Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz, professor of international relations
and comparative politics, Georgia Southern University, and visiting professor,
Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College

aria Ryan, a professor of American history at the
University of Nottingham, has written an insightful
history of the conception of irregular warfare across the
US government and on the periphery in the war on terror. Full
Spectrum Dominance: Irregular Warfare and the War on Terror
proposes the pursuit of an irregular warfare capability was
part of a broader project with roots predating the application
of counterinsurgency in Iraq and transcending the war
on terror (4). Ryan argues “9/11 was the initial catalyst for
the turn toward irregular warfare because it exposed U.S.
security vulnerabilities in spite of unassailable conventional
military power” (9).

Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2019
328 pages
$60.00

Irregular warfare developed into a national strategy and doctrine due to several
factors: the “globalization” of international security (12); the function of “peripheral
theaters of the war on terror” as the “testing grounds for the utilization of irregular
tactics” (12); and the development of the Iraqi insurgency (12).
The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have widely defined America’s war
on terror. Ryan explains secondary fronts in Georgia, the Caspian Sea Basin,
the Philippines, and sub–Saharan Africa have become key testing sites for
developing what the Department of Defense calls “full spectrum dominance” (4).
Ryan defines this concept as “dominance across the entire spectrum of warfare
from conventional through to irregular conflict, in order to ensure the continuation
of US military preeminence in an era of globalization, in which networked nonstate
actors now also challenged US hegemony alongside traditional state-based threats”
(4). Since the Army’s potential enemies include regular conventional armed forces
and nonstate actors, accomplishing globalized full spectrum dominance requires
conventional warfare and asymmetric capabilities. To execute this strategy, the
Army aims to combine “an offensive approach to both irregular challenges and
conventional military affairs” (17).
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Ryan makes another important contribution by asserting full spectrum
dominance provides an optimistic outlook on the future of military warfare and
a “rejection of the narrative of American decline by the Bush administration” (213).
Ryan writes the strategy “is grounded in the belief that the United States should
and could dominate international relations not just in the realm of conventional
state-based affairs but also at the transnational level” (213). This overextension
of confidence regarding America’s military dominance has roots in a decentralized
and chaotic post–Cold War international system with wars characterized
as networked insurgency–style warfare. Conventional military power has limited
value in the face of asymmetric challenges exploitative of US vulnerabilities.
To counter such threats requires unconventional activity (31).
Regarding the fourth-generation warfare theater, Ryan writes “nationstates” are “no longer the only actors on the international stage” (7) and
“[t]ransnational and subnational groups and networks” are “emerging as powerful
forces” (7). Ungoverned areas in which a state cannot furnish basic provisions for
its citizens have become fertile ground for terrorist organizations and criminal
enterprise networks. As Ryan explains, “[t]he strategy also reiterated the problem
of ‘ungoverned states and under-governed territories,’ stressing the need to ‘deny
terrorists safe haven in failed states and ungoverned regions’ ” (44).
The African continent served as a trial location for a whole government
approach utilizing full spectrum dominance, which began with the establishment
of a regional task force based in the East African country Djibouti (85).
Other initiatives in Africa included the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), developed
in response to the US government’s identification of the Sahel as its number two
focus in Africa (the Horn remains number one) in the war on terrorism (89).
The State Department established a second interagency program, the East Africa
Counterterrorism Initiative, in June 2003 as a “counterpart” to the PSI (93).
The important establishment of the African Command (AFRICOM) in 2007
allowed for a “ ‘holistic’ approach to security that would include good governance,
the rule of law, and economic opportunity, as well as more traditional security
missions such as train-and-equip programs, with the ‘emphasis on prevention’ ”
(110).
Based on Ryan’s insightful observations, I recommend Full Spectrum Dominance
to readers interested in security studies, especially US Army War College students.
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Scripts of Terror:
The Stories Terrorists Tell Themselves
By Benedict Wilkinson
Reviewed by Dr. Whitney Grespin, lecturer and regional program lead,
Institute for Governance, Defense Security Cooperation University,
and non-resident fellow, Joint Special Operations University

B

enedict Wilkinson, in Scripts of Terror, a book
adaptation of the author’s PhD findings, provides
a theoretical framework for readers to apply to motivations
of violent Islamist groups and the strategy of terrorism.
Well-researched and lucid, Scripts of Terror identifies eight
narrative “scripts” fundamental to the motivation and evolution
of Islamist extremist organizations in Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
and Yemen. The scripts, drawn from three case studies, consist
of: “survival, power play, mobilisation, provocation and
polarisation, de-legitimisation, attrition, co-operation, and
de-mobilisation” (7).

New York: Oxford University
Press, 2020
236 pages
$45.00

Wilkinson analyzes irregular warfare through valuable vignettes illustrating
the potential for different responses from violent extremist organizations (VEOs)
faced with similar problem sets. Bringing these episodes’ outcomes to attention
provides opportunities for informative or insightful thought exercises for strategists
conceiving responses to or predicting second- and third-order effects of terrorism.
Wilkinson highlights the phenomenon of VEO subsets formulating scripts
independently of leadership. For instance, he writes, “whilst the organisations
were acting towards al-Qa’ida’s ambitions, they were not acting according
to a grand master strategy developed by bin Laden, but to all intents and purposes
formulating their scripts autonomously” (67). The decentralization of script
creation should remind readers some VEO subsets pursue a “commander’s intent”
through their own methods; no script is prescriptive.
The work reads primarily as academic. Wilkinson’s (admirable) observation
of the central problem lacks a “step further” approach. He never articulates policy
relevance or draws on his expertise to recommend responses to, interruptions
of, or mitigations of scripts. Wilkinson neglects to address the roles of states
as incubators for VEOs and misses an opportunity to better characterize the
relationship between scripts and their settings (92).
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Geopolitical realities and time constraints limit the book’s case studies
to a Central Command-focus and field research conducted in one country.
The work might have benefited from broader consideration of similar groups
in different areas of responsibility to determine whether differing trends could
emerge elsewhere. The (albeit inevitable) omission of such data weakens the
authority of Wilkinson’s claims.
The book’s biggest contribution lies in its opportunities to interpret each script
as a potential course of action with benefits and detriments dependent upon
leadership and context (73). With this approach, Wilkinson’s scripts could facilitate
an intellectual wargaming experience in which readers could analyze incentives
and disincentives for each script used by an adversary. Wilkinson acknowledges
the importance of observation and anticipation, writing: “Without stories and
their cause-effect structures, the outcomes of actions cannot be envisaged and
decisions can only be made blindly in the vague hope that something advantageous
might arise” (143).
Even with areas in need of improvement, Scripts of Terror could serve as a useful
primer for VEO case studies. It could prepare practicioners as pre-deployment
reading for a better understanding of the foundations and evolutions of potential
adversaries. Readers of this publication should be cautioned through this work
against the perils of “believing their own press.” Wilkinson writes violent
Islamists “were deluded by the compelling narratives of scripts as stories [as]
[t]hese stories were so alluring . . . that their inherent flaws were glossed over,
ignored or dismissed.” The Parameters community of practice also risks convincing
itself of narratives contradicting ground truth.
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The Unknown Enemy:
Counterinsurgency and the Illusion of Control
By Christian Tripodi

W

Reviewed by Dr. Kalev Sepp, senior lecturer, Naval Postgraduate School

as there a misplaced focus on populations and cultures
in the prosecution of the military campaigns in Iraq
and Afghanistan? Dr. Christian Tripodi presents a historical
analysis and indictment of a century of attempts by Western
commanders to wage counterinsurgency warfare in support of
national policies. His review covers five cases of failed and failing
British, French, and US interventions, with selected quotations
from over 330 books and articles by scholars, journalists, and
memoirists and four archival sources.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press
300 pages

A senior lecturer in the Defence Studies Department
$89.99
of King’s College London, the author’s previous book
examined British political officers on the North-West Frontier of colonial India,
1877–1947. Tripodi displays a sense of the perennial intricacies of control and
conflict in destabilized regions and sees a critical emphasis placed by Western
armies deployed in these zones on understanding their operational environment;
that is, “the peoples and cultures they operate amongst” (xi). Noting this, he asks,
“[W]hat is the relationship between such forms of understanding to the success of
these endeavors” (xi)?
Tripodi begins his answer by arguing that then-Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, in his 2002 listing of “knowns” and “unknowns,” left out
“unknown knowns”—which the reader eventually comprehends as biases and
reflexes deeply embedded in a nation’s strategic character (178). These are
collectively “The Unknown Enemy” of the book’s title (chosen as it happens, by
the book’s editor), and chiefly explain recurring shortcomings of the Western way
of counterinsurgency.
The author critiques American and British efforts in the Afghanistan and
Iraq wars to “know the human terrain” as paradoxically replacing “strategy with
stereotypes” (4). He assesses that their planning drew on “bad history” and the
“questionable” works of T. E. Lawrence, Mao Zedong, and David Galula (11).
Counterinsurgency, Tripodi proposes, must be understood by practictioners
as “political warfare . . . when warfare is used not simply to create the terms for
political victory, but instead as a force of politics in and of itself” (22, author’s
emphasis). Socio-cultural intelligence and “big data,” he contends, do not enable
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military officers to deal adequately with “phenomena they rarely comprehend” in
this kind of fight (23).
The four themes Tripodi employs to examine each of the counterinsurgencies
are: (1) Imperialism, defined as expeditionary democratization; (2) the Nature
of War, which he believes is “largely hidden” to military leaders; (3) the Power
of Doctrine, epitomized by US Field Manual 3-24, which holds a “host of
assumptions” and “facile and unworkable principles”; and (4) Policy, Tactics, and
the Military Operational Code, a term Tripodi borrows from an unpublished
doctoral dissertation, meaing a “set of beliefs about certain rules of action,” which
can simply be called organizational culture (28–43, 182).
In each of the five cases Tripodi analyzes with his four themes, he
discovers succinct reasons for governmental and military failure. On the Britishruled Indian North-West Frontier, 1919–39, the Indian Political Service
was manipulated by the local Pashtuns and burdened by a “directionless and
confusing” British policy (88). Similarly, an insupportable French national
policy during the Algerian War, 1954–62, drove the Sections Administratives
Spécialisé (SAS) to militarize counterinsurgency, winning tactical actions but
losing the war. The US Military Advisory Command in Vietnam, 1964–72,
did not recognize the “fundamental uselessness of pacification.”
Three decades later, the British Army in Basra and the US forces in Al Anbar,
Iraq, 2006–9, were at “the mercy of powerful local actors,” which the Americans
“didn’t understand.” The UK-US actions to counter the insurgencies produced
consequences contrary to their strategic objectives; pacifying Anbar empowered
the Sunni majority, causing “immense frictions” with the Shia-led national
government. As for Afghanistan, NATO’s fight in Helmand, 2006–14, could
not be won because of Afghan corruption, the Pakistani sanctuary, and Western
governments tiring of the war—announcing in 2010 that their military forces
would withdraw by 2014. In 2021, they belatedly implemented that decree.
Tripodi agrees with many strategists and analysts who preceded him. His note
of debilitating “bureaucratic interests” was well disposed by Ambassador Robert
Komer in his 1973 Vietnam retrospective Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional
Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam, where Komer identified the
“inherent reluctance of organizations to change operational methods” (118).
During the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions, Professor Eliot Cohen, Jan
Horvath, and John Nagl, offered offered “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes
of Counterinsurgency” (Military Review, March-April 2006). Among their
paradoxical dictums: “If a tactic works this week, it will not work next week; if
it works in this province, it will not work in the next.” They warn, and Tripodi
echoes, “Tactical success guarantees nothing.” Tripodi’s bibliography does not
include such references and is not a counterinsurgency readling list.
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None of Tripodi’s assessments is particularly new, although they are usually
not presented with such academic condescension. For military commanders,
“a true understanding of (the war in Helmand) was even more problematic than a
misunderstanding, or even no understanding at all . . .” (195). Senior commanders
were “ . . . without benefit of a historian’s eye for the inherit problems” of the
role of military power as an agent of change (66). One might allow that General
David Petraeus’ doctoral dissertation, subtitled “A Study of Military Influence
and the Use of Force in the Post-Vietnam Era” (1987), and Lieutenant General
H. R. McMaster’s PhD in military history qualify them as historians. Their
advisers, like Pashto-speaking analyst Carter Malkasian (mentioned in the preface)
were similarly credentialed. Yet, Tripodi gives them little credit.
A viable assessment of the value of socio-cultural intelligencee in
counterinsurgency requires investigation of winning campaigns as well as losses—
but none are studied.The government successes in Malaya versus the Malayan
National Liberation Army (MLRA), France versus the OrganisationArmée
Secrète (OAS), Philippines versus Hukbalahap, El Salvador versus the Farabundo
Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), Peru versus Sendero Luminoso,
or Turkey versus Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), among others, could have
been researched. And if application of cultural knowledge does not work, then
what does? Tripodi offers no solutions besides calling for military professionals
“to better understand their role” as “political actors” in such conflicts (208).
Military professionals may find his lengthy, if eloquent, sentences and paragraphs
often obscure rather than clarify his arguments.
Engaging Russian, Chinese, and Iranian expansion below the level
of conventional and nuclear combat—that is, in the realm of political warfare—
is now recognized as a strategic imperative. There are foundational tutorials:
the 1942 British Political Warfare Executive white paper, George F. Kennan’s
1948 State Department memorandum, The Inauguration of Organized Political
Warfare, and the 1950 National Security Council policy paper NSC-68,
United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, all consider political
warfare in the context of what is now termed great-power competition.
Counterinsurgency is just one of its operational components. For military
commanders and staffs, wide study of this “like-war-but-not-war,” and previous
successes and failures in its conduct, may be useful preparation for the demands
they may have to meet in the very near future.
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Military History

Tower of Skulls:
A History of the Asia-Pacific War, July 1937–May 1942
By Richard B. Frank

R

Reviewed by Colonel Jonathan Klug, US Army, assistant professor,
Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations,
US Army War College

ichard Frank’s Tower of Skulls shares many similarities
with Rick Atkinson’s An Army at Dawn. Both superb,
“bingeable” first volumes of World War II trilogies contextualize
the American Army in different theaters of war. Frank’s
Tower of Skulls resembles An Army at Dawn in the quality of its
research and readability but has a broader scope. Frank focuses
on the Asia-Pacific War as a whole rather than one theater
and one army. Frank delivers on the sweeping and ambitious
nature of Tower of Skulls. Given contemporary concerns in the
Western Pacific, Frank’s efforts are especially relevant to military
historians and senior members of the defense community.

New York: W. W. Norton &
Company
768 pages
$40.00

As the subtitle suggests, the book spans the period from July 1937,
the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War ( July 7, 1937–September 9, 1945),
to May 1942, the day before the Japanese-American carrier battle of the Coral
Sea. Frank spends the first five chapters of the book detailing and contextualizing
the fight between the Japanese and Chinese and addresses the roles of other
nations, especially the United States. His expert discussion interweaves action in
China with the series of events leading to the Pearl Harbor attack. He dedicates
just over half the book to the period before the merging of the Sino-Japanese War
with the Asia-Pacific War, which one could argue began the global conflagration
of World War II.
In the second half of Tower of Skulls, Frank covers events from December
7, 1941, to May 1942. He examines Pearl Harbor and its aftermath and
investigations with an evenhanded discussion of the latter. Pearl Harbor marks
the beginning of Japan’s grand offensive, and Frank examines each significant
Japanese effort following it, with an excellent treatment of Australian, British,
Dutch, and American aspects. Part of this treatment includes the forging of the
Anglo-American Alliance and the early conferences of the Combined Chiefs
of Staff. Tower of Skulls features a thoughtful consideration of the Allied failures
in Southeast Asia and the Philippines. Frank concludes the book with a discussion
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of the Japanese Empire’s zenith and the Bataan Death March, setting the stage
for the trilogy’s second volume, which will begin with the Battle of the Coral Sea.
Frank’s exhaustive and impeccable research synthesizes a wide variety
of sources. In his acknowledgments, he recognizes a circle of supporting
Asia-Pacific War experts and World War II generalists and details many archives
where he conducted research using primary sources. Frank devised his own form
of endnotes (also seen in his books Guadalcanal and Downfall) to support his
writing, which often includes detailed, expert explanations—a mark of sound
scholarship. While formal standardized endnotes would facilitate the retracing
of Frank’s efforts, his approach improves readability and condenses the book.
The inclusion of excellent maps also supports comprehension.
Underpinned by superb research, Tower of Skulls balances artful historical
coverage with readability—no small feat given its scope. Frank tells a magnificent
story of the Asia-Pacific War with seamless shifts from a bird’s-eye view
to a worm’s-eye view. Although he focuses mainly on the strategic environment
and battles, Frank incorporates a human element through his descriptions
of critical leaders and individual stories.
Frank’s work does what no other trilogy or single-volume history of the
Pacific War has done: provide balanced coverage of the principal belligerents
of the British Commonwealth, the United States, Imperial Japan, and China.
While balancing the treatment of the first three major powers is an achievement,
Frank contributes to World War II historiography with his unique elevation
of the Sino-Japanese War and its significance to the field of strategic studies.
Rana Mitter and others’ books attest to the tremendous recent literature on the war
in China. Still, no other author has seamlessly incorporated China’s contribution
into the greater context of the Asia-Pacific War in the way Frank has now.
If the next two installments follow the trajectory of Tower of Skulls, Frank’s
authoritative trilogy will provide immeasurable contributions to the field.
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Kim Jong-un’s Strategy for Survival:
A Method to Madness
By David W. Shin
Reviewed by Dr. Patrick M. Cronin, Asia-Pacific security chair, Hudson Institute

W

ho could have guessed Kim Jong-Un would turn out
to be such a clever strategist? He was dispatched
to a Swiss boarding school during North Korea’s famine
years in the 1990s, graduated from Kim Il-Sung Military
University in P’yŏngyang shortly after North Korea’s first
successful nuclear test in 2006, and was hastily groomed
for leadership after his father suffered a stroke in 2008.
When Kim Jong-Il died in December 2011, his third son,
27 years of age, inherited a troubled regime guided by a clique
of octogenarians and locked in enmity with the United States
and its democratic allies. Many observers considered the
“young general” out of his depth. His likelihood to survive was
questionable, his strategic acumen dubious. What a difference
a decade makes.

London: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2020
482 pages
$142.00

In his latest book, Kim Jong-un’s Strategy for Survival, retired Colonel
David W. Shin explains the secret to Kim Jong-Un’s success. As the subtitle
suggests, Shin asserts there is indeed a “method” to Kim’s so-called “madness.”
Shin demystifies the Kim regime and shows the young Kim had a clear
“strategy for survival” replete with: control of political elites and information
flow; circumvention of sanctions; summons of economic efficiency; assembly
of a credible nuclear deterrent; and deeper cooperation with China and Russia
to fend off Japan, South Korea, and the United States.
Shin spent years at the intersection of arms and Asia as a product of the
Army’s Foreign Area Officer Program. His experience includes negotiating with
North Koreans at P’anmunjŏm as a United Nations Command Military Armistice
Commission staff member and as a Joint Staff security representative on the
US delegation to the Six Party Talks. Now an associate professor at the
National Intelligence University, Shin testifies to the value of cultivating deep
regional expertise among military professionals.
Shin’s professional background and systematic sourcing provide an authoritative
basis for his judgments on Kim’s strategy. He captures how Kim orchestrated
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a hierarchy of power using the Korean Workers’ Party’s Organization and
Guidance Department to sort out critical political and military leadership
posts. Shin notes how Kim also strengthened state security by cracking down
on illegal cell phone signals, thus turning an information threat into an advantage.
The totalitarian system may have regressed under his father, but, according to Shin,
the young Kim understood how to secure the power needed for survival.
Shin illustrates Kim’s survival strategy through four case studies. The first
is Kim’s choreographed nuclear crisis in March 2013, accomplished through
dispersing KN-08 mobile missiles. Washington found the threat credible because
Kim had paraded a KN-08 ICBM mockup the previous April in a power play that
happened to telegraph Kim’s strategic intent accurately.
The second case study comes from 2015, in which a tampered landmine
wounded two South Korean soldiers patrolling the demilitarized zone.
Kim engineered this crisis to demonstrate authority. He was willing to use
limited force against conservative South Korean President Park Geun-Hye
but seemed content to use less escalatory means when dealing with progressive
President Moon Jae-In, suggesting finesse—rather than randomness—to his
decision making.
The nuclear showdown in 2017 is the third case study. Days after de-escalating
tensions over the 2015 landmine incident, a media leak disclosed a new alliance
contingency plan (OPLAN 5015) that would seek a prompt end to the war
through a decapitation strike on North Korea’s leadership. According to Shin,
this revelation hastened Kim’s ICBM program. Shin suggests Kim consciously
engaged in a war of words with President Donald Trump to justify a nuclear
ICBM and to buy time to complete it.
Shin faults Trump for resurrecting Nixon’s madman theory, the coercion
of an adversary by means of establishing one’s own volatility. He adds he wrote the
book to refute the idea that Kim is “crazy.” At the outset, Shin assails the analysis
of the late Jerrold Post for overdiagnosing Kim’s apparent malignant narcissism.
Shin attests “certainty in psychoanalysis remains elusive.” But perhaps Shin
would agree it is unclear whether foreign affairs specialists using other
(non-psychoanalytic) tools could identify the underpinnings of Kim’s
actions, either.
Compulsion to relinquish nuclear weapons may never take effect on Kim,
but surely few national security professionals assume the North Korean dictator
is non compos mentis. For this reason, “madman” seems a straw man. For instance,
Shin implies then-National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster believed Kim
was insane because McMaster opined classical deterrence theory would not
apply to Kim. McMaster, however, was counting on Kim’s rationality and hoped
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to muster “maximum pressure” to convince Kim to reconsider the risks of nuclear
weapons and initiate serious diplomatic talks.
In the final case, Shin highlights statecraft that led to a diplomatic stalemate
with the United States. Kim sought to reveal the futility of America’s goal
of “Final and Fully Verifiable Denuclearization.” (Not without a touch
of hypocrisy: the short-term possibility of accomplishing a goal does not determine
the ultimate outcome, as Kim surely believes of reunification.)
Despite the policy implications of these case studies, Shin skirts
a consideration of arms control talks based on the concept of “denuclearizing the
Korean Peninsula.” The sound reasoning of taking modest step-by-step measures
is embedded in the Biden-Harris administration policy. South Korean President
Yoon Suk-Yeol also hopes to induce North Korean nuclear concessions with new
economic development promises. But this challenge remains: would sanctions
relief, in exchange for dismantling the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex, help or hinder
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs?

In the end, to know Kim Jong-Un’s strategy is not to be able to forecast
his every move, but to avoid underestimating him. A close read of Shin’s book will
make it easier to understand Kim and almost impossible to underestimate him.

Blood, Metal, and Dust:
How Victory Turned into Defeat in Afghanistan and Iraq
By Ben Barry
Reviewed by Dr. John A. Nagl, associate professor of warfighting studies, US Army War College

B

lood, Metal, and Dust is a military history of the wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq focused on the roles of the
United States and her closest ally, the United Kingdom.
The author, Ben Barry, served as an infantry officer in
Bosnia and as Director of the British Army Staff before
joining the International Institute of Strategic Studies
over a decade ago. Since then, he has studied and written
about contemporary history and served as the primary
author of a classified study of the British Army’s role in
Iraq’s stabilization. That work informed Barry’s new book,
in which the ex-infantry officer pulls few punches.

New York: Osprey
Publishing, 2020
528 pages
$30.00

In this stunning compendium of lessons learned, Barry analyzes why the
overwhelming early successes of the US-led coalitions in toppling the Taliban
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in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq turned to “dust” in the face
of persistent insurgencies. Throughout the book, Barry notes how many Western
tactical victories resulted in strategic failure.
Barry telegraphs his sentiments through the book’s subtitle, How Victory Turned
into Defeat in Afghanistan and Iraq. He argues with conviction that “for all the
blood and money expended since 9/11, the US and its allies did not win the war
in Iraq and have failed in the longer term to achieve almost all of their objectives
in Afghanistan” (14). The book, published before the end of the Western military
campaign in Afghanistan, contains the prescient prediction “an emboldened
Taliban could well overwhelm the current Afghan government and its forces,
imposing a victors’ peace that would give it the ability to reverse much of the last
two decades of socio-political development” (14).
If the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan proved unpopular in the United States,
then they were hated in the United Kingdom—particularly Operation Telic
(the British code name for the Iraq War). Barry notes the British military’s
trepidation concerning a shift in public opinion. He highlights the tension
between spheres: “the army’s key leadership was worried that the effect of fighting
two unpopular wars at the same time might so greatly damage the army to the
extent that after the wars ended, it might not be able to recover its capability
and its reputation” (325). This became a particular concern after British troops in
Afghanistan engaged in heavy fighting in the Helmand province in 2006, during
part of a larger shift of emphasis from Iraq to Afghanistan mirrored by the United
States. The public mind indeed quickly soured towards the largest deployment
of British troops since the Persian Gulf War, and both campaigns disaffected
the British.
Writing with unsparing prose and conveying inarguable lessons, Barry could
republish his outstanding final chapter, “Bloody Lessons,” as a profitable standalone article to raise hackles on this side of the Atlantic. Barry notes, with a
decidedly un-British willingness to point out mistakes made by its larger ally,
“the late 2001 failure to encircle and isolate the Al Qaida fighters in the Tora
Bora mountains allowed the movement a better opportunity to reconstitute itself
than if the US attack had been better planned and led” (462). In the wake of US
troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, reflection on the early missed opportunity
for success at Tora Bora should caution strategists to take full advantage of
opportunities when they present themselves in conflict, if only to prevent future
vulnerabilities.
Barry brutally denounces the 2003 American invasion of Iraq as “the worst
military decision of the 21st century” and even calls it “military strategic folly
on a level equal to that of Napoleon’s 1812 attack on Russia and Hitler’s 1941
attack on the Soviet Union” (464-65). Unlike those two gross strategic errors
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in Mackinder’s heartland, “Iraq administered no such massive attrition of the
military capabilities of the US and its allies. But it had an effect of similar strategic
magnitude—the significant loss of [US] legitimacy” (465). Mistakes made in Iraq
and Afghanistan have shaken America’s global leadership role and will reverberate
for generations.
Barry argues the “simplest explanation” for the strategic defeat of the
United States and her partners in both wars “is that the US government
of President Bush displayed insufficient strategic competence between 2002
and 2007” (484) as “[i]t took several years for President Bush to recognize that
the ends, ways and means being employed were inadequate” (485). The problem
mirrored itself on the other side of the Atlantic: “British contributions to the
first parts of the Iraq and Afghan wars were degraded by a lack of strategic
competence in London” (486). Of President Bush’s American counterpart,
British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Barry writes his “strategic leadership of Britain’s
role in both wars should be judged a failure” (487).
Barry doles out scathing criticism of American and British leaders,
but some belligerents did earn his praise. Unfortunately, those participants fought
on the other side. He calls Qassem Soleimani, then-commander of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard’s Quds Force, “the most successful strategic leader of the
wars” (488). He deems the Afghan Taliban and Iran “much more successful”
than the United States and her allies (509) and believes “Iran is the only nation
that can be judged to have succeeded in achieving its strategic aims in Iraq” (463).
Blood, Metal, and Dust is not a cheery read for Americans who care about
the high estimation of their country and hold the armed forces in high regard.
Given America’s tradition of widespread patriotism and love of its troops,
this book deserves a wide audience for a better understanding of—and foresight
to curtail—America’s weaknesses. Ben Barry has the courage to call out failures
of the American national security establishment. The lessons he lays out could
save lives and prevent strategic failure when America reencounters the inevitable
challenge of irregular warfare.
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Contributor’s Guidelines
Article Submissions
Content Requirements
Scope
Submissions to the US Army War College Press must address strategic issues regarding
US defense policy or the theory and practice of land warfare while exhibiting the highest
standards of research and scholarship. Actionable strategic, policy, or instructional
recommendations must be included. For more information, visit https://press.armywarcollege.edu.

Audience
US Army War College graduates, other senior military officers, policymakers, and members
of academia concerned with national security affairs.

Clearance
Members of the US military and employees of the US Department of Defense must provide
a memo from the local Public Affairs Office stating a submission is appropriate for public release
(see AR 360-1, ch. 6).

Concurrent Submissions
Submissions must not be available on the Internet or be under consideration with other
publishers until the author receives notification the submission will not be published or until the
work is published through the US Army War College Press.

Formatting Requirements
Length
Monographs (accepted from USAWC faculty and staff only): 20,000 words (15,000-word
main text, 5,000 words in the foreword anwd executive summary).
Articles: 5,000 words or less.
Commentaries: 2,500 to 3,000 words.
Book reviews: 800 to 1,000 words.

File Type
Text must be provided in a single MS Word document (.doc).
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Visual Aids
Charts, graphs, and photographs may be provided to clarify or amplify the text. Tables must
be presented in the body of the Word document. Microsoft-generated charts and graphs must
be submitted in Excel. And photos must be provided as .jpg images of not more than 9MB
(at 300 dpi). If any table, chart, graph, or photograph has been previously published, written
permission from the copyright holder to republish the content must be included with the submission.

Citations
Use the Chicago Manual of Style format to document sources. Indicate all quoted material by
quotation marks or indentation. Reduce the number of footnotes to the minimum consistent
with honest acknowledgement of indebtedness, consolidating notes where possible. Lengthy
explanatory footnotes are discouraged and will be edited.

Submission Requirements
Address
usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil

Include
For each contributor, provide the following information: full name, mailing address, phone number,
e-mail address, areas of expertise, and a brief biography or curriculum vitae.
Attach all files, including graphics.
For book reviews, include the author, editor, or translator’s name, the book’s title, the publisher,
and the publication date.
Abstract requirements, approximately 200 words, including the following information:
a. What is the thesis/main argument of the piece in one sentence?
b. How does this piece differ from what has already been published on the topic?
c. What methodology and sources are/will be used?
d. Why will this piece be of interest or useful to the readers of the USAWC Press, who are
mainly policy and military practionners?

Timelines
Receipt
Please allow 1 business day for confirmation of receipt.

Review
Articles: 4 to 6 weeks.
Monographs (accepted from US Army War College faculty and staff only): 10 to 12 weeks.
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Transit Center at Manas, Kyrgyzstan
US Army soldiers get as comfortable as they can as they prepare to fly a C-17 Globemaster III
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